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The acquisition of major weapons systems is an
extremely complex process involving many highly interrelated
individual operations, each critical to the completion of the
final product. This thesis is an examination of the Patrol
Frigate Acquisition Project through the development of a
series of eight case studies around the major problems that
have confronted the program during the initial stages of the
procurement life cycle. The case studies are designed
primarily for use in graduate level systems acquisition
management courses of instruction. Although the cases are
intended for use in series, substantial background information
has been included in each case to allow separate and
individual analysis. The case subjects include project
planning, DCP/DSARC, cost estimating, ship specifications,
centralized procurement, contracting, Ship Project Directives,
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The acquisition of major systems is an extremely complex
process involving many highly interrelated individual opera-
tions, each critical to the completion of the final product.
A prominent technique used in the acquisition of these systems
is called Project Management. This well-known concept holds
that by having one individual charged with the coordination
of the management and financial direction of the acquisition
of a system, significant reductions in cost, procurement,
production and delivery times can be realized. Within the
Naval Ship Systems Command a number of Ship Acquisition Project
Managers (SHAPM's) for both ship and system acquisitions, have
been established and are currently functioning.
The objectives of this thesis were to investigate and
analyze the Patrol Frigate (PF) Ship Acquisition Program and
to develop case studies around the major problems that have
confronted the Ship Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM) during
the initial stages of the PF procurement life cycle. The
case studies, are designed primarily for use in graduate level
systems acquisition management courses of instruction.
Although the cases are intended for use in series, substantial
background information has been included in each case to allow
separate and individual analysis.

The Patrol Frigate Ship Acquisition Program was chosen
because of the availability of information, the cooperation
extended by the Project Office, and the several unique
features of the acquisition program itself which lend appli-
cation to other types of major acquisition programs such as
aircraft and missiles. One notable feature is the "fly before
buy" concept. The PF is also the first major acquisition
program to come under the auspices of DODI 5000.1. Since the
project was still in the detail design phase and the lead
ship contract had not been let, the cases were limited to
situations occurring prior to this milestone in the procure-
ment life cycle.
The case method of instruction was chosen since it appeared
to be the best method for in-depth study and analysis of
individual problems and decisions occurring in the realm of
project management. Part of the learning process is utilizing
information in a way which will get participants personally
involved in taking responsibility for action in one after
another of concrete situations of things, people, and events.
It is a method of getting at the strategic point of action,
from which one may call on any and all relevant science and
knowledge to develop "maximum thrust with minimum side
effects" toward the goals for which the project manager must
take responsibility.
The learning of project management is a unique process,
unlike the learning of almost any other field. In general
there is no vast body of laws and theories to be passed on to

the student. Instead, there is a body of principles whose
application in a number of situations must be conveyed.
The instructor in a project management course typically
has some ideas and experience with the subject for which he
is responsible. Enlarging one's understanding of subjects in
project management does not necessarily follow the same proc-
ess of isolation and control as in the subjects of laboratory
science. The process is more one of clarifying the strategic
elements in the specific situation involving the subject.
The use of the term "case" is so widespread, ranging from
the medical case to the law case to the business case to the
social worker's case, that it is necessary to establish the
meaning for which the term is used here. The term "case"
shall be meant as a description of a situation or problem
actually faced by a manager, and requiring analysis, decision
and the planning of a course of action. However, the decision
may be to delay a decision and a planned course of action may
be to take no action.
Furthermore, there is a need to distinguish between the
use of cases and the "case method". Cases may be used in
many ways. After certain principles have been presented by
lecture or assigned reading, a case may be assigned students
for reading and the instructor may then lecture upon the ways
in which the principles may be applied to the case. Or the
students may be asked to try to apply the principles to the
case as an exercise. Both of these practices would use cases;
Neither would be the use of the case method.
s

The case method for our purposes is defined as the student
discussion of a sequence of cases planned to develop within
the students (1) an understanding of the principal problems
of importance to the project manager in the field of activity
they are studying, (2) some proficiency in producing useful
ideas about ways of effectively handling the kinds of problems
studied and (3) good judgment in deciding on one and in plan-
ning its effective execution by the project organization.
As a means of conveying knowledge the case method may
seem disorderly and unstructured. Ideas come to the student
from the data of case facts and from the discussion of them,
as students and instructor all argue among themselves and
challenge and support and explore each others' ideas of the
pertinence of particular facts, the influence of particular
considerations, the contribution of new data derived from the
presented material after analysis or calculation, and the
importance of various factors. The ideas come by experience,
in whatever order events occur. However, an invisible
structure usually underlies the apparent randomness, and
the previous development of this structure through the
writing, selection and sequencing of the cases, is one of
the major contributions of the case writers. Without a
structural basis, a case becomes meaningless, since the
underlying theme and broad points will not be effectively
conveyed.
This structuring is what has been attempted by the
authors in these case analyses of the PF . The situations and

resulting problems facing a project office of a major system
acquisition have been collected, organized and presented for
analysis by the student to illustrate the "real life"
applications of the principles he has been studying.
Perhaps the most important feature of the case method for
training project managers is that it is situational, for the
project manager is always dealing with a situation. The
project manager never enjoys the economists' "long run," he
works always in the short run. He never enjoys the pleasure
of "other things remaining equal," for him they never do.
Each problem is affected by the traditions of the organization
in which it arises, the practices of the profession involved,
the characteristics of the individuals concerned, and the
relationships among the key program officers and civilian
personnel. The project manager does not and cannot live in
the generalized world of the scholar; he lives in a particu-
larized world at a particular time with particular people,
places and situations. Through its presentation of a long
series of related situations, discussed under the knowledge-
able guidance of the instructor as case leader, the case




II. PATROL FRIGATE ACQUISITION PROJECT HISTORY
At the time of conception of the Patrol Frigate (PF)
class ship, the Navy was in the process of the first large
scale fleet renewal program since World War II. It was fore-
seen that the overdue deactivation. of the remaining obsolete
World War II destroyers would result in escort levels which
would fall short of that needed in the 198 0-time frame, even
with deliveries from the DD-963, Nuclear Frigate (DLGN-58)
,
and DE-1052 class programs.
In light of this realization and with consideration of
the viggrous and ambitious effort of the U.S.S.R. in the
modernization of the Soviet Navy, the Navy was pressed on two
accounts: a need for rapid replacement of over-age ships and
the acquisition of new ships of requisite quality and capability
to cope with the Soviet threat.
In September 1970, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
initiated a new destroyer type feasibility study "to examine
a new class ship with relatively simple equipments and few
complex Integrated hard- and software systems." The study
objectives were:
1. To define ship characteristics and performance require-
ments in relation to missions and tasks; and
2. To examine alternative program costs in depth and with
definite cost ceilings imposed.

By early 1971, the Navy was convinced that, subject to
availability of funds, it could build an affordable yet
effective ship, and CNO approved initiation of a conceptual
design phase to explore the PF mission and design assumptions
in greater detail. The Naval Ship Engineering Center (NACSEC)
immediately began the first phase of Preliminary Design under
the direction of the Naval Ships Systems Command (NAVSHIPS)
PF Project Manager. CNO then used these design studies to
further define the ship's characteristics.
The mission of the PF is to alleviate the urgent need for
large numbers of capable but less expensive ships for the sea
control mission of the Navy. The Navy expressed belief that
convoy-type protection would continue to be essential into the
1980 's and beyond. This relatively low-cost ship would then
join the DD-963 and other open ocean escort programs by
replacing the aging World War II escorts in supporting under-
way replenishment groups, amphibious assault groups, and mili-
tary and merchant convoys
.
The PF is planned to be an essential element in the anti-
submarine warfare capability of the escort force. It is
designed to weather attacks of various types of anti-shipping
missiles and torpedoes, both for self protection and the
defense of the escorted forces. In short, the ships are to
have a three-fold capability:
1. Detect and attack submarines both at long and short
ranges and decoy a launched torpedo away from its
target;
2. Destroy anti-shipping missiles launched from submarines,
aircraft or surface ships; and
10

3. Launch its own anti-shipping missiles against surface
targets
.
The PF was envisioned as an extremely capable medium ship,
but designed for the lower end of the naval warfare spectrum,
i.e., use in low threat areas. The ship would not have a
requirement to escort carrier task forces and, therefore,
would have a much simpler command and control system. Also,
it would not have a requirement for amphibious gunfire
support. In short it was designed to supplement and comple-
other destroyer type forces.
The unique factor of the proposed PF acquisition is the
element of cost. Reduced cost was to be a major driving
factor in the PF project. For the first time ever, the Navy
was literally designing to a price, a firm cost threshold,
while still requiring adequate ship effectiveness. The CNO
stated, "In order to attain our goal in a minimum time,
during a period of diminishing budgets, we are adapting many
new practices and policies both in the operational and
administrative fields." The progress of the PF program with
these innovations is an excellent example to monitor as the
Navy .intends to produce a relatively large number of dollar-
constrained ships to achieve a limited mission.
Although several of the technical features of the PF
design are classified their relation to the procurement
analysis is not significant and, therefore, will not be
mentioned. The essential features of the PF design are




PATROL FRIGATE TECHNICAL FEATURES
DESIGN FEATURES
Length Overall 440 Feet
Beam 45 Feet
Navigational Draft 23 Feet
Full Load Displacement 3400 Tons
Sustained Speed 28 Knots
Endurance >4000 NM @ 20
Knots
CONSTRAINTS
Cost $45. 7 M*
Displacement 3400 Tons
Accommodations 185 Total
* Average follow ship cost, FY 73 dollars
12

In addition to these requirements several constraints are
imposed. A price ceiling for the follow ships was established
at $45.7 million. The full load displacement was not to exceed
3400 tons. Finally, the crew (Officer and Enlisted) was not to
exceed 185. These figures were constraints not goals. They
were upper limits, not to be exceeded, and lowered if possible.
The design philosophy was that if a constraint was exceeded,
then some other features or equipment on the ship had to be
reduced or eliminated. In fact such a trade-off was necessary
when a second helicopter was added to the design.
With these goals and constraints in mind the procurement
planning of the PF class was initiated. The PF Ship acqui-
sition Project was set up under NAVSHIPS as PMS 399 with
Captain E.J. Otth, USN as Ship Acquisition Project Manager
(SHAPM) . The initial project organization is depicted in
Figure 2. Three of the four major operating divisions were
of a conventional nature. They were:
1. Management, which included cost control, financial
matters, planning and scheduling, and appraisal and
reporting;
2. Procurement and production, which included cost of
Government Furnished Equipment, configuration management,
production planning, and installation and test manage-
ment; and,
3. Integrated logistics support, which included personnel
and training, maintenance planning and supply support,
and data management.
The fourth major organizational group was in the technical
area and was handled differently. The principal technical
assistant to the SHAPM was Captain John Orem as Ship System
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organization as previously depicted, and one in NAVSEC
.
Figure 3 summarizes both the NAVSEC functional organization
and the NAVSEC PF Project Office organization. The PF Ship
Design Manager reported directly to Captain Orem and was
responsible for directing the PF Ship System Design effort
of NAVSEC through the PF Task Group Managers. The Task Group
Managers, in their respective discipline areas, worked
through the NAVSEC functional organization. The result was
a functional matrix organization.
The features of the procurement plan are presented in
Figure 4 and indicate the major acquisition phases of the
procurement program. The Ships System Design (SSD) would be
developed by NAVSEC and defined in a series of four technical
nbaselines. The two parts of the Conceptual Phase were to
establish the PF Functional Baseline prior to DSARC 1. After
approval of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and based on
proposals submitted in response to the Navy's RFP, two ship-
builders were to be awarded Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) con-
tracts for SSD support. One of the shipbuilders would be
designated as the lead shipbuilder and do the Detailed Design.
This shipbuilder will be referred to as Shipbuilder (or
Contractor) A and the other design support contractor will be
referred to as Shipbuilder B.
After the awards, development of the Preliminary Allocated
Baseline would commence. Shipbuilders A and B would assist
in design reviews and special studies concentrating principally
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covered as well. This phase would be terminated at DSARC
2.
Following review and comment on the Preliminary Allocated
Baseline by Shipbuilders A and B and participating Naval
activities, NAVSEC would prepare the Lead Ship Allocated Base-
line. This baseline would be the technical basis for the
lead ship production contract. Shipbuilder B would not
participate beyond the establishment of the Lead Ship Allo-
cated baseline. He could, however, compete for the follow
ship awards.
At an appropriate time, possibly before but not later
than award of the lead ship production contract, Shipbuilder
A would be authorized to proceed with Detail Design, depend-
ing upon the availability of funds and the technical progress
to date. Approximately 18 months after establishment of the
Lead Ship Allocated Baseline, NAVSEC would establish the
.Follow Ship Allocated Baseline to serve as the basis for the
follow ship production contracts. In preparing the Follow
Ship Allocated Baseline, NAVSEC would utilize information
derived from the Detail Design.
A more detailed look at the conception of Shipbuilders
A and B and their support of NAVSEC in SSD is presented in
Figure 5. This flow chart indicates the inter-relationship
of the SSD support contract line items, or tasks. It should
be noted that the horizontal time based scale is not linear.
Figure 6 presents the procurement plan on a time scale with
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proposals, contracts were awarded to Bath Iron Works Corpo-
ration as Shipbuilder A and Todd Shipyards Corporation as
Shipbuilder B.
Contracts for the follow ship procurements were tenta-
tively to be in two batches of 24 and 25 each over a five
year period. Awards were to be given to three yards on a
competitive basis. Ship deliveries would be at the rate of
about one per month. Figure 7 depicts the procurement plan
for contract award and ship production.
A primary innovative concept of the PF procurement plan
was the combination of proper lead/follow ship phasing,
extensive land-base testing, and detail-design validation
before extended application. This concept then would fulfill
the intent of prototyping the design. Long delays inherent
in prototyping would be avoided in the total-program ship
acquisition, while allowing reasonable establishment of the










































III. SUMMARY OF THE CASES
A time-phased diagram of the PF procurement life cycle
indicating the chronological progression of the cases is
presented in Figure 8. A brief description of each case
follows.
A. PROJECT PLANNING CASE
This is a two-part case dealing with early long range
planning of an acquisition project. The analysis made in this
case should result in the determination of appropriate pro-
curement methods for the project.
The first part of the case is a consideration of the
various procurement alternatives and an application of
analysis techniques in order to determine procurement
methods to be used.
The second section of the case requires the preparation
of the Advanced Procurement Plan for the project using the
results of the above analysis and other data supplied.
B. DCP/DSARC CASE
This case investigates the roles of the Development
Concept Paper (DCP) and the Defense System Acquisition Review
Council (DSARC) in the procurement life cycle of a major
weapons system. The current DCP/DSARC process as formally
stated in DOD Directive 5000.1 of July 13, 1971 is reviewed
and analyzed. The DCP/DSARC process applicable to the
23

Patrol Frigate (PF) is presented, and the unique problems
associated with conventional hull ship acquisition programs
are discussed. Alternative proposals to the present DCP/
DSARC process are considered. The student is required to
prepare an outline for a DCP and a DSARC presentation.
C. COST ESTIMATING CASE
This case deals with budget cost estimating for the
Patrol Frigate (PF) as an example of costing in a major
acquisition project. The analysis made in this case should
demonstrate some of the problems of early budget estimating,
the use of cost estimating relationships and other techniques,
and the accuracy involved in these tasks.
D. SHIP SPECIFICATION CASE
This case investigates the concept of ship acquisition
specification. The first part of the case explains how tech-
nical requirements are made known to ship designers and ship-
builders through the medium of specifications. Problems in
obtaining the proper mix of performance-type and design-type
specifications to meet requirements of each step of the
Patrol Frigate procurement cycle are considered. Although
specifically addressing ship specifications, this same
general problem exists for other systems. The second part
of the case involves a review and an analysis of two separate
specification package proposals. The student is required to
determine the advantages and disadvantages of each specifica-




E. CENTRALIZED PROCUREMENT CASE
In shipbuilding a substantial fraction of the total cost
is due to equipment installed on the ship by the builder.
This equipment falls into two general classifications:
that equipment which is furnished by the government for
installation by the builder is called Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) or Government Furnished Material (GFM) ; that
equipment which is not furnished by the government is
procured by the builder for installation and is referred to
as non-GFE or non-GFM. This case deals with the problems
regarding procurement of this latter type of equipment, non-
GFE, for the Patrol Frigate (PF) acquisition. These problems
are complicated by the production of the follow-ships of the
class in a number of shipyards and the desire to procure the
equipment using a central agency.
F. LEAD SHIP PRODUCTION CONTRACT CASE
This is a two-part case dealing with the structuring
decisions for the lead ship production contract for the
Patrol Frigate (PF) . This contract, while basically a
production contract, has development characteristics because
of the nature of lead ship production. The use of options
and incentives are considered.
The first part of the case deals, essentially, with
long range planning of the contract structure while the second
part introduces a few of the more complex problems which had
to be dealt with as the time of award of the contract
approached. 25

It is recommended that students consider Part A of the
case first and without knowledge of Part B. Once they are
satisfied with their analysis of Part A r then the complications
of Part B will present interesting sidelights into program
management.
G. SHIP PROJECT DIRECTIVE CASE
This case investigates the role of the Ship Project
Directive (SPD) in the management of a major ship acquisition
project. The major aspects of NAVSHIPS SPD Instruction
(7000. 29B) are reviewed and summarized. Relationships
between the Ship Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM) and the
Secondary Managers are discussed. Problems encountered with
SHAPM primacy, reporting requirements, cost estimates and
financial reports, funding deficiencies and changes, and
timing of initial SPD preparation are cited. The student is
required to analyze these problems and prepare recommendations
for their correction.
H. TEST AND EVALUATION CASE
This case investigates the Operational Test and Evalu-
ation (OT&E) process in the procurement life cycle of the
Patrol Frigate. The case studies some of the recent changes
in test and evaluation concepts brought about by the recom-
mendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel and DODI 5000.1.
The initial Patrol Frigate test and evaluation plan is
reviewed and then contrasted with the two alternative plans.
Major issues concerning Land Based Test Sites, whole-ship
26

Initial Operational Test and Evaluation, and number of
shipyards to be used are considered. The student is required
to develop his own test and evaluation plan for the Patrol
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This is a two-part case dealing with early long range
planning of an acquisition project. The analysis made in
this case should result in the determination of appropriate
procurement methods for the project.
The first part of the case is a consideration of the
various procurement alternatives and an application of
analysis techniques in order to determine procurement methods
to be used.
The second section of the case requires the preparation
of the Advanced Procurement Plan for the project using the
results of the above analysis and other data supplied.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives for the student considering this case
are
:
1. To gain understanding of the principles of procurement
planning.
2. To understand the Department of Defense and Navy
requirements for advanced procurement planning.
3. To apply some of the analysis techniques used in
advanced procurement planning.
4. To gain insight into the role of the project manager




Advanced Procurement (AP) planning may be defined as a
series of decisions directed to the integration of procure-
ment, technical, and financial plans during the weapon system
acquisition cycle. The goal of AP planning is to obtain a
successful weapon system, in a timely manner, at the lowest
total cost to the Navy. This is accomplished by the docu-
mentation, at an early point in time, of the long range
contractual method or methods which will be utilized for the
procurement by contract of both the development and production
of an individual item or system.
The project manager is responsible for AP planning and
for the preparation and approval of the Advance Procurement
Plan (APP) that documents his planning. This responsibility
may not be delegated, although assistance from a variety of
disciplines is available including requirements, technical,
financial, ILS, legal as well as procurement personnel.
Project managers must, therefore, be familiar with the pro-
curement techniques and methods for accomplishing the project
at lowest total cost commensurate with the Navy's require-
ments. They must be aware of general considerations such as
competition, contract type, source selection, and so forth,




An APP is the documentation of the project manager's
efforts in AP planning. Its format and content requirements
are prescribed in ASPR 1-2100, Advance Procurement Planning.
Essentially it is a description of the analysis made in the
planning, a listing of the procurement goals and objectives
for the project and a milestone schedule.
A critical part of every APP is the milestone chart.
These milestones focus attention on the time element required
to achieve the proposed procurement objectives. The key
milestones may differ to some degree in each procurement,
reflecting the particular circumstances or conditions of that
procurement; but, the critical milestones of each program
that effect the procurement actions require identification
and inclusion in the plan.
D. REQUIREMENTS
The requirement for the first part of this case is to
perform the analysis required and define the ship procurement
method. The objectives of the analysis are:
1. To analyze current methods of ship procurement.
2. To select the method must appropriate for acquisition
of PF ships.
3. To develop the method into a procurement plan.
Minimal initial constraints of two kinds are imposed on
the analysis: explicit and implicit. The explicit
constraints derived from the program objectives and prior




1. The lead ship production contract was to be awarded in
the fiscal year identified in the program plans.
2. Shipbuilder input was to be obtained early in the design
process.
3. Only private (not naval) shipyards were to be considered
for production.
4. The ASW lead ship was to precede the AAW ship, but both
were to be produced by the same shipbuilder. (This
constraint lost practical significance when the
decision was made to drop the ASW version.)
5. The procurement plan must be compatible with funding
plans under consideration.
The principal implicit constraint is that the recommended
procurement plan has to comply with the ASPR and existing DOD
and Navy directives.
The following major factors are to be considered in
evaluating alternative approaches to the procurement:
1. Feasibility of awarding the lead ship production con-
tract by the date desired.
2. Provision for maximum competition for follow ships
under a multi-year approach.
3. Provision for standardization' of ships built at dif-
ferent yards.
4. Provision for Navy participation during contract design.
5. Provision for follow yard review of the evolving
contract design.
6. Availability of timely and accurate information for
follow ship construction.
7. Provision for ensuring that selected shipbuilders
especially the lead ship builder, are thoroughly




Four major criteria are to be used in the selection of
alternative methods of procurement:
1. Schedule . The strongly expressed desire of the Navy
to achieve an earlier than ususal award of the lead
ship production contract was of paramount importance.
2. Program Cost Credibility . Two governing considerations
in the selection of an approach to the PF procurement
were the requirements (i) to have realistic estimates
of program costs at the time the contract for the lead
ship is awarded and (ii) to procure all ships at a
cost equal to or less than that estimated.
3. Contractor Assumption of Responsibility for Performance .
The procurement process for the PF Program was to
place a major part of the responsibility for ultimate
ship performance on the contractor , with the Navy
retaining a high degree of control over the ship's
technical design.
4. Acceptability . The procurement method selected was to
be acceptable not only to those who must approve the
program for the government but also to those within
industry who must respond within the framework of the
government approval action.
The first step in the analysis has been completed. The
major procurement-oriented considerations that Navy manage-
ment must address have been identified. Eight major factors
have been defined and are shown in Figure 1. The options
open to management decision at each point have been deter-
mined and are listed with the decision.
As indicated in Figure 1 , ship design and ship system
engineering were considered as a singly decision area with
six options. Support engineering planning was a separate
decision area with three associated options. Since the
options in these two decision areas are relatively independent,
the number of possible combinations is six times three, or




OPTIONS OPEN FOR MANAGEMENT DECISION
DECISION AREA OPTIONS
1. Type of Specification Performance
Design (Construction)
2. Ship Design and Ship . NAVSEC
System Engineering








tion for lead ship,
followed by competition
for follow ships
Industry, with one compe-
tition for lead ship plus
some follow ships
Industry for design and
system engineering only,
• with subsequent competi-
tion for both lead and
follow ships










4 . Program Management Navy with outside as-
sistance
Contractor (different
from that used in deci-
sion areas 2 and 3, if
used at all)
Contractor (same as that
used in decision areas 2
and 3, if used at all)













7. Production Options One yard to produce all
ships
One yard to produce lead
ship plus some follow
ships; yards for remain-
ing follow ships
One yard for lead ship;
yards for follow ships,
possibly awarded at
intervals





For the purpose of further analysis, the elements that
make up the 18 possible combinations remaining were arrayed
in the form of a decision tree, as shown in Figure 2. The
six options or alternative sources for ship design and ship
system engineering are shown in the left column and are
referred to as branches. The three options or sources for
accomplishment of support engineering planning—any one of
which can be chosen with each of the six options for ship
design and ship system engineering—are shown repetitively
in the right column, referred to as limbs. The three lower
branches (left column) that show industry performance of ship
design and ship system engineering also indicate the general
method of procurement for production of lead and follow
ships. This is because these methods differentiate the way
in which industry would perform in the design role.
Working from the top down on Figure 2 , each combination
of branches and limbs was examined for the purpose of elimi-
nating the options that were not viable. It was concluded
that NAVSEC alone could not handle both ship design and ship
system engineering because:
1. NAVSEC' s current and prospective work load is such
that there would not be sufficient manpower and other
resources to cover so much additional work.
2. NAVSEC probably lacks sufficient detailed knowledge and
historical data to perform the work at the level estab-
lished by its own standards. Accordingly, this top
branch and its limbs, a total of three combinations,
were eliminated.
Similar reasons dictated against the second branch and
its top limb which add support engineering planning to ship




PROCUREMENT OPTIONS FOR SHIP SYSTEM DESIGN,
SHIP SYSTEM ENGINEERING, AND SUPPORT ENGINEERING PLANNING
Alternative Sources
for Ship Design and
System Engineering:
NAVSEC










NAVSEC With Outside Assistance
Other Contractor (s) Reporting toNAVSHIPS
Naval Activities Other Than NAVSEC
Industry, With Compe-
tition for Lead Ships;
Followed by Competi-
tion for Follow Ships
Industry, With One
NAVSEC With Outside Assistance
Other Contractor (s) Reporting to NAVSHIPS
Naval Activities Other Than NAVSEC
NAVSEC With Outside Assistance
Other Contractor (s) Reporting to NAVSHIPS
Naval Activities Other Than NAVSEC
NAVSEC With Outside Assistance
Other Contractor (s) Reporting to NAVSHIPS
Naval Activities Other Than NAVSEC
Competition for Lead
Ship Plus Some Follow
Ships
Industry for Design
NAVSEC With Outside Assistance
Other Contractor (s) Reporting to NAVSHIPS
Naval Activities Other Than NAVSEC
NAVSEC With Outside Assistance
Other Contractor (s) Reporting to NAVSHIPS
and System Engineering^! Naval Activities Other Than NAVSEC
Only; with Subsequent
Competition for Both
Lead and Follow Ships
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the burden of this design effort would be an unnecessary
strain on NAVSEC's resources—even with assistance. Therefore,
this branch/limb combination was eliminated, although the two
other limbs on that branch were left for further consideration.
Any combination of ship design and .ship system engineering
which was to be performed by industry using Navy facilities
other than NAVSEC for support engineering planning was
eliminated from the remaining branches. It was concluded
that neither a design agent nor a shipbuilder could exert
the necessary control over or establish (within the time
required) the necessary interface with Navy facilities to
.ensure that the work would be done efficiently and
expeditiously.
These eliminations left only ten of the 18 possible
combinations mentioned above. At this point in the analysis,
each of the ten combinations was considered in relation to
the type of specification that might be used in the PF pro-
gram: a performance-type specification, a design-type ^^—
specification, or a mix of the two. While the type of
specification used does bear on the method of ship system




The second requirement of this case is the preparation of
the APP for the PF. The Student is to now assume the role of
Project Manager. Much of the information needed for this task
has been developed in the previous analysis. The remainder of
the information required is presented in Enclosure (1) to
this case. Included as Enclosure (2) is the ASPR, Article
1-2100 Advance Procurement Planning and as Enclosure (3) is
the NPD, Article 1-2100 Advance Procurement Planning. These







Summation of procurement data.
ASPR, Article 1-2100, Advance Procurement
Planning
NPD, Article 1-2100, Advance Procurement
Planning
Example Advance Procurement Plan for the
SUNLAMP Missile System (fictitious example





SUMMARY OF PROCUREMENT DATA
1. The objectives of the Patrol Frigate (PF) Program are to
define ship characteristics and performance requirements to
minimize ship size and cost consistent with mission require-
ments, to estimate total program costs with accuracy, and to
produce the PF ships at or below the program cost estimates.
2. The mission of the PF is to supplement and replace existing
and planned ASW and AAW escort ships in protection of amphib-
ious forces, underway replenishment groups, and military or
mercantile convoys against air, surface or submarine threats.
3. The PF characteristics are as follows:
Length at waterline 4 30 feet
Beam 4 3.7 feet
Full load displacement 3400 tons
Sustained speed 28.1 knots
Propulsion gas turbine
Propeller shafts single
4. Funding for the total 50-ship procurement is based on the
following schedule:
FY 7 3 7 4 75 7 6 77 7 8 7 9
Ships 1 3 7 12 12 12 3
5. All PF ships will be constructed by private yards.
Competitive selection of a shipbuilder for the lead ship, to
participate in the ship system design with NAVSEC , is planned
for February 1972, followed by the award of the FY 1973 lead
ship construction contract to that shipbuilder in February
1973. Multi-year contracts for the remaining 49 ships will
40

be awarded in June 1974 to three competitively-selected
shipbuilders, one of which may be the lead yard.
6. Other major milestones are as follows:
Release RFP for SSD 11-71
NAVSEC Start SSD 11-71
Shipbuilder Start SSD 2-72
Start LLT GFE Buys 6-72
Start Detail Design 6-72
Deliver Lead Ship 12-76
Deliver First Follow Ship 4-78
Deliver Last Follow Ship 4-82
It is planned that the lead ship will.be 32 months in
construction and the follow ships will require 28 months
initially, improving with learning to 24 months. With three
yards at work, with concurrent contract detail design by the
lead yard, and with prior year advance material procurement,
it is expected that a ship delivery rate of one ship per
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Part 21—Advance Procurement Planning
1-2100 Advance Procurement (AP) Planning.
1-2100.1 General.
(a) Advance procurement (AP) planning is the means by which the
efforts of all personnel responsible for the procurement of defense material
by contract are coordinated as early as practicable in order to obtain re-
quired items of the requisite quality, on time, and at the lowest sound price.
It involves the prospective analysis of requirements and the documentation
of technical, business, policy, operational, and procurement considerations
into a comprehensive procurement plan. These considerations include all
operational requirements (time and mission goals) , technical objectives
(performance, reliability, etc.), economic factors (potential costs), use of
appropriate contract techniques, and compliance with procurement regula-
tions and policies. Potential conflicting interfaces and any resulting essen-
tial trade-off decisions must be recognized to accomplish a sound material
procurement program. In the planning phase, it is necessary to determine
what management systems will be required during the life of the
program. Planning for management of the acquisition should be included
in advanced procurement planning. (See 1-331.) Advance procurement
planning establishes and graphically portrays realistic milestones to be
met in achieving the goals of a specific program. The Advance Procure-
ment Plan (AP) serves as the principle long-range procurement planning
document charting the course of major procurement programs over their
life-cycle, keyed to the Department of Defense Five Year Defense Program.
(b) System/Project Management Plans comprise a total management
approach for acquiring a system or project intended to meet an approved
requirement. The AP Plan covers the contractual plans for acquiring such
a system or project.
(c) The development of the AP plan covering the contractual plan
shall include a best effort to plan for the use and establishment of neces-
sary facilities in or near sections of concentrated unemployment or under-
employment and areas of persistent or substantial labor surplus.
1-2100.2 Applicability.
(a) While the AP planning provided for herein applies to the more
complex and costly programs to procure hardware developed and produced
to satisfy the need for modern military equipment, its principles may also
be adapted to the procurement of all supplies and equipment. Although
some degree of AP planning is necessary to buy even shoes, subsistence, or
other common items of supply, the formal, complex, and detailed AP plan-
ning described herein is not applicable to such items. AP planning of the
character and scope provided for herein may cease at such time as
requirements are procured by means of formal advertising.
(b) AP Plans shall be prepared for negotiated hardware develop-
ment and production procurements in accordance with the guidelines set
forth in 1-2102, for:
(i) development procurements described in 4-101 (a) (3) through
(7) estimated at 5300,000 or more for any fiscal year; and
(ii) production procurements estimated at 51,000,000 or more for
any fiscal year.
However, this shall not be construed to require the preparation of an AP
Plan for an individual emergency procurement, negotiated pursuant to 3-
202, which is not already covered by an approved plan.
(c) Items governed by the Department of Defense High Dollar Spare
Parts Breakout Program (AR 715-22, NAVMATINST P4200.33A, MCO
P4200.13A, AFR 57-6, DSAM 4105.2) are not covered by this paragraph.
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1-2100.3 Initiation of Advance Procurement Planning.
(a) AP planning shall be initiated at the time the Technical Development
Plan (TDP) is initiated, which normally is upon entrance into the advanced
development category of research and development effort as discussed in 4-101
(a)(3). AP Plans shall be incorporated by reference in TDPs. Plans shall
be prepared at the time requirements become known, utilizing the Five Year
Defense Program and supporting information.
(b) AP Plans may be initiated as early as the exploratory development
stage where there is a reasonable expectancy of future procurements within
the dollar thresholds stated in paragraph 1-2100.2 (b)
.
1-21004 Responsibility for Preparation.
(a) The project manager, project officer, program director, or other
official responsible for the material program concerned is responsible for AP
planning and for the preparation of specific AP Plans, including the concur-
rent updating of the Plan with each program, budget or management decision
significantly affecting the Plan. This official will be supported by a project
team composed of the contracting officer or his designee, and cognizant engi-
neering, production, logistics, maintenance and other appropriate personnel.
(b) Each AP Plan shall be prepared in accordance with established mile-
stones of the program or project. An AP Plan should be updated at least
annually, beginning when the item appears in the shopping lists supporting
the budget estimates submitted by the President to the Congress each Janu-
ary for the ensuing fiscal year.
1-21GD.5 Approval. AP Plans shall be approved in accordance with
Departmental procedures.
1-2100.6 Sup-port for Determinations and Findings. AP Plans may be
used to support a determination and findings (D£F) to establish the author-
ity to negotiate a contract for supplies or services in accordance with 3-305.
When requirements are reasonably firm and no delay in processing the Plan
through the final approval actions is occasioned thereby, such D&F may be
initiated promptly after agreement has been reached by the planning team
on the complete AP Plan.
1-2101 Guidelines for Development of Advance Procurement Plans.
(a) To facilitate the attainment of procurement objectives, AP planning
must identify those milestones at which decisions should be made. An
appropriate time-phasing of the integral stages of the procurement must bo
included in the plan, identifying
:
(i) the research, development, and production stages;
(ii) the points at which a determination will be made as to the type
of documentation to be procured
;
(iii) the time of dolivery of a data package suitable for competitive
procurement
;
(iv) the point at which a review will be initiated to determine the
practicability of obtaining competition; and
(v) when feasible and appropriate, the time when competition can
be introduced either in the procurement of the overall system
or by the breakout of subsystems and components for direct
competitive procurement.
[The next page 1* 198.65]
fl 1-2101 ARMED SERVICES PROCUREMENT REGULATION
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A sample milestone chart is shown in 1-2102. AP Plans should also identify
the performance and reliability characteristics which must be attained by
the contractor and against which performance and reliability under incentive-
type contracts can be accurately measured.
(b) Certain requirements, technical, and funding decisions must be made
far ahead of the contracting phase of the procurement. The AP planning
efforts of all personnel engaged in the busines management of the procure-
ment process, that is, in the determination of requirements, development of a
technical data package, funding, contracting, or contract administration must
be coordinated. Personnel in the pre-contracting stage, as well as those in-
volved in actual processing of the procurement request, must be cognizant of
their responsibilities and participate fully in the development of AP Plans.
Individually and collectively they are responsible for the extensive AP Plan-
ning and preparations necessary to achieve the procurement objectives.
(c) AP Plans shall be prepared on an individual item basis or on a project
basis encompassing individual plans for one or more separate requirements
under the project. For new projects or individual item requirements, the
initial AP Plan will be developed and issued as concurrently as possible with
the applicable TDP and shall be incorporated in a section of the TDP. "When
the TDP is initiated, the project manager or project officer will commence
AP planning with the direct assistance of the contracting officer and the other
members of the project team. AP Plans shall be prepared substantially in ac-
cordance with the sample format set forth in 1-2102, adapting it to either a
project plan embracing many components, or to a single item, as appropriate.
"Where a project plan is utilized, the sections of the format shall be prepared,
in whole or in part, for each item or class of items in the project,
and one section for the integrated project itself. A complete plan would include
all the goods and services to be procured. Some parts of the plan may be very
detailed and some less detailed, as determined by relative complexity of pro-
curement, but the coverage would be comprehensive. A complete project plan
is considered essential to test the several parts of the project for consistency
and balance, e.g., to see that Government- furnished aviation equipment is
procured in adequate quantity to outfit airframes being procured.
(d) The project manager (or if there is no project manager, such other
official as may be designated by the Head of the Procuring activity) sup-
ported by a project team (to include cognizant engineering, production, lo-
gistics, maintenance and other appropriate personnel, and the contracting
officer or his designee) will, prior to the initial procurement, consider the
feasibility of direct Government purchase of components. The guidelines appli-
cable to this determination are essentially the same as those in 1-326.4.
1-2102 Sample Format for the Preparation of Advance Procurement
Plans.
(a) The following illustrative format is designed to give guidance in the
preparation of AP Plans. Its use may be expanded, contracted or modified to
suit the needs of individual projects or components. The greatest utility of
the illustrative format would be at time of initiation of a new development.
(b) The format of the milestone chart is flexible, because the same mile-
stones may not be present in every procurement program. For example, the
contract definition stage is applicable only to selected major development
ARMED SERVICES PROCUREMENT REGULATION fl 1-2102
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programs, and hence this milestone need not always he shown. Another exam-
ple is that of equipment that has already been developed, in which case only
planning for production items need be charted. Also, some equipment may
never be procured competitively after the winner of the design competition, as
for an airframe, has been selected. In such cases, the objective of AP Planning
is to assure that equipment of the desired quality, performance and reliability
is produced on time at the lowest sound price and that the contracting docu-
ments shall reflect the means for accomplishing such objectives.
(c) The first page of the sample format identifies the project by number,
description, and name of project manager. Where more than one component
of a project is involved, such components may be listed therein.
(d) The second page of the sample format indicates the type of narra-
tive information which is necessary to explain the long range basis for pro-
curing the needed items for the ensuing five-year period. It is not intended
that such narrative should be compressed into a single page; the paragraphs
may be expanded or contracted to fit the need. When there is more than one
major component to a project, additional pages may be inserted. Plans may
be tentative or firm. A tentative plan sets forth a number of possibilities from
which, after investigation, a sing3e approach is chosen on the basis of feasi-
bility or superiority of approach. Plans may be preliminary and evolutionary
in character as, for example, when the feasibility of producing an item has
yet to be determined and the plan is predicated on successful determination
of feasibility. Later, when feasibility has been determined, the plan may be
updated in more definitive terms. The narrative should supplement the data
on the milestone chart.
(e) (1) The sample milestone chart is the. keystone of the AP Plan. The
use of milestone charts introduces discipline into the planning process by
identifying in graphic form the critical decision points that must be taken
and time factors that must be observed where action is necessary to produce
an item or to make a competitive buy possible. The chart not only forces
consideration of all factors involved but it also provides a visual portrayal of
the decisions necessary to achieve objectives and indicates the time at which
they should be made. The milestone chart portrays the step by step planning
and normally covers the period from feasibility study through delivery of
the production items. The chart tells the story of time, cost and quantity of
required items, illustrating milestones which must be recognized in the deci-
sion making process. Normally the first milestone is the advance development
effort and the date of completion thereof. However, where there is a reason-
able expectancy of future production, coupled with the need to make trade off
decisions involving economic considerations, preparation of a tentative AP
Plan should be undertaken prior to completion of a feasibility study. The
second milestone usually is the award of the engineering developmental con-
tract for purposes of design and fabrication of an item that can be service
tested to prescribed design parameters. At completion of this milestone a docu-
mentation package is usually available and equipment is produced upon which
[The next page is 198.67]
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the operational test and evaluation program is conducted. It should be noted
that to this point it normally is advisable to award the work to tho designer
and developer. At completion of service test, the production documentation
package is delivered. This package is the first technical data package upon
which competition could be obtained. The third milestone is the first produc-
tion buy (see 3-108). The developer/first producer pohcy. is stated in 3-108.
The fourth milestone is the second production buy. This is the milestone to-
ward which the plan has been working from the inception of the feasibility
study since it will generally indicate how future buys should be effected. At
this point it should be reasonably clear whether and when competition, includ-
ing price competition, is or will be feasible and practicable.
(2) This format is a tool which can be used to predict in advance
potential problem areas and to measure performance in <onaparison to planned
actions. It provides opportunity for early resolution of difficulties and elimi-
nation of late stage delays.
ILLUSTRATIVE ADVANCE PROCUREMENT PLAN FORMAT
Page
















1. Item or system
:




Unit $ : Total $
b. FY 19 Unit $ : Total $
c. FY 19 Unit $ : Total $
d. FY 19 Unit $ : Total $
e. FY 19 Unit $ : Total $
4. Delivery requirements
:
5. If R&D : Est. total development cost $
6. If production: Total est. quantity and cost for remaining production
life:
7. Background and Procurement History
:
8. Current Procurement:
a. Procurement method and plan
:
b. Proposed sources and basis for selection
:
c. Contemplated negotiation authority and justification: (If the Plan
is to support a Secretarial D&F, include all information required
by 3-302.)
d. Type of contract contemplated and reason therefor:
9. Long Range Procurement Objective:
10. Availability of data suitable for competition: (Fully explain status
and plans for acquiring and evaluating data)
11. If competition is not planned, discuss breakout in accordance with
1-326 (Schedule of Major Subcontracted Items to be attached)
12. Other considerations, when applicable
:
13. Identification of members of the Planning Team
:
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Part 21—Advance Procurement Planning
1-2100 Advance Procurement Planning.
1-2100.1 General.
(a) The purpose of the APP is to document, at an early point in time, the
long range contractual method or methods which will he utilized for the pro-
curement by contract of both the development and production of an individual
item or S3rstem. It is the written result of advance procurement planning, as
defined in ASPR 1-2100.1, as the means by which the efforts of all personnel
responsible for the procurement, by contract, are coordinated as early as
practicable in order to obtain, on time, required items of requisite quality and
at the lowest sound price.
. (b) As a management tool, the APP can serve many useful functions;
however, the specific purpose must remain dominant if the APP is to be used
for any purpose other than that set forth in subparagraph (a) above. For
example, the APP should rarely be used as sole support for a Determination
and Findings (D&F), because if it is the sole support, the indication is that
the APP has been delayed in submission to await specific facts required in a
Request for Authority to Negotiate (RAN) or Justification for Authority to
Negotiate (JAN). Use of the APP for this or any other purpose which subordi-
nates the specific purpose of the APP to this or any other use, is not the desired
advance procurement planning within the meaning of ASPR 1-2100 or this Part.
1-2100.2 Applicability.
(a) In addition to the requirements prescribed in ASPR 1-2100.2 for the
preparation of APPs on negotiated hardware procurements, APPs will be pre-
pared or will require coverage, in the manner prescribed in NPD 1-2 101(d),
for the following:
(i) Two-step formal advertised procurements. (Refer to ASPR 1-2100
(b) for dollar thresholds. In the event of a multi-year procurement,
if the total estimated value of the multi-year is in the amount of
$1,000,000 or more, an APP is required.)
(ii) In-house development efforts where it is anticipated that the
eventual production effort will be contracted to industry and for
which the production effort will require the preparation of an APP.
The APP should be prepared at the commencement of the in-house
effort and should show how the transition from in-house R&D will
lead to production by industry.
(hi) Other procurements which the Chief of Naval Material (MAT 022)
designates as requiring APP preparation.
(iv) Non-hardware procurements will be included in APPs covering sys-
tem procurements under the conditions set forth in NPD 1—2101(d).
NAVY PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES 1-2100.2
49

178 31 March 1971, Rev. 8
(b) Whenever emergency procurement under ASPR 3-202 is a develop-
mental effort as a result of a Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) or Rapid
Development Capability (RDC) priority, an AFP is required and will be
prepared as soon as possible, but is waived for an individual procurement when
the preparation would delay the procurement action. A QRC, RDC or other
priority assignment does not automatically waive the requirment for an APP
when there will be additional requirements for an item, and an APP will be
prepared and approved for these future requirements prior to their procurement.
1-2100.3 Initiation of Advance Procurement Planning.
(a) To initiate timely APP preparation requires that the Acquisition
Manager (AM), as defined in NPD l-2100.4(a), must notify the appropriate
contract group or division and commence forming the planning council as
soon as the Specified Operational Requirement (SOR) or Advanced Develop-
ment Objective (ADO) is assigned to the Principal Development Activity
(PDA) by the Chief of Naval Material (MAT 03). The APP must be prepared,
submitted and approved in sufficient time so that it can be incorporated or
referenced in the Technical Development Plan (TDP).
(b) Advance procurement planning for items which already have passed,
or do not require the TDP state, shall be initiated, if the procurement meets
the criteria set forth in ASPR 1-2100.2 or in XPD 1-2100.2, when a Program
Change Request is initiated. The APP will be submitted no later than the time
the item first appears in the Five Year Defense Plan.
(c) It is emphasized that initiation of the planning and submission of the
APP should not wait until a Procurement Request (PR) has been prepared,
or until funds are scheduled for obligation. Advance procurement planning
and early preparation cf an APP may in fact provide additional justification for
the requirement of specific funding. The APP can show the optimal funding to
provide the most economical contractual method and alternative contractual
methods for less than optimal funding.
1-2100.4 Responsibility for Preparation.
(a) Acquisition Manager (AM). The Acquisition Manager (AM) is defined
as that individual charged with overall responsibility for acquisition of weapons
systems, individual items of equipment and facilities, as well as planning for
logistic support of' these end items. Project Managers, Project Officers, Program
Directors, Commodity Managers and other officials responsible for the material
program are considered Acquisition Managers for the purpose of this Part.
1-2100.4 NAVY PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES
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(1) The Acquisition Manager (AM) for the material program con-
cerned is responsible for advance procurement planning and for the preparation
of the specific APP, including the concurrent updating of the Plan with each
program, budget or management decision significantly affecting the Plan.
(2) The Acquisition Manager (AM) and/or the procuring activity are
encouraged to require preparation of APPs for internal use for procurements
not covered by ASPR 1-2100 or this Part, even though submission to the
Chief of Naval Material for approval is not required.
(b) Each organization shall make such organizational arrangements,
including assignment of functions and responsibilities, as necessary to coor-
dinate, establish and implement advance procurement planning and preparation
of APPs. When the procurement of a system spans several procurement
organizations, the AM shall designate the head of the APP Council who will
coordinate the plans of all the organizations into preparation of an APP for
the entire system.
(c) Each APP shall be updated annually. Under some circumstances, the
APP may contain several years effort before a decision point will be reached
that will determine future planning. In these cases, the APP may include a
request that the annual update be waived. All APPs should clearly indicate
when the APP will be updated.
1-2100.5 Approval.
(a) Advance Procurement Plans shall be prepared internally by procuring
activities, signed by the Acquisition Manager and the head of contracts group
or division. Ten (10) copies shall be forwarded to the Chief of Naval Material
(MAT 022) for review and approval. When the designated PDA or AM
utilizes the services of other activities such as Naval Ordnance Laboratories
(NOLs), ONR, NADC, NTFC, NRL, or NPO (or SYSCOMS for CNM-
designated PMs), the PDA or AM may either prepare the APP or designate
the service activity to prepare the APP. If the service activity prepares the
APP it will be submitted to the Chief of Naval Material (MAT 022), with a
copy to the AM or PDA. unless the AM or PDA specifically directs submission
via the AM or PDA. For those APPs sent direct to MAT 022, the AM or PDA
may comment to MAT 022 within two (2) weeks of receipt of the APP copy.
A review of the program will be accomplished by Headquarters, Naval Material
Command and, providing it is in accordance with Defense procurement
objectives and Navy policy, approval of the APP will be granted. The review
of the APPs will be primarily directed towards determining the soundness of
long range contractual plans in the APP.
NAVY PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES 1-2100.5
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(b) Based on the information provided and such other information which
may be available, the Chief of Naval Material's approval of the APP is defined
to mean, specifically, that the contractual plans set forward in the APP are
judged to be sound. It is recognized that the APP is a plan, subject to unfore-
seen events and changes which may require deviation from the contractual
plans set forth. The Chief of Naval Material (MAT 022) should however, be
kept informed by either a memorandum or a revision to the APP when changes
occur.
1-2101 Guidelines for Development of Advance Procurement Plan.
(a) The ASPR 1-2101 guidelines are flexibly outlined. Each plan must be
self-supporting to the extent practical, but where necessary, references to
specific parts or the whole of other documentation should be included in the
APP rather than including redundant information. Referenced documents
shall be made available upon request to facilitate review of the APP. If the
procurement approach in the APP is supported by, of differs from, that con-
tained in any document which has been approved at any level higher than the
Chief of Naval Material, the document must be referenced and differences
noted in the APP.
(b) Among the milestones, the APP should identify are:
(1) The points at which procurement of each applicable element of
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) will be started to insure timely delivery.
(2) The points at which each item of Government Furnished Material
(GFM) will be available and if different, the latest date it must be available
to preclude having a detrimental effect on the program.
(c) While some programs may only have several decision points, others
which are more complex may have many, especially if there arc several major
sub-projects under one project. Though the primary concern is for procure-
ment milestones, any other milestones or decision points which will effect the
procurement should be indicated.
(d) ASPR 1-2101 (d) requires preparation of APPs on an individual item
basis or on a project basis, however, a system APP will be prepared within the
Department of the Navyfor each complete system. The system APP will cover:
(i) all procurements relating to the system which will require Sec-
retarial approval of a Determination and Findings (D&F) or;
(ii) procurements that do not require Secretarial approval, but which
will have a unit cost of $100,000 or a total cost of more than
$1,000,000 or;
l-2101(d) NAVY PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES 3-306.51
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(iii) procurements by contract for studies, services, and software if
Secretarial approval of a D&F will be required or total cost of the
procurement will exceed SI,000,000 or;
(iv) any other procurements not covered in (i), (ii) or (iii) above, but
which may have an effect on the system development/production.
In-house efforts related to the system will be discussed and the relationship
shown between the effort and the system. If a subsystem is being procured
under another APP, it is only necessary to reference the APP and indicate
on the system APP, milestones which reflect how the acquisition effects the
system procurement.
(e) The following important specific areas which have been neglected in
the past will be covered in the APP:
,
(1) Each APP shall indicate how Government Furnished Material
(GFM) or Equipment (GFE) will be procured and how it will be provided
to the prime contractor in time to meet Government obligations under the
contract with the prime contractor. The milestone chart ma)r be used to show
the procurement and delivery milestones in simple programs. In more complex
programs, a separate milestone chart, line of balance chart, or PERT type
chart may be necessary to show all procurement and delivery milestones, as
well as other information on GFM or GFE. The management techniques
which best indicate that the necessary advance procurement planning for all
GFM/GFE has been accomplished shall be provided in the APP.
(2) Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) is necessary in all procure-
ments. Just as it is necessary to plan the procurement of hardware for service
use, it is important to procure the ILS for that hardware. Assurance shall be
provided in the APP that provision has been made to procure that ILS which
is necessary. If the procurement of any required clement of ILS has not been
provided for, the APP shall state the facts involved. An Acquisition Logis-
tician shall be designated for each program, identified in the APP, and shall
take part in APP Council meetings to insure provision is made for the pro-
curement of required ILS. Where ILS planning has already been done in a
TDP or ILS plan, such document need only be referenced in the APP.
NAVY PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES l-2101(e)
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(3) The APP shall contain a discussion of the technical risk when there
is R&D to be accomplished in the program. The discussion should avoid nebu-
lous words which are not well defined and which would convey different meanings
to different persons. The discussion shall outline (i) what has been accomplished
to eliminate risk, (ii) the results of testing that took place, and (iii) a comparison
of these test results with the goals established for the item or program at its
inception. When no test results are available, the comparison may be made to
similar programs which had similar developments in the past. When the terms
high, medium, low, or no risk are used, an explanation as to how this determina-
tion was made shall be included. It may be sufficient to reference specific parts
of an approved TDP.
(f) Whenever Advance Procurement Plans do not schedule the introduc-
tion of competition for the end item, the following information concerning
breakout shall be included in such plans:
(i) a statement that ASPR 1-32G is being complied with;
(ii) identification of components for which a decision to breakout has
been made, and brief discussion of acceptability of risks and esti-
mated overall cost savings;
(iii) with respect to those components which have been reviewed and
earmarked as being susceptible to breakout pursuant to ASPR
1-32G.3, the number of items included thereunder shall be indi-
cated and identified if their number is sufficiently small to do so
without imposing an excessive administrative burden, briefly
stating the reason why such components are not now subject to
an affirmative decision to breakout;
(iv) if the listing of the components under (iii) above will impose an
excessive administrative burden, the Advance Procurement Plan
shall state that the documentation required by ASPR 1-32G.5
has been prepared and will be available for review by representa-
tives of the Chief of Naval Material. Such documentation will be
reviewed by the Chief of Naval Material on a selective test basis;
(v) identification of components of systems and subsystems not sus-
ceptible to breakout shall not be made in the APP but a listing
thereof, and a brief statement as to the reasons for their nonsus-
ceptibility, shall be maintained on file in the procuring activity
subject to review by the Chief of Naval Material.
l-2101(f) NAVY PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES
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31 March 1971, Rev. 8 183
1-2101.1 Establishment of Cut-Off Dates. Advance procurement planning
is a continuing process. The APP only represents the plans at a single point
in the process. To allow for an orderly processing, the Acquisition Manager
shall establish a cut-off date and the APP shall be prepared and submitted
with the information available as of that date. The APP need not be redrafted
if changes that occur prior to the date of submission to the Chief of Naval
Material (MAT 022) do not effect the contractual mcthod(s) to be used. A
memorandum shall be attached to the APP indicating the changes that have
occurred.
1-2101.2 Classification of APPs. Because of their planning nature, APPs
which do not contain classified information shall be marked "For Official Use
Only" and be handled and safeguarded as required for documents so marked.
1-2101.3 Execution of Advance Procurement Plans. Where circumstances
dictate, procuring activities may proceed with the execution of the plan,
pending its approval, up to the point of issuance of Request for Proposals or
Quotations.




NAVORD ADVANCE PROCUREMENT PLAN NO. 0XX-XX-71.X
PROGRAM: Surface Navy Launched Multi-Purpose Missile (SUN-
LAMP)
PROJECT MANAGER: LT . B. R. LEONARD (PMO-100)
DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM
The purpose of the SUNLAMP Program is to provide the
operating forces with a light weight antiship to be installed
on small combatants (PGH VIPER/DD/PF)
.
The program is to modify and test a guidance system and
procure a launcher arid interface it with an in-use USN ship-
board weapon direction system together with support equip-
ments, maintenance package and logistics plan. The program
shall investigate the possibilities of (1) upgrading the
present SEAHAWK system, (2) building a multi-purpose system
from existing USN/USAF/USA/USMC hardware and technology, and
(3) building a multi-purpose system from NATO navy components
APPROVED:
DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR CONTRACTS DATE
PROJECT MANAGER DATE
Plan prepared by B.R. Leonard, questions should be
referred to this planner (the cut-off date for information
delineated in this APP is 2/4/72)
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NAVORD ADVANCE PROCUREMENT PLAN NO. 0XX-XX-71.X
1. System :
The SUNLAMP Program is comprised of subsystems identified
as follows:
A. STARFIRE Missile
B. GFCS MK 8 6
C. Missile Guidance/Control Package
D. Launcher Package
The equipment items under each of the respective sub-
systems are described in Attachment #1, hereto. The
alpha-numeric numbering system used to identify each of these
items will be utilized throughout this APP for brevity
purposes and for cross reference to SUNLAMP Program
documentation.
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4 . Delivery Requirements Based on Production Schedule
of new ship and ROH of ships to be retrofitted:
FY 7 4 FY 75 FY 76 FY 77
NEW CONSTRUCTION
PGB VIPER CLASS 4 10 11
PF CLASS 12 12 6
OTHER APPLICATIONS
I&E TRAINING 3 2
CPSS dates for equipment for installation on new construction
is as follows:
a. Foundations, base and other structural items
requiring attachment and alignment to the hull will be
scheduled for delivery 12 months prior to completion of ship
construction.
b. Other equipment will be scheduled for delivery a
minimum of 9 months prior to completion of ship construction.
c. Test equipment and associated support equipment will




CPSS dates for equipment for installation during regular over-
hauls is as follows :
All equipment and hardware - 6 months prior to beginning
of overhaul.
Ship Types Requiring SUNLAMP Systems y




5. ESTIMATED TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COST :
Approximately 21,000K through FY 77
6. TOTAL ESTIMATED COST FOR PRODUCTION :
Approximately 200,00 0k through FY 77
o 4 10 11




7. BACKGROUND AND PROCUREMENT HISTORY ;
a. Background ;
Most systems presently installed in the fleet have
been designed from their inception as one separate weapon
system to be used for specific purposes. While this type of
development is capable of producing an ideal system for a
particular application, it also produces very high cost due
to state-of-the-art development costs. In the face of other
pressing national needs the funding for new and expensive
systems has become most austere. However, the need for new
weapon systems to insure the security of our nation continues
to grow.
One solution to our need for new weapon systems is to
provide adequate, but quite possibly less than ideal, weapon
systems by adapting and modifying existing weapon system
components to meet the defense needs. While satisfying an
operational need, funds that might otherwise be used on
extensive development of one project are released for devel-
opment of other systems.
The SUNLAMP Project is such a "hybrid" system. By
making maximum use of the U.S. Army's operational surface to
surface missile, the STARFIRE, by utilizing the Navy's
GUNFIRE CONTROL SYSTEM MK 86, and by NAVORDSYSCOM intergrating
the system components the development cost of the new system
will be kept to a minimum. The savings realized by using
currently produced and supported equipment will greatly aid in
keeping the total development cost of SUNLAMP low.
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b. Prior Procurement Activities :
Due to the "hybrid" nature of SUNLAMP, some major
components are "off the shelf." The Army, which plans to cut
back on the number of deployed STARFIRE Missile batteries in
FY 75, can release up to 75 STARFIRE Missiles from their
stockpile. Therefore, the development and production of
additional missiles is not required at this time. Lockheed
Missile and Space Company, Sunnyvale, built and delivered
37 5 STARFIRE Missiles and guidance systems to the Army from
FY 69 to FY 71.
The Navy has proprietary rights to the specifications
to the MK 86 Gunfire Control Systems. "Off the shelf"
components will satisfy the FY 74 requirements and sole source
or competitive procurement can provide the additional require-
ments. While it's anticipated that some modifications will
have to be made to the STARFIRE Missile guidance package and
to the MK 86 GFCS to make it compatible with the SUNLAMP system,
NAVORD engineers are confident that the modifications are
within state-of-the-art. They also believe that the modifica-
tions to the missile guidance package are well within the
capability of Lockheed Missile and Space Company (LMSC) , the
prime contractor for the original STARFIRE missile system.
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8. CURRENT PROCUREMENTS :
a. Procurement -Method and Plans ;
It is planned to award the contract for the production
of the launcher and the modification of the guidance package
and gunfire control system during FY 72. It is planned to use
the following procurement method:
1. Incentive Provisions : The requirement for quality
and quantity of systems is firm. Performance, reliability and
quality requirements have been established. Maintenance,
logistics, and test and evaluation requirements will be
established. Scientific analysis is virtually complete and
technical problems can be isolated. Equipment design is
within the state-of-the-art. All major design is considered
stable with minor launcher, and interface requirements still
remaining to be defined. Producibility risk has been assessed.
It is considered that the cost of structuring and administering
an incentive is more than offset by the potential cost savings.
Utilization of performance and delivery incentives are not
planned.
b. Proposed Sources and Basis for Selection : LMSC is
proposed as sole source for modifying the missile guidance
package section of the system. LMSC built the STARFIRE
Missile in FY 69 through 71. Raytheon is proposed as- sole
source for the MK 86 GFCS. Raytheon has been building
the MK 8 6 GFCS for the Navy and is currently under contract
to provide MK 8 6 GFCS for 30 of the 6 planned SUNLAMP
installations. Lockheed as the prime contractor for the
STARFIRE Missile system and Raytheon as the prime contractor
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for the MK 86 GFCS have the technology base, facilities and
demonstrated experience that can provide these major
components of the SUNLAMP system at least cost to the Navy.
Negotiations between Hydraulic Specialist Inc. and Huggs Tool
Co. are recommended for the" purchase of the Launcher.
Hydraulic Specialist currently manufactures the ASROC Missile
Launcher while Huggs Tool Co. currently produces the Sea Hawk
Launcher. Both of these firms have the existing technical
base, production capability and experience to produce the
SUNLAMP Launcher within the production/delivery schedule




Contemplated Negotiation Authority and Justification :
(1) Launcher and interface engineering for development
and production: 10 USC (a) (10) is considered the authority
for negotiation. A sole source negotiated contract can be
justified because LMSC was the prime contractor for the
STARFIRE Missile and guidance system which will be modified
for SUNLAMP and, therefore, is uniquely qualified to develop
and .produce the modified guidance package for the SUNLAMP
system. Raytheon is likely uniquely qualified to produce
the MK 86 GFCS for the additional 30 installations.
d. Type of Contract Contemplated and Reasons Therefore :
A fixed Price Incentive contract is planned. Because
the two major expense items in this contract, the missile and
GDCS, are GFM, the primary risk of cost overrun is confined
to the modification of the missile guidance package -«nd to _
the development of the launcher. At the same time, there is
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a cost reduction possibility attributed to the contractor's
potential ability to coordinate the development and produc-
tion efficiently. It is conviently anticipated that a real-
istic target price, cost ceiling and share ratio can be
negotiated. Delivery and performance incentives are not
planned to be used.
9. LONG RANGE PROCUREMENT OBJECTIVES
Subsequent to the production of the SUNLAMP system, addi-
tional requirements for a multi-purpose ship launched missile
system may be required. LMSC and Raytheon will not have
proprietary rights to documentations on the SUNLAMP system.
Unless state-of-the-art modifications are required on a
follow-up procurement of SUNLAMP systems, formal advertising
may be appropriate. GFCS to fill FY 75 and 7 6 requirements
will be procured.
Contemplated SUNLAMP requirements for FY 7 3 and beyond
are discussed on Figure (2)
.
10. AVAILABILITY OF DATA FOR COMPLETION
a. In as much as Lockheed Corporation has retained the
machine tooling, test instruments and facilities and design
data incident to the development and production of the STAR-
FIRE Missile this section is not definitively applicable.
b. It is envisioned that considerable cost savings to
the government will be effected by NAVORDSYSCOM coordinating
the components for the SUNLAMP system. Due to the concept of
integrating currently available components it is currently
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estimated that SUNLAMP development costs will be less than





a. Sole Source Board Approval
Current procurement of GFCS and Guidance package
will be presented to the NAVORD Sole Source Board for review
and approval upon completion of the P.R.
b. Small Business
It was determined by the Project Manager that no
procurements would specify small business; however, small




Integrated Logistic Support (ILS)
(1) General
The primary objective of the Integrated Logistics
Support Management program is to provide for systematic
planning, acquisition and management of total logistic
resources in order to obtain maximum material readiness and_---
optimum cost effectiveness of the SUNLAMP Weapon System.
Necessary and sufficient logistic support and
technical assistance will be procured to provide for operation,
maintenance and support of SUNLAMP equipment by personnel of
the U.S. Navy. Additionally, every effort will be made to
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maximize use of common support systems, procedures and
facilities, integrating them with the peculiar requirements
attributable to SUNLAMP wherever possible.
(2) Current Procurement
Provision will be made for the coordinated and
systematic planning, design, acquisition, distribution, and
management of the following major elements of logistic
support as an integrated whole:
a. Planned maintenance
b. Support Personnel Requirements and Training
c. Publications
d. Support Equipment
e. Spares and Repair Parts
f. Facilities
g. Contractor Technical Services
as related to the planned procurements indicated in para-
graph Eight of this document.
Maintainability design will be accomplished with
full consideration to the operational environments, in which
SUNLAMP will operate.. Features and characteristics of new
equipment design will be such that maintenance can be
accomplished by military personnel under the operational
conditions in which the equipment will be operated and
maintained.
A Failure Data Program will be employed. The
intent of this program is to provide a data base for predic-
tions and analysis during the design and development phase
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and provide feedback during equipment and system testing in
order to identify potential problem areas and implement any
necessary corrective action. The data system complies with
the requirements of MIL-STD 470 and MIL-STD 785A. Initially
patterned after Navy data system techniques, it has been
modified periodically as the Navy 3M system has evolved,
maintaining similarity of concept.
Data from the data systems will be processed using
IBM 360/75 computer facilities, thus allowing for effective
and efficient retrieval of reliability, maintainability and
support data. This data will be made available in both
summary and detail form for distribution to groups responsible
for problem analysis and corrective action.
(3) Long Range Procurement
Specific requirements directly related to
Integrated Logistic Support of follow-on procurements of the
SUNLAMP Weapon System will be addressed as plans for procure-
ment of additional systems are formulated. Policies for the
integration of the elements of logistic support during the
Contract Definition Phase and Development Phase will be







This case investigates the roles of the Development
Concept Paper (DCP) and the Defense System Acquisition Review
Council (DSARC) in the procurement life cycle of a major
weapons system. The current DCP/DSARC process as formally
stated in DOD Directive 5000.1 of July 13, 1971 is reviewed
and analyzed. The DCP/DSARC process applicable to the Patrol
Frigate (PF) is presented, and the unique problems associated
with conventional hull ship acquisition programs are discussed.
Alternative proposals to the present DCP/DSARC process are
considered. The student is required to prepare an outline
for a DCP and a DSARC presentation.
B. OBJECTIVES
During investigation of this case the student will develop
an understanding of:
1. The purpose of the Development Concept Paper.
2. The purpose of Defense Systems Acquisition Review
Council
.
3. The implications of Research and Development (R&D)
projects versus non-R&D projects in the DSARC process.
4. The unique problems associated with the management of
conventional hull ship acquisition projects.
5. Alternative approaches to the present DOD level review
,
system.
6. The CNO's thoughts and proposals for carrying out a





During the life cycle of a major system, there are a few
occasions when requirements, plans, and approval come together
for formal service and Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) interface. These critical occasions or stages and the
process for Department of Defense (DOD) approval of these
stages in systems acquisition process are formally stated in
DOD Directive 5000.1 of July 13, 1971 entitled "Acquisition of
Major Defense Systems." According to this directive the
Secretary of Defense (SecDef) will make the decisions which
initiate program commitments or increase those commitments.
Currently, the SecDef makes three key system decisions by
choosing among alternatives posed in the Development Concept
Paper (DCP) and in updated versions of this document. He also
obtains the recommendations of the Defense Systems Acquisition
Review Council (DSARC) to assist him in making his decision.
The specification of the three distinct stages in the systems
acquisition process with DOD level review between stages is
designed to minimize concurrency and commitment of full-scale
development and production before adequate information is
available and analyzed.
The DCP is the primary development program management
document in OSD. It summarizes the essential arguments which
the SecDef must consider in arriving at his decisions whether
to continue the program and, if continued, in what form and
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with what restraints. The considerations which support the
determination of the need for a system program, together
with a plan for that program, are documented in the DCP
.
The DCP defines program issues, including special logistic or
procurement problems, program objectives, program plans,
performance parameters, areas of major risk, system alter-
natives and acquisition strategy. The document is prepared
by the Service and coordinated among all interested parties
in the Services and OSD by the Office of the Director of
Defense Research and Engineering (ODDR&E)
.
The DCP approved by the SecDef will identify the limits
or conditions that accompany his decision. These are the
thresholds or limits of cost, schedule, and performance which
cannot be changed or violated without SecDef approval. These
thresholds require the Service to initiate a later SecDef
program review if the limits are likely to be exceeded.
The DSARC, which is the vehicle for OSD's review of the
program being recommended by the Service, provides a major
input to the Secretary. A typical pre-DSARC schedule of
events is presented in Figure 1. The DSARC is composed of
the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)
,
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) , and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) . Also,
the Deputy SecDef may attend these meetings.
A flow chart of the DCP/DSARC system as outlined in DOD
Directive 5000.1 is presented in Figure 2.
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The currently required DCP and DSARC schedules are as
follows
:
1. Approved DCP - following Exploratory Development.
2. DSARC I - Program decision to proceed from Exploratory
Development to Advanced Development.
3. DSARC II - Program decision to proceed from Advanced
Development to Engineering Development.
4. DSARC III - Program decision to proceed from Engineer-





Completion of draft DCP 3 months prior to DSARC*
staffing in OPNAV
Preview of CEB addressal of 2 1/2 months prior to DSARC**
program
CEB for OPNAV review of 2 months prior to DSARC***
program
DCP forwarded to SECNAV 1-2 weeks after CEB
CNO and SECNAV informal
meeting on program issues —
(as required by SECNAV)
[Exchange of "For Comment" and
"For Coordination" versions of
DCP between Navy and OSD]
Copy of DSARC presentations 2 days prior to Flag Level
provided to Op-96 Review
Flag Level Review of DSARC 2 weeks prior to DSARC
presentations
Final version of DCP forwarded 2 weeks prior to DSARC
to OSD
Independent Parametric Cost 2 weeks prior to DSARC
Estimate Presentation to CAIG
Joint CNO and SECNAV Review 1 week prior to DSARC
of DSARC presentations
4 months for new programs. From OPNAVINST 5000. 41A
18 Dec 1972
** 3 1/2 months for new programs

















































D. THE DCP/DSARC PROCESS FOR THE PATROL FRIGATE PROGRAM
A schedule of the DCP/DSARC process for the Patrol
Frigate program is shown in Figure 3. The preparation of the
PF DCP was a joint effort between the Navy and DDR&E with the
Navy having prime responsibility for presenting the justifi-
cation and procedures for the acquisition of the system.
The Navy's responsibility was further subdivided so
that OP-03D primarily prepared the analysis for justification
of the system and the project staff (PMS 399) prepared the
plans and procedures for the acquisition. This split devel-
oped because of the high degree of centralization of decisions
at the CNO and OPNAV level in this project. The CNO personally
established cost, time, manning and tonnage limitations and
many of the characteristics of the ship, such as the propul-
sion system, sonar suite, and number of helicopters.
The first DSARC had been established as early as 1971 in
early PF documents. However, in February 1972 the meeting
had not yet occurred. The DCP, although limited to 20 pages
plus tables, then consisted of about 50 pages plus several
pages of negative comments from the DDR&E. These comments
chiefly questioned the justification for the ship as
presented and the degree of concurrency in development and



























































































































































1. A statement that the present escort force is old and
rapidly being phased out of the fleet. A description of
the threat in terms of bombers, missiles and submarines.
2. An escort with anti-air warfare (AAW) and anti-ship
missile defense (ASMD) characteristics would be effective
in protecting convoys from fighter-bombers and ASM's in
small numbers. Plots of percent destroyed of these
attacking forces versus a number of PF's protecting a
convoy were shown.
3. A discussion of each major subsystem on the ship and
its performance characteristics. For some of these sub-
systems the PF concept exploration report (CER) was
referenced since subsystem selection trade-offs had been
addressed at that stage. For example, the best sonar had
been rejected in that study because of its cost, space and
weight requirements and the fact that the PF was envisioned
to be in convoy with other escorts which would be equipped
with the best sonar. A memo from PMS 30 2 to PMS 399
discussing the sonar requirements is presented in Enclosure
1. The helicopters would also be sonar-equipped. In
general, however, the subsystems were presented as "best
for the mission."
A schedule of the procurement plan and the types of
contracts is also shown in Figure 3.
The contracts for ship design support were awarded on
April 12, 1972. Meantime a meeting of the CNO * s executive
board (CEB) was scheduled for May 18 to review for the DSARC.
At this point the . DCP had been revised particularly with
respect to the justification. The gun, sonar, number of
helicopters, number of computers, manning level and use of
automatic detection and tracking had changed since February.
The justification now presented the JSOP levels of number of
escorts in the required objective, and "reasonably obtain-




The discrepancy between "reasonably obtainable" and the
post World War II escort forces available still would not
be filled by the PF program level. The AAW and ASMD roles
were emphasized and the ASW role de-emphasized as well as
performance of the helicopter. Many of the subsystems were
justified in their selection by their lower cost and weight.
About the middle of May one of the project staff made the
following remark in conversation.
"The DCP is the means for everyone, both Navy and DOD, in
the R&D effort to get their noses into the ship design
effort. As long as the DCP is not approved they can keep
trying to sell their pet programs. Once it's approved
they'll have to stop. I'll bet there won't be an approved
DCP until after the award of the production contracts for
follow-on ships."
E. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
Several Admirals and Program Managers in OPNAV and
SHIPSYSCOM objected to the use of the three step DCP/DSARC
procedures for conventional ship construction programs. They
felt that the current DCP/DSARC was structured to provide
proper management for major Research and Development programs
and that the highly controlled and definitive system was, in
many ways, inappropriate for the management of a conventional
ship acquisition program. They said the rigid application of
this procedure to conventional displacement hull ship programs
would result in unnecessary expenditure of time by project
personnel, increased expense, and delays in delivery of
urgently needed ships to the fleet. It was recommended that
the first essential step required to alleviate this problem
was to separate non-R&D programs, such as shipbuilding, from
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the R&D programs that do require the "fine grained"
management review and test and evaluation now being proposed
for all programs. A flow chart of a proposed modification
to the DCP/DSARC process applicable to conventional displace-
ment hull shipbuilding programs is presented in Figure 4.
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) after studying the
problem believed that a streamline of the decision processes
used in ship acquisitions was in order. The following
memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy was prepared by the
CNO and sets forth his thoughts and a proposal to carry out
a simplification of the DCP/DSARC requirements for ships:
"The current DCP/DSARC procedures were developed to insure
proper management of all new major programs. The basic
structure of the DCP/DSARC is well suited to programs
coverning research, development and procurement of new
weapons systems and equipments. There are, however, many
factors in conventional ship construction programs which
are different from normal research and development programs
and detailed compliance with the DCP and three stage DSARC
procedures unduly complicates getting our shipbuilding
programs underway.
The purpose of the DCP system is to produce a document
that will provide essential technical and operational
programmatic information to the SecDef prior to all of his
decisions concerning major defense programs. It is designed
to identify the primary issues and differences in the basic
data on assumptions; set forth the principle program features,
alternatives, military and economic rationale and risks;
provide the means for insuring collaboration and debate
by key DOD officials; record and set forth the SecDef
program decision and its rationale and define the manner
in which the program is to proceed.
As stated this system is well suited for emerging
research and development programs; however, it is overly
complex and restrictive when applied rigorously to the
majority of our shipbuilding programs. Also, as with all
management systems, the DCP requirements have tended to
grow, requiring ever more lower level detail information
thus further contributing to complexity, overmanagement and
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There are, obviously, some ship programs which require
extensive research and development. New technology hulls
would be in such a category, if they were not being developed
in prototypes. For such programs, the full definitive DCP
process is required since it is mandatory that the feasi-
bility and applicability of this type platform be adequately
demonstrated before embarking on a program for fleet intro-
duction and use. In general however, most of our ship
programs do not fall into this category.
The required Navy force levels are established through
the approved OSD, JCS, Navy processes and the status of our
existing assets are well known. It is also economically
impossible to build ships in the numbers needed to have all
of our required forces as new and modern as requirements
dictate. Thus, our shipbuilding programs in the main are
required to provide replacements for obsolete or overage
units and to attempt to meet the minimum required force
levels.
There is little question, therefore, as to the need
for building these conventional ships, and their missions
and requirements have been well established time and again.
Thus, it should not be necessary to justify in elaborate
detail in each DCP why this type of ship is required, and
what mission it is to fulfill. Likewise, the many varied
threats which the fleet must face are well known to all
appropriate offices within the Department of Defense and
to relate this in ship DCPs is redundant.
There is a requirement, however, for the Navy to
demonstrate that a proposed ship program provides a cost
effective solution to the problem of maintaining our force
levels with modern effective ships.
There is another area where the DCP process is now
generating problems in ship programs. This concerns the
determination of ship characteristics. Unlike research and
development programs, there is no total ship R&D in conven-
tional displacement hull ships. We know that the ship will
float, make the defined speed and have the requisite
endurance.
.
We have years of experience on which to base
these predictions and our performance in past programs
verifies this fact. The primary point, then, is the
adequacy of weapons, sensors and other related systems
called out in the characteristics. It is necessary that,
during the ship formulation process, adequate analyses and
studies be made to develop the system alternatives and to
enable selection of specific equipments. As in any complex
problem, there have to be compromises and trade-offs between
the several systems and capabilities. Often they are
supported by analyses, but some of the decisions must be
made on the basis of judgment and experience. The CNO makes
such decisions based on the best technical advice within
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the Navy and in consideration of the program goals and
constraints.
It is essential that the available analytical
support data be furnished to the OSD. The OSD staff should
insure that the parameters of the various systems are real-
istic and that the production risks are properly identified
and addressed in the overall program plan. However, the
Navy should not be subject to time consuming and repeated
justification of the choices made. Obviously, every selec-
tion can be questioned and in a balanced well thought out
and cost effective ship not every system will have maximum
effectiveness. The CNO approved characteristics have
considered these facts along with the Navy's overall force
requirements and the fiscal constraints. Unless there is a
significant mistake or over statement of system capabilities
or parameters, or an understatement of production or schedule
risk, the approved characteristics selection should not be
subject to detailed system by system review and challenge.
The DCP and DSARC review should rightly consider in
detail the program cost predictions, contracting and pro-
duction methods, IOT&E provisions, schedules and thresholds.
The program management and progress monitoring provisions
are also most important and should be thoroughly covered as
should be the contractors' ability to produce.
The three DSARCs and their decisions are again geared to
the normal structuring of a research and development program.
Conventional ship programs do not fit this general DSARC
schedule. For example, once the ship formulation and
resultant characteristic determination have been accom-
plished, ship system design proceeds rapidly either in-house
or in-house with shipbuilder participation by the selected
shipbuilder. In either case, the ship program should be in
the current budget in order not to have an additional year's
delay in beginning ship construction. It would, therefore,
appear proper to have only one DSARC in a ship development
program conducted after completion of formulation and ship
systems design, and prior to contracting for the detailed
design and production of the lead ship.
If significant milestones, including those for IOT&E,
are satisfactorily met no additional OSD formal reviews are
required. It may be necessary to validate the satisfactory
completion of IOT&E or other program milestones by means of
a formal management review at a time in the program as
specified in the DCP. Also, management reviews should be
held when major program thresholds are broached.
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It is, therefore, proposed that the DCP system for ships
be modified in concept over that utilized for major weapons
systems. In accordance with the above philosophy, the DCP
should provide:
a. Statement of mission and requirement for proposed ship
and program.
b. Discussion of rationale of decision leading to the
defined ship and program. (Footnote applicable
analysis for reference and study)
.
c. Required ship characteristics (Footnote applicable
analysis and technical performance criteria for
reference and study.)
d. Technical and schedule risk analysis and milestones.
e. Procurement plan.
f. IOT&E plan.
g. Major issues and alternatives.
h. Program thresholds.
One DSARC should provide for program approval and
construction of the first ship. Additional formal OSD
management reviews would be held when required, either to
validate the IOT&E requirements or whenever major problems
arise or established thresholds are breached."
In summary the CNO proposed policy for displacement hull
ship program includes: (1) one DSARC per ship program to be
conducted after completion of formulation and ship system
design, but prior to contracting for detailed design and pro-
duction, (2) demonstration of adequate IOT&E performance for
sub-systems prior to large scale production, (3) the use of
shore based test sites for critical ship system integration
demonstration, and (4) elimination of additional DOD formal
reviews if all significant milestones are satisfactorily met,
including those for IOT&E.
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The DCP for the PF was approved with a few modifications,
and on 31 August 1972 the Patrol Frigate Project Manager
presented the PF acquisition program to the Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council. The following topics were
discussed in the DSARC presentation: (1) Ship Design Features,
(2) Procurement Plan, (3) Test and Evaluation, (4) Production
Plan, (5) Program Cost, (6) Program Risks, and (7) Recommended
Thresholds. Deputy Secretary of Defense Rush's response to
DSARC I is presented in Enclosure 2. He authorized the Navy
to proceed with the program for development and construction
of the PF lead ship and land based test sites. He requested
that an informal review of program test results and contract
plans be conducted 120 days in advance of a proposed DSARC
III. The Navy was also requested to develop a plan for, and
evaluate the impact of assigning the lead PF to OPTEVFOR for
a reasonable period to complete an at-sea operational
appraisal of the PF as a whole prior to the lead ship's full
release for Fleet usage.
F. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. Should the DCP/DSARC process as stated in DOD
Directive 5000.1 be applicable to conventional hull ship
acquisition programs? Why or why not?
2. How many DSARC decision points should be required in
a conventional hull-ship acquisition program? Where are the
critical decision points in this type of acquisition
program?

3. Should the DCP/DSARC decision-making be required at
the SEC DEF level or is the Service head or Service Secretary
level sufficient?
4. If you were the PF SHAPM:
a. When would you want your next DSARC?
b. What topics would you present?
c. What decisions and thresholds should be addressed?
d. What fall-back positions should be developed in
case of a negative DSARC decision?
e. What would your response be to the PMS 302 memo?
G. REQUIREMENTS
Each student will develop an outline for a PF DCP and a
PF DSARC I presentation. The student's position on the
issues mentioned in the discussion questions should be













(a) PMS-399 Memo Ser 292 of 3 July 1972
(b) NAVSHIPS ltr Ser 0121-PMS386 of 12 June 1972
(c) SECNAV INST 5000.1 of 13 March 1972
(d) ASPR 6-103.5, NPD 6-103.2 and the Buy American
Act (41 U.S.C. lOa-d)
(e) NAVSHIPS Note 4120 of 12 January 1971
(f) GOR-22 Surface ASW
(1) Attributes of DE 1160 and SOS-505 Sonars
(2) Space and power requirements for the AN/SOS-38
and DE 1160 Sonars
1. In reference (a), PMS-399 requested PMS-302 to initiate
action, at the earliest possible date consistent with funds
availability, for procurement of one SOS-505 sonar system
from Canadian Westinghouse Limited for installation on the
lead PF.
2. In light of reference (b) and numerous other factors,
listed in enclosure (1) , and addressed in paragraph 6 below,
PMS-302 considers this selection of the SOS-505 detrimental
to the US Navy surface ship sonar program and contrary to
the letter and spirit of references (c) and (d)
.
3. To date, no Specific Operational Requirement (SOR) has
been addressed to a small, surface-duct sonar comparable to
the SOS-505 for installation on US Navy ships. The
only requirements for such a system are spoken to in PF
characteristics memoranda and decision papers. These require-
ments are stated in such general terms as "SOS-505 type,"
"small," "solid-state," "duct-sonar," "of a cost less than
the SOS-505," etc.
4. Based on information available and the guidance of
references (c)
,
(e) and (f ) , PMS-302 infers that the PF
sonar must possess the following attributes:
a. Capability to detect, localize with sufficient
accuracy to permit a fire control solution adequate for over-
the-side torpedo attack, and classify submarines outside the
submarines' effective torpedo range.
b. Minimum skilled manpower requirements.




e. Compatibility with digital Command and Control and Fire
Control systems.
f. High reliability, availability, and maintainability.
g. Be an on-the-shelf item which is at the upper end
of the development spectrum of technology.
h. Have interface data with other PF ship's systems
fully defined by 1 October 1972.
i. Have full installation data for follow ship contract
baseline by 1 October 1974.
j. Minimize the number of new kinds of equipment to be
introduced while not sacrificing performance effectiveness.
k. Maximize standardization of systems, equipment,
components and parts.
1. Have minimum logistic support problems.
m. Have adequate operationally oriented testing.
5. In view of the constraint of para 2i above requiring a
firm production base line by October of 1974, insufficient
time is available for development and testing of a completely
new system design. Accordingly, this constraint requires
limiting consideration to systems already reduced to hardware,
which are the 505, 610E, half-frequency SOS-38, and DE 1160.
Because the DE 1160 most nearly represents an on-the-shelf
item at the upper end of the development spectrum (SECNAV
INST 5000.1) in that it is about a decade more modern than
the 505, 610E, or SOS-38, PMS-302 proposes to limit develop-
ment effort to the DE 1160. This puts us in a sole-source
situation with Raytheon, but we would be in a sole-source
situation with either Westinghouse Canada or EDO if the 505,
610E or half-frequency SOS-38 were selected. Based on the
above, the attributes cited in enclosure (1), and the con-
cerns cited in reference (a) PMS-302 considers the following
approach to providing a sonar system for the PF to be in
the best interests of the PF program and the US Navy surface
ship sonar effort.
a. Configure the lead PF to include the AN/SOS-38 sonar
system as now installed on the Hamilton Class Coast Guard
Cutters. Three such systems are now in inventory ready for
immediate use with training facilities and full logistic
support already in existence. The AN/SOS-38 is a service-
approved system having undergone US Navy OT&E and is




b. Provide sufficient cooling water facilities and
electrical power for the DE 1160 in the lead PF
.
c. Proceed with pre-production procurement and OT&E of
the DE 1160, now undergoing prototype testing (with Navy
participation), to meet the following schedule:
(1) By 2 October 1972 , identify $5.5M FY-73 & 74
funds for procurement of three systems and Navy OT&E.
(2) Award a sole-source CPIF contract to Raytheon
for three pre-production DE 1160' s by 22 December 1972.
(3) Commence Navy OT&E by 1 September 197 4 and
complete OT&E by 1 April 1975.
d. Develop an optimum plan, expanding on enclosure (2),
for either delivering a service-approved DE 1160 in lieu of
the AN/SOS-38 to the lead PF in December 1975, or replacing
the SOS-38 in the lead PF with the follow-ship system during
PSA or first overhaul.
6. Procurement of a single foreign-made sonar of near
obsolescence for the lead PF under the existing circumstances
(AN/SOS-38 's in US inventory and a system a decade more
modern in prototype testing) is considered inadvisable. Such
action will inject a one-of-a-kind sonar of mediocre capability
and zero domestic logistic support (training, repair parts,
technical services, etc.) into an inventory which NAVSHIPS




Approyed for Service use (USN)
Relative Active Performance
Relative Passive Performance
Estimated Production Unit Cost
(in FY 73 $)
Manufacturing lead time
Total deck area required (sq.
ft.)
Total weight (lbs)
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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D.C. 2Q301
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF NAVY
SUBJECT: Patrol Frigate Program
The DSARC review of the Patrol Frigate (PF) Program held
31 August 1972 found that the Navy had done a commendable job
in the efforts to design the PF to a cost goal of $45M (FY 73
dollars) per ship. This is an excellent start, but the real
job lies ahead in producing the ships within the cost goal.
Based on past experience, this is going to be a very difficult
task requiring both ingenuity and strong discipline.
I am pleased to note the strong effort to insure adequate
test and evaluation (including IOT&E) prior to major contract
for follow ships. However, the planned date for the first
major contract for follow ships assumes that no critical
deficiencies will be found during such testing. The Navy
should continue to give emphasis to the completion of all
feasible early T&E (including IOT&E) on the combat subsystems
and on the land-based test sites. The DSARC and the DDT&E
will evaluate at the time of their review of the Navy's
recommendation to proceed with follow ships whether adequate
test and evaluation (including IOT&E) has been accomplished
with satisfactory results, and if not, whether some delay in
contracting is warranted.
Also, it may be desirable that a period for operational test
and evaluation of the lead ship, prior to that ship's full
release to normal Fleet usage, be allocated to OPTEVFOR. The
purpose of this testing would be to determine the PF '
s
expected operational effectiveness in its expected roles and
the need for any early modification to follow ships. Should
such modifications be required, a later DSARC would have to
determine the relative merits of opening existing contracts
to change by change order procedures or making modifications
after acceptance from the shipbuilder.
I have reached the following decisions:
a. The Navy is authorized to proceed with the program
for development and construction of the PF lead ship and
land-based test sites and advance procurement funding
—
$191. 5M in FY 1973 for lead ship and land-based test sites
and $17. OM in FY 1974 for advance procurement funding.
b. The Navy should continue its planning on the basis
of the block construction schedule indicated in the DCP and
in the FYDP (24 ships followed by 25 ships, the first block




The number of PF follow-on ships and/or the need for any
further study will be determined through the POM process.
c. 120 days in advance of a proposed DSARC III, an
informal review of program test results and contract plans
will be provided.
d. Approval of follow ship production should be contingent
upon accomplishment of adequate test and evaluation (includ-
ing IOT&E individually on subsystems, and collectively at
land-based test sites) with satisfactory results. Data from
such tests must be made available for examination prior to
DSARC III, now scheduled for March 1975. In addition, logis-
tics support for the all new systems and training and
manpower allocations to support all new requirements shall be
presented at the same time.
e. The Navy is requested to develop a plan for, and
evaluate the impact of assigning the lead PF to OPTEVFOR for
a reasonable period to complete an at-sea operational appraisal
of the PF as a whole prior to the lead ship's full release for
Fleet usage. This plan and evaluation, together with the
Navy's recommendations, should be submitted to OSD at the time
of preparation of the revision to the DCP for initiation of
construction of the first follow ship.
f. In light of the strong start the Navy has made in the
design of the PF to a cost of about $45M (FY 73 dollars
unescalated) , I want to insure that all efforts are made to
insure that the cost goal is achieved in production. I
therefore, direct that all periodic management and DSARC
reviews highlight the Navy's performance in meeting a cost
goal of $45M (in FY 73 dollars excluding shipbuilder
escalation and outfitting and post delivery costs) and the
reasons for any increases. A threshold of $50M under the
same stipulation will be established in the DCP.








This case deals with budget cost estimating for the
Patrol Frigate (PF) as an example of costing in a major
acquisition project. The analysis made in this case should
demonstrate some of the problems of early budget estimating,
the use of cost estimating relationships and other techniques,
and the accuracy involved in these tasks.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives for the student considering this case
are
:
1. To gain understanding of the problems and needs of
budget estimations early in the program life.
2. To apply some of the techniques used in cost estimating




Budget cost estimating for shipbuilding is a task
essential to the efficient and valid planning, programming,
budgeting and management coordination of the appropriation
program. It is an annual requirement for inputs to the Navy
budget request and for updating the Five Year Defense Plan,
for the Tentative Program Objectives Memorandum, and for the
Program Objectives Memorandum. In addition, budget cost
estimates are required periodically for various cost and
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feasibility studies to determine the cost of various con-
figurations for specific ships or classes of ships.
The building of ships and the conversion of ships under
the SCN Program are totally dependent on the appropriation
of sufficient funds to cover the "end cost" of the ships;
because, after Congressional approval of the budget request,
the Navy is obligated to the Congress to complete the ships
authorized in a program year with the funds which were appro-
priated. The funds so appropriated are deemed sufficient
to cover increased costs of labor and material, inaccurate
estimates, administrative changes and technological advances
(other than military characteristics changes of sufficient
magnitude to warrant appropriation of additional funds by
the Congress)
.
Insufficient funding could have serious impact on
portions of the shipbuilding and conversion program, possibly
necessitating cut-backs in ship capability or fleet effec-
tiveness. For these reasons budget cost estimating must be
handled accurately and timely.
Several techniques for budget cost estimating have been
developed by cost analysts. One of the primary methods
is the use of cost estimating relationships (CER) . Essen-
tially data on past, current, and projected programs is
systematically collected and stored. The data is then
analyzed with a view toward development of estimating
relationships which may be used as a basis for determining
the resource impact of future proposals. In the case of
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military systems, these relationships would, ideally, relate
various categories of resources to the system's physical
characteristics, performance, and operation concept.
Without an extensive and continuously updated inventory
of estimating relationships, resource analysis would be
impossible. A few examples of these relationships are:
1. Initial tooling cost for turbo-jet airframes as a
function of aircraft gross weight and speed.
2. Development cost for turbo-jet engines as a function of
thrust, flight Mach number, and maximum compressor tip
speed.
3. Ballistic missile booster cost as a function of missile
weight, quantity, type of propellant and so on. (There
would be separate relationships for each of the major
components of the booster.)
4. High-power prime radar equipment cost as a function of
peak power output and antenna area.
5. Aircraft depot maintenance cost as a function of air-
craft gross weight, speed, and activity rate.
The resource that we are interested in ends up as dollars
but may be estimated as labor hours, material, etc. For the
PF acquisition, various cost estimating relationships based
on the ship weight or characteristics have been used.
The principal model used to estimate the cost of the PF is
the model maintained by NAVSHIPS 0161, the NAVSHIPS cost
estimating branch. During the design of the ship, the weight
of the ship is categorized in seven weight groups as shown on
the attached form NAVSHIPS 4280/2. From the statistical
analysis of past cost information by weight group such as is
shown in Figure 1, the cost per ton for material and the
number of labor hours per ton are estimated. For the PF the
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cost. Current labor costs per hour are multiplied by the
labor hours required per ton. Groups eight and nine for
engineering services are added as a percentage and profit is
figured for the total price estimate. For the first ship
non-recurring development costs must be added. A learning
curve is used to estimate the cost of follow ships.
Figure 2 is a summary weight report which shows the
"budgeted" and current estimates of weight by group.
D. REQUIREMENTS
1. Calculate the expected price of the ship if profit
is ten percent, overhead 90 percent and services of groups
eight and nine are six percent each.
One difficulty with this estimate is that past ships
in the data base had steam propulsion rather than gas tur-
bines in the propulsion system. The gas turbines are
estimated at $1.5 million each and 46,009 pounds each. How
should the estimate be adjusted?
2. The weight estimate shows total weight of the ship
including government furnished equipment. What problems
arise from this in estimation?
3. Figure 3 shows additional non-construction cost
estimates. Prepare a total cost estimate. What are the
non-recurring development costs? What range of accuracy do
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Cost Data for PF based on engineering evaluation as pro-
vided by the ship cost estimator. These are initial costs
estimates and are expressed in FY 73 dollars.
COST ITEMS COST BASIS LEAD FOLLOW
Design Changes 12% lead ship
const, price
2.000 0.000













DE-1052 cost data 3.000 0.300
H/M/E Test/Instru-
mentation
DE-1052 cost data 3.000 0.000
Initial Stock Spares H/M/E equip, list 4.000 0.000
Training Material
Services
LHA cost data 1.500 0.100
NAVSEC Electronics SEC 6271 estimate 3.188 3.188
NAVSHIPS Sonar PMS 37 8 informa-
tion
2.526 1.726
Propulsion Mach'y Preliminary equip,
list
7.186 5.215
H/M/E Equipment Preliminary equip,
list
1.400 1.400
NAVORD Cost NAVORD estimate 34.265 8.852









This case investigates the concept of the ship acquisition
specification. The first part of the case explains how
technical requirements are made known to ship designers and
shipbuilders through the medium of specifications. Problems
in obtaining the proper mix of performance-type and design-
type specifications to meet requirements of each step of the
Patrol Frigate procurement cycle are considered. Although
specifically addressing ship specifications, this same
general problem exists for other systems. The second part of
the case involves a review and an analysis of two separate
specification package proposals. The student is required to
determine the advantages and disadvantages of each specifi-




During investigation of this case the student will
develop an understanding of:
1. The Concept of Ship Acquisition Specifications.
2. The difficulty of expressing ship system design results






5. Problems encountered with lead ship- follow ship
procurement.
6. Product baseline as applied to ships.
7. Various criteria used to judge and evaluate specifica-
tion package proposals.
C . BACKGROUND
The Navy's technical requirements are made known to ship
designers and shipbuilders through the medium of specifica~
tions . Thus, since the specifications are a primary means of
communication between the Navy and its ship contractors it
is crucial that they be suitable for the purpose intended.
If it is the Navy's intent to assign ship performance respon-
sibility to the shipbuilder, it is axiomatic that the
designer/builder be given latitude in the design. In this
case, performance type specifications are appropriate.
However, if the Navy has or can achieve a design in which it
has a high level of confidence, it can retain performance
responsibility and assign industry the task of developing
design details and of building the ship according to the Navy's
basic design. In this case, design- (sometimes called
construction) type specifications are appropriate.
Early in the PF procurement study, the significance of
the type of specifications to be used was recognized. Much
discussion among study personnel and with the Ships Acqui-
sition Project Manager (SHAPM) ensued. Subsequent program
developments impact on particular points in the discussion;
however, they do not invalidate the concepts advanced.
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The type of specification becomes a major consideration
at four points during the PF Program, that is, during the
procurement of:
1. Ship system design.
2. Ship design validation.
3. Lead ship and initial follow ships.
4. Remaining follow ships.
The types of specification which may be used for all phases
must be considered in planning for ship system design so that
the information needed for developing subsequent bid packages
can be obtained from the designer.
There are basically two types of specifications. First
there is the performance-type specification, such as that
used in the DD963 program. The second is a design-type
specification, such as that conventionally used with the
contract design method of procurement. A performance-type
specification may be defined as one in which only character-
istics are specifically defined (such as capacity, function,
and operation) — leaving to the design contractor (who is
preferably also the shipbuilder) the details of design and
structure. A design-type specification may be defined as
one with which the required end product may be obtained from
any qualified producer.
Most specifications used in ship procurements are a
combination of these two types. In this context, performance-
type specifications and design-type specifications may be
considered as end points on a spectrum of specifications. A
pure performance type specification has not to date been
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prepared for a ship procurement. Moreover, based on present
plans for the Patrol Escort, the government will make the
decision on many shipboard systems during the concept devel-
opment portion of concept formulation and during the ship
system design portion of concept validation; in some of these
cases it will specify much of the system as government-
furnished equipment (GFE) . Consequently, it will be impos-
sible to assign the shipbuilder "total system responsibility"
for the ship system. With the Navy maintaining technical
control during the ship system design, it is difficult to
assign the builder responsibility for meeting the Functional
Requirements Baseline (FRBL) even for non-specified
subsystems.
At the other end of the specification spectrum are fully
detailed design-type specifications, such as those prepared
for the procurement of equipments and components. Except
for some submarine procurements, such rigid requirements are
rarely used when procuring ships.
The issue to be faced in early program planning is one of
selecting from this spectrum of specification possibilities
the correct mix of performance-type and design-type specifi-
cations to meet the requirements of each step of the PF
procurement cycle.
Figure 1 depicts a schedule of related activities from
the start of Ship System Design (SSD) through construction
of the lead ship. As shown in the figure, the detail design
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Allocated Baseline (FSABL) and evolves through to completion
in five increments. The FSABL portion will be the basis for
solicitation and award of follow ships. An extract from a
PF FSABL document list is presented in Figure 2. The remain-
ing five increments will be made part of the follow ship
contract as they become available.
As may be noted from Figure 1, the FSABL portion is an
output of Ship System Design. The remaining five increments
are outputs of Detail Design as validated by (1) continuing
land-based test sites activities, (2) actual construction of
the lead ship and (3) Navy review and approval of selected
portions of detail design data for follow ship contract
application. Using a product baseline as the contractual
basis for construction and acceptance of ships is a new
approach for the Navy. A product baseline, as applied to
ships, is a list of data by generic title, constituting a
description of a single ship by hull number rather than a
definition of the class. The product baseline is not consid-
ered a contract instrument for the procurement of follow ships
To- help avoid confusion about terms, that body of data
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D. CONCEPT OF THE SHIP ACQUISITION SPECIFICATION
Considering the follow ship as a contract line item, the
ship acquisition specification according to Harbridge House
will be the only technical requirements statement or defini-
tion of that ship as it is to be built, outfitted, tested,
and submitted for government acceptance, While it is an
over-simplification, it is useful to envision a "perfect"
PF lead ship as it would exist upon completion of Navy accept-
ance trials, and then think of the ship acquisition specifi-
cation as a portion of that total body of data needed to
describe that ship to a follow shipbuilder in terms that will
enable him to produce an "identical" ship. More precisely,
the ship acquisition specification is the top specification
in a data tree invoking lower tier specifications and drawings.
This data tree is organized to provide three levels of tech-
nical direction. The corresponding ship, compartment, and
item level data are introduced below.
Ship level data considers the ship as a facility ready
for installation and stowage of shipboard items, and also
cites the tests, demonstrations, and trials attendant to
government acceptance of the completed ship. Compartment
level data is a sub-set of the ship's facility definition
to treat each compartment as a unit. Items stowed or installed
in the compartment are located (dimensioned) physically
within the compartment, and by reference to a chain of lower
level data; the precise definition of the item is ultimately
specified. The compartment level data also includes
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compartment unique requirements such as condition of readi-
ness markings and paint schedules. Item level data is best
described as a sub-set of the compartment level in terms of
specifying (1) the item to be installed or stowed, (2) the
interface requirements to be accommodated, and (3) the item
peculiar installation and check out requirements. Item level
data also controls the precise configuration of an item in
terms of the item's purchase description, part number, "mark
mod," installation information, pertinent technical publi-
cations and other item unique descriptors.
An objective of the PF procurement is to involve potential
shipbuilders in the ship design at an early stage in order to
improve the producibility of the design and the validity of
cost and schedule estimates prior to release for production.
In addition, the intent is to place as much responsibility for
the performance of the ship on the builder as other program
-•ana*
constraints permit. It is not an objective of the PF pro-
curement to acquire competitive designs, as during Contract
Definition for the DD963.
In order to meet these objectives, present plans are for
a single shipbuilder to perform technical development of the
ship, form the preliminary design stage to approximately the
same level of detail as traditional contract design. At this
point, in order to further validate the technical require-
ments, several potential shipbuilders will be given the
design as a basis for preparing their proposals to build the
lead ship and some of the follow ships. If the shipbuilder
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is to assume a high level of performance responsibility, he
must be given reasonable latitude in the product he proposes
to deliver. In certain areas, it will be in the best interest
of the government to clearly state detail requirements. For
example, where the need for specific systems or equipments
has been defined or specified by the government, the ship-
builder will not be allowed latitude. In remaining areas,
if the objectives of the procurement are to be met, the ship-
builder must receive a statement of ship requirements in a
form which allows him to build the ship to those detail
requirements which best suit his facilities and production
methods and for which he is willing to assume performance
responsibility.
To implement this approach, the shipbuilders who will
validate the ship design must be provided with that design in
a form which depicts the ship requirements, but which does
not constrain them unnecessarily in terms of the details of
meeting these requirements.
Traditionally, the results of the second phase of ship
design development (contract design) have been expressed in
the form of contract specifications, contract drawings, and
contract guidance drawings. For the procurement method
proposed for the Patrol Escort, the ship specification which
is to be made a part of the lead ship production contract will
be the specification generated by the prospective builder
during ship design validation and may look similar to the
traditional contract design specification.
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The problem, therefore, is to express the results of ship
system design (heretofore called contract design) in a form
appropriate for the start of ship design validation. This
ship specification must clearly express the operational,
functional, and technical requirements that must be achieved
in the ships. These requirements must be stated in terms that
do not unnecessarily constrain a prospective builder.
E. REQUIREMENTS
As the PF SHAPM you must determine the advantages and
disadvantages of the following specification plan proposals.
1. (HH) The Harbridge House "build to" ship acquisition
specification.
2. (RL) The Link "performance plus a plan" approach.
The following criteria should be used during your evaluation
of the specification packages.
a. Promotion of the standardization of construction.
b. Savings from centralization of design.
c. Ease of administration of contract.
d. Avoidance of claims.
e. Standardization of equipment.
These later criteria may be more important since standard-
ization of construction in ships may have little advantage
to the Navy in comparison with standardization of equipment.




The two proposals actually are not far apart. The
Harbridge House specification does call for some performance
specifications. The RL plan does provide the ship builder
with a detailed plan which he may rely upon if he can demon-
strate compliance . They both, then must address the central
problem which is, "Can we prepare a timely detail design
which will ensure performance." This is a very difficult
question to answer. The major advantages and disadvantages
of the plans relate to how heavily they rest on the Navy and
the contractor being confident of the answer to this question.
In other words, this is a risky area which will introduce
confusion, hesitation and general uncertainty at the ship-
yards. Unfortunately such uncertainty works against the
goals of the PF of minimal cost follow ships. Perhaps more
important it may turn the currently positive attitude of the
industry toward the PF program into a less positive one.
Therefore before making a more detailed analysis the SHAPM
should carefully explore the reaction of potential yards to
any specification plan, and in general to choose a plan which
causes least uncertainty at the yards.
For both plans a major portion of the problem will be
the establishment of what constitutes conformance with the
design. Although it would be possible to add the phrase all
dimensions - .xx feet, etc., it will be very difficult to
decide exactly what xx should be, provide it to the ship-
builder before he signs the contract and defend the value
selected in claims proceedings. If the builder receives test
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statements, etc. after the contract is signed, he will be
in an excellent position to institute claims because no one
has enough experience to say what reasonable requirements are
in this case.
Another problem is the requirement to pass the lead ship
builders processes and procedures to other yards. This may
be difficult and expensive to secure from the lead yard.
Even if he wants to pass them, it will require a major effort
to define and modify what they actually are since they are a
part of his environment.
Using the previously mentioned criteria and considering
the aforementioned problems determine which proposal is more
advantageous to the Navy and reasons thereof.
F. THE HARBRIDGE HOUSE PROPOSAL
The results of the design effort performed by the ship
system design contractor will be expressed in the form of
drawings, specifications, and studies. The specifications
will be similar in content to those used in traditional
contract bid packages; however, they will contain more func-
tional requirements than was the previous practice and will
generally use detail requirements only where no latitude is
to be allowed the shipbuilder. General Specifications and
certain selected destroyer specifications will be useful to
the ship system design contractor as reference material
which expresses the present policy of the Navy in the
construction of destroyer-type ships. The ship system design
contractor will, using these references, extract the
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functional requirements for shipboard systems and equipment
and will develop, amplify, or revise existing specification
write-ups to emphasize performance-type requirements and min-
imize detailed construction requirements. Design standards
and details, such as the Design Data Sheets presently cited
in specifications, will provide useful expressions of
requirements.
As one of the first tasks in the ship system design
effort, the contractor should prepare a preliminary specifi-
cation for a "destroyer escort." This preliminary specifi-
cation will be for the primary purpose of overall adequacy,
rather than for final details, and should be submitted in
draft form in time for a thorough review of each section by
the responsible Navy codes and revision by the contractor
prior to development of this "destroyer escort" specification
in the Patrol Escort specification. Thus, by the end of
ship system design, the contractor will be able to present
specifications which have been approved in both form and
content. Additionally, the contractor should develop a
complete cross-reference from old to new format so that the
existing specification requirements may be found in the new
specifications during review. Documented justifications for
the inclusion of any new requirements or for the omission of
General Specifications requirements must be maintained.
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Specification development will require a continuing
dialogue between the ship system design contractor and the
cognizant specification authority within the Navy in order to
achieve a product at the end of ship system design which will
express the results of the design development to the mutual
satisfaction of the designer and the responsible NAVSEC codes
.
In some cases, such as combat systems, it may be advantageous
to leave specification development with the NAVSEC codes. The
level of total effort required by the ship system design
contractor and NAVSEC to produce this type of specification
may be double that normally required to produce a destroyer-
type contract specification. The estimated efforts in the
previous paragraph do not include the work which is presently
in progress or under consideration in the Navy's specification
improvement program.
Changes, such as a major reorganization of the specifi-
cation format or major revisions in policies concerning what
is shown on contract drawings, would involve additional
effort by both NAVSEC and the ship system design contractor.
G. DESCRIPTION OF SHIP SYSTEM SPECIFICATION
The ship specification resulting from ship system design
of the Patrol Escort can follow closely the present arrange-
ment of the General Specifications. It is envisioned that
most, if not all, of the present sections of the General
Specifications (as applied to destroyers) will be included.
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Each specification section should contain, as its first
portion, a statement of the overall requirements and objective
to be achieved for the Patrol Escort. Where appropriate,
the general statement shall distinguish firm requirements and
objectives. Stated differently, this first portion may con-
tain the overall objectives, but within these objectives, it
should state minimum satisfactory requirements for the Patrol
Escort.
The second part of each section of the specifications
should contain the detailed requirements which follow from
the minimum general requirements. In those cases in which
equipment selections or subsystem details are invoked by the
government as firm requirements, they shall also be included.
That descriptive and illustrative material which is presently
used to explain the requirements and objectives should be
omitted. Where considered necessary, it may be furnished in
a separate document for the builder's information.
H. STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENTS
The requirements and objectives expressed in the specifi-
cations should be of the performance-type insofar as possible.
It is recognized that statements of what a system should do
(that is, performance) are not always adequate to fully express
the Navy's functional requirements. In a combatant ship
specification, system characteristics are often as important
as system performance, however, weight requirements are also
a critical element in the selection of appropriate shipboard
systems. As another example, shock requirements are not
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directly related to system performance, but they are critical
to continued performance under adverse conditions. General
requirements, such as shock criteria and operation under
conditions of roll or heel, will ordinarily be expressed in
the general requirements section of the specification.
Statements for each subsystem will be necessary only when the
minimum acceptable requirement varies from the general state-
ment. In summary, the specifications must continue to describe
the ship, but particular care should be used in this new
variety to define what it is the shipbuilder must deliver,
rather than how he is to procure or produce it.




The ship specifications used in procuring ship system
design should be of the performance-type except for such
specific ship systems as propulsion, communications command
and control, and so forth, which will be identified by the
government so as to avoid superfluous study in areas in which
decisions have already been made. This identification of





The ship specifications provided to the shipbuilder
for validation will be the output of ship system design. It
is recommended that, except in the areas in which firm system-




This will involve new procedures. Contract design
specifications which are based on marked-up General Specifi-
cations contain too many detailed requirements to be suitable
for the start of ship design validation. However, General
Specifications do represent the compilation of existing Navy
shipbuilding policy and practices, and it will be necessary
to charge the ship system designer (or some other agency)
with the task of extracting subsystem performance requirements
from these specifications.
3. Lead Ships and Initial Follow Ship
The ship specifications used in procuring lead ships
and initial follow ships should have a government-controlled
baseline that is no more detailed than is necessary to express
the requirements. This will allow the shipbuilder reasonable
flexibility as to how the performance is achieved.
4
.
Follow Ships from Other than the Lead Shipyard
The policy used when developing ship specifications
for procuring follow ships from other than the lead shipyard
should be the reverse of that used for lead ships and initial
follow ships; that is, the government-controlled baseline
should be as detailed as is necessary to achieve the




J. THE LINK PROPOSAL
In the PF program there is not time for the ship
acquisition specification to be generated after the completion
of tests on the lead ship. Timing forces the need for a plan
to be developed in context with three basic needs. First, the
initial release (the FSABL portion) must be adequate to
negotiate follow ship contracts with a "not-to-exceed" ceiling
price. Secondly, the follow yards need to know the nature,
content, and schedule for the remaining five increments of
data in order to plan and execute their production efforts.
Lastly, all elements of the ship acquisition specification
must be both accurate and timely.
As an aid in the understanding of this plan, it is useful
to distinguish between some development and production
activities. The Lead Ship Allocated Baseline (LSABL) is a
performance requirement oriented technical data package
intended to serve as the Navy's technical statement of work
to the designated lead shipbuilder. Consider that the Navy
could award a Detail Design contract against the LSABL to
the lead yard calling for delivery of a production oriented
technical data package— the ship acquisition specification
(as a CDRL item) --without awarding a lead ship. Extending
the hypothesis, NAVSEC could then review the delivered data
and declare that ship acquisition specification data as being
adequate for production contracts for follow ships. The lead
yard would be the developer, having reduced performance to a
practical design solution by virtue of his experience alone.
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The foregoing distortion was deliberate to help focus on the
following points:
1. The ship acquisition specification could be generated
independently of the award and construction of the lead ship
or the Land Based Test Sites (LBTS) , or both.
2. The ship acquisition specification could be generated
on a schedule such that every item of technical data was
reviewed and approved by the Navy prior to using that data
for lead ship construction of the LBTS.
3. The Lead Ship and LBTS contracts could specify that
Navy approved ship acquisition specification data (and no
other) must be used as the basis for procurement, fabrication,
assembly, test, check-out, installation, T&E and any other
action requiring technical direction (including unique proc-
esses) to deliver the lead ship and sites under the
contract (s)
.
4. The Navy could monitor the aggregate of construction
activities in three above to help ensure:
a. that the requirement statement was complete for the
purpose intended (i.e. procurement, fabrication, etc.).
b. that the test statement was adequate for accepting or
rejecting material produced in accordance with the
requirement statement.
c. that changes in (a) and (b) or both are reflected in
the data. In this case, actions in (a) and (b) or both
are repeated after the change is made to data and
hardware.
d. that the ship acquisition specification data are
complete and delivered on schedule with unlimited
rights to use the data for competitive production
(procurement) of identical or like items.
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e. that adequate Test Memoranda (or equivalent), T&E plans
and QA plans can be developed independent of the Navy
and operate satisfactorily in practice.
5. The Navy could self-impose the equivalent of the fore-
going on participating commands and activities.
The points established above are the foundation upon
which this plan is based. Clearly, design and construction of
the lead ship must be viewed as a means to an end. The
critical product of this effort is a validated technical
data package suitable to contract for production of follow
ships by follow yards.
With respect to the immediate task of generating FSABL,
as the initial portion of the ship acquisition specification,
it should be re-emphasized that the LSABL and the FSABL
perform two different functions in the PF program. The LSABL
governs development separately, the FSABL is part of that
data intended to govern subsequent production, under new and
different contract terms. It is, therefore, risky to expect
the normal conventional evolution (expansion and refinement)
of the LSABL in the FSABL to make the conversion from devel-
opment requirements to production requirements. Those con-
cerned with the generation of these data will be asked to
consider these related but clearly separate efforts carefully
in light of the markedly different intended use of the
data. Further, T&E, QA, and supporting commands and activities,
will be asked to participate in the design process actively,




In context with the PF Program, the concept of the ship
acquisition specification will be reduced to practice in
accordance with several principals set forth below.
1. The ship acquisition specification will be limited to
a technical description of the ship. Administrative infor-
mation, deliverable data requirements, and the like information
contained in the "Gen Specs" will be omitted. Process data
judged critical to the achievement of a technical requirement
is considered to be technical data and will be included.
2. The ship acquisition specification data will consist
of two primary components of information. These components
are independent of either the level of data indenture or the
relative technical importance of the data. These components
are (1) requirement statements and (2) test statements. To
elaborate, a requirement statement should be taken literally,
that is, to mean any technical requirement from a weld
length— to a power supply surge--to the ship's turning radius.
No distinction should be made between "performance," "design,"
"process," "structural" or any other requirement for purposes
of understanding the component of the ship acquisition
specification data that sets forth the technical requirements
for the ship. Requirement statements will be quantitative
with "GO-NO GO" accept or reject limits.
With regard to test statements, several distinctions
apply.
a. A test statement is intended to prescribe the means
of determining compliance or non-compliance to a requirement
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statement. These "means" range from visual inspection of
painted surfaces to measuring shaft run-out, to ship level-
fuel consumption determinations.
b. A test statement must contain enough information to
enable the shipbuilder to determine at least one way to
satisfy the test statement. However, because the Navy also
determines acceptability, it is helpful to distinguish between
Quality Assurance (QA) and Test and Evaluation (T&E) for
further clarification. Generally, T&E oriented test state-
ments will require the shipbuilder to interpret the test
statement and prepare a Test Memoranda (or equivalent)
.
Further, because more than one procedure can usually be
devised to meet the test statement, Navy concurrence in the
responsiveness and adequacy of the contractor proposed pro-
cedure will be required. Typically, the equivalent of a
Test Memoranda will be specified as a deliverable data item
subject to government acceptance and thereafter substitutes
(operates contractually) for the test statement specified in
the ship acquisition specification. Rarely should it be
necessary for the ship acquisition specification to specify
the sequence in which test statements are to be conducted.
Except when damage to equipment or to personnel relate to
sequence of testing, such matters will be excluded from the




Quality Assurance (less T&E as discussed above) relates
to test statements in a different way. To illustrate one
extreme, consider a foundation drawing showing a plate thick-
ness of two inches, plus or minus one-sixteenth inch. Here
the test statement is the allowable tolerance range already
specified as part of the requirement statement. No further
test statement is needed but more importantly, the range of
options open to the contractor to demonstrate compliance to
such requirements will have already been reduced to a
"standard practice," followed within that yard in all such
cases. These "standard practices" are generally industry
accepted techniques which vary little from yard to yard and
are of such minor concern to the Navy that a compliance
demonstration would reduce to having contracted with a qual-
ified shipbuilder.
In context with the ship acquisition specification, test
statements may fall in a range from specified "T&E" to
"industry practice," which represents the two ends of the test
spectrum. Test statements falling in the middle of the range
will be specified sufficiently to first ensure the govern-
ment's inspector (activity) has enough information to
independently accept or reject without recourse to other
data, and secondly, to support the contractor's preparation
of his quality assurance plan, including inspection
procedures. (Such judgments are best made by SupShip's




a. T&E test statements will be specified in the ship
acquisition specification and may be expected to lead to test
memoranda that are subsequently approved by the Navy. T&E
test statements are also scheduled by a T&E plan that the
Navy approves. Test sequences will not generally be specified
in the ship acquisition specification.
b. Industry practice will not be subject to separate
test statements, nor will statements such as "workmanship
must be first class" be included. Assume a pre-award survey
and subsequent surveillance will be substitute for test
statements.
c. Test statemetns for requirement statements not
covered in (a) or (b) above will be required. These test
statements are QA requirement inputs. Assume that Navy ap-
proval of the shipbuilder's QA Plan and subsequent on site
Navy activity will cover the general case. Given this
assumption, test memoranda will not be generated.
d. Test Memoranda, T&E Plans and QA Plans derive from
the ship acquisition specification but are not part of the
ship acquisition specification. However, close internal
coordination is mandatory to obtain concurrence that require-
ment statements and test statements are adequate prior to
inclusion in the ship acquisition specification.
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3. If a performance oriented requirement statement is
completely controlled by design requirement statements, the
performance oriented requirement statement will generally
be deleted. Judgments in this area must consider the relative
risk (uncertainty) of determining compliance to the design
requirement. When a performance requirement of critical
consequence is under consideration always "back-up" the design
requirement with a performance test statement, but at the
same time, recognize that a modified (simpler and easier)
test can often provide an acceptable confidence level.
4. To obtain ships that are suitable on the operational
inventory, a certain number of tests and selected demon-
strations will be considered vital by the user as a condition
of his acceptance. Theoretically, these capabilities are
inherent in the design; and ships built in accordance with
the design are acceptable without further tests. In practice,
however, few engineers claim to be able to determine that
hardware always equals the data without some reservations.
These situations support the following ground rules:
a. User-oriented tests will be included in the ship
acquisition specification to the extent necessary to ensure
delivery of acceptable ships. These tests are included so
that the Navy may, in the face of a deficiency, decide upon
corrective action without taking delivery of the ship without




b. Other performance tests of critical interest to the
designer may be specified in the ship acquisition specifi-
cation for reasons stated above.
c. Deficiencies will generally be resolved by correcting
the fault in either the Navy's design or the builder's non-
compliance to the design. In other cases, the design and
hardware will be satisfactory with the fault attributable to
the Navy's test statement or the builder's method of demon-
stration. In exceptional cases, the basic performance
requirement (a or b) will be revised. Other outcomes,
including acceptance of the ship with the deficiency are, of
course, possible; along with combination of those noted above
The principle being highlighted here is that the ship
acquisition specification, as a detail design specification
will contain performance requirements—not to prove the
design, not to prove the adequacy of the QA/T&E program, not
as a basis for determining financial responsibility—but
primarily to place delivery of an acceptable ship clearly
within the scope of. the follow ship contract (s).






In shipbuilding a substantial fraction of the total cost
is due to equipment installed on the ship by the builder.
This equipment falls into two general classifications: that
equipment which is furnished by the government for instal-
lation by the builder is called Government Furnished Equipment
(GFE) or Government Furnished Material (GFM) ; that equipment
which is not furnished by the government is procured by the
builder for installation and is referred to as non-GFE or non-
GFM. This case deals with the problems regarding procurement
of this latter type of equipment, non-GFE, for the Patrol
Frigate (PF) acquisition. These problems are complicated by
the production of the follow-ships of the class in a number
of shipyards and the desire to procure the equipment using a
central agency.
OBJECTIVES
The objectives for the student considering this case are:
1. To gain an understanding of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of centralized procurement of weapon system
equipment.
2. To examine approaches which may be made to the central-
ized procurement concept.
3. To apply analysis techniques used in procurement




The procurement plan for the PF is based on a lead ship-
builder and several follow shipbuilders. GFM will be centrally
procured, that is contracted, purchased and distributed by one
agency. The procurement plan for other equipment is the issue
addressed here. Allowing each follow shipbuilder to procure
equipment independently endangers standardization. A cen-
tralized procurement plan wherein the PM office, NAVSEC , the
Lead Yard, some special group formed for the purpose, or a
combination of the above procures all non-GFE items, might
save equipment acquisition and life cycle cost but could
increase the government's liability to claims by follow ship-
builders as well as increase the risk of delay. This increase
in claims liability would be due to the government's assump-
tion of the responsibility for the timely availability of the
proper equipment.
The factors which should be considered in determining
the desirability of central procurement for each item are:
1. Standardization for military necessity.
Standardization of equipments designated for quick turn
around is mandatory. Non-standardization in this case would
violate modern maintenance concepts. Quick replacement and/
or repair as well as a well-organized preventive maintenance
system depend upon a large degree of standardization within
a ship class. Without this standardization ships time on
the line could be drastically reduced by lack of parts or
maintenance requirements beyond planned capability.




The benefits are technical compatability , RMA certi-
fication, training facilities in being, and supply support.
Without standardization these benefits extend only as far
as the lead ship for all follow ships will be different.
3. Material and administration costs.
Central procurement should reduce the cost to the
government of the material purchased simply because of the
lot size involved and the fact that many of the items require
tooling or set-up costs which would only have to be met
once with central procurement. On the other hand, admin-
istration costs would be expected to rise since the
central procurement agency would have to be funded. Testing
alone could amount to a half million dollars.
4. Amount of investment required.
Centralized procurement of an item would essentially
require the obligation of funds to purchase the item for
all 50 ships of the class unless options are used. Some of
this money would have to be advanced to vendors.
5. Risk of supplier failure and program delay.
If an item is to be centrally procured and only one
vendor is to be used, the failure of this vendor to supply
on time could delay the production of the entire class
while a new vendor is found, contracts negotiated, and
production begun on the item again.
6. Government claim liability.
If the government directs centralized procurement of an
item and delivery is delayed because of failure of the item
to be delivered on time and/or in accordance with specifi-
cations, then the government is liable to claims by the
builders as if the item were GFM.
7. Possible new rules on multi-year contracts.
The production of the PF class will extend for several
years and centralized procurement of an item will require
obligation of the government on a multi-year basis. This
could be dis-allowed or regulated by Congress in the future
because of difficulties with Litton on cancellation costs
of LHA.
8. PF procurement plan.
The plan calls for two blocks of ship production over
five fiscal years with three yards being used and deliveries
made at the rate of one per month.
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In general, the advantages of centralized procurement are
higher standardization and lower material and procurement
administration costs. The disadvantages are higher risks of
delay and of claims. These questions shall be discussed in
further detail.
The claims problem can be understood by consideration of
Figure 1. The results of the two main causes of claims,
errors in government specifications and delay of delivery by










(FOLLOW YARD) CLAIM NO CLAIM
Figure 1
The degree of standardization depends both on the degree
of centralization and on the policy of the centralized pro-
curement agency with regard to the number of suppliers. If
six or eight follow yards can buy from a large number of
suppliers, there will be almost no standardization. On the
other hand, if three yards individually purchase from a very
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limited number of suppliers, the standardization may be very
high although less than perfect. Centralized procurement
agencies themselves often develop several suppliers in order
to reduce prices and curtail risk, which in turn reduces
standardization. Therefore, complete standardization is, in
fact, rarely achieved. The standardization question requires
a detailed look at the number of suppliers for each major
item.
The risk versus cost trade-off is fairly obvious. Item
cost is reduced if the fixed cost is allocated over additional
quantities. But the decrease per item drops rapidly as the
number of items increases. As an example, we choose the
Controlable Reversible Pitch Propellor (CRP) for which a cost
of $540,000 has been estimated. Suppose 50% of this amount
is the fixed cost. The cost savings for one supplier of 50
would be $270,000 versus two suppliers or $540,000 versus
three suppliers. This is only four percent of the estimated
$13,500,000 cost of the 50 CRP * s . The trade-off is the
increased risk of .cut-off or delay of the items supplied.
Suppose the risk of any one supplier not meeting his commit-
ment is five percent and the probability of failure is
independent between suppliers. Then the trade-off curve











PROBABILITY OF NO SUPPLY
06
A second example of how the cost trade-off must be made
is shown in Figure 3. This is a table of bids received on the
reduction gear for the propulsion system. A short history of
each of the companies past performance is given in the DATA
section of the case. The decision which must be made is again











The non-GFE equipment to be procured for the PF falls into
two categories: the propulsion system, approximately $6
million per ship; and other non-GFE which totals only $1 mil-
lion per ship. While much of the propulsion equipment is .'
long-lead-time material, most of the latter non-propulsion
equipment is not. The difference in these groups of non-GFE
equipment, particularly with regard to lead-time, allows the
possibility of different treatment of the two groups. The
non-GFE, non-propulsion equipment is listed in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4
Non-GFE Non-PROPULSTION EQUIPMENT





Liquid Oxygen System 22
Windlass & Capstan 45
Boat, Davit, & Winch 38
Hoists 13
Reefer System 20




Vent. Fans & Controls 66
Air Conditioning & Cooling Cont. 34
Heating Equipment 22
$983
Not including auxiliary propulsion boilers, $150,000, diesel
generators, $480,000; furniture, galley equipment, inciner-
ator and sewage facilities or air conditioners, $66,000
because standardization may be automatic for these items.
However, these could add as much as another million dollars.
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Several decisions regarding centralized procurement of
the propulsion system have already been made:
1. The decision for centralized procurement.
2. The decision not to go GFE.
Moreover, it is likely that the propulsion centralized
procurement agency must be Bath Iron Works (BIW) because they
are already in the process of selecting vendors for the Land
Based Test Site (LBTS) and lead ship. Long-lead-time require-
ments dictate that propulsion system orders be placed prior
to award of follow ship contracts. It would be necessary to
duplicate BIW's initial effort if some other company served
as centralized procurement agent for the propulsion system.
In addition the valuable experience gained by BIW in the
design and initial procurement would be lost.
The past decisions and time considerations essentially
dictate that BIW will be the centralized procurement agent
for the propulsion system. The BIW contract requires them to
submit a procurement plan for the propulsion system. This
procurement plan is attached to the case in the DATA section.
The remaining alternatives in the propulsion system pro-
curement deal with how BIW should proceed with the central
procurement. One decision is whether they should actually
buy the equipment for the first follow ships and take title
to the equipment or merely negotiate procurement contracts
with options for each of the follow shipbuilders. The final
decision is exactly how the option should be written and
implemented. The BIW plan includes recommendations for this.
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The major question is whether the option should be placed in
the contract for the lead ship and LBTS or whether a competi-
tion should be held after the LBTS results are known.
For the non-propulsion equipment there are many more
alternatives because time is not as important and no previous
decisions have been made. The major alternatives are:
1. Follow shipbuilders procure individually.
2. Joint venture of all builders in selecting vendors.
Each builder then required to buy from selected vendors.
3. Lead shipbuilder selects vendors and negotiates con-
tracts with option for follow shipbuilders if they
desire. Standardization will not be a factor in
proposal evaluation.
4. Same as 3. except selected vendors and prices are
specified in the RFP and follow shipbuilders are
allowed to specify other vendors if desired. Proposals
would be evaluated for amount of standardization.
5. Same as 3. except follow shipbuilders required to buy
from the selected vendors.
6. Government furnished equipment.
The first and last alternatives are probably not serious
alternatives. Individual procurement for all items would mean
passing up the only chance at standardization for 1/4 to
1/3 of the escort fleet for the next 25 years. There certainly
are many items which can be centrally procured with virtually
no claim liability for the government. At least these should
be centrally procured.
The GFE option also has some serious drawbacks. First
is the increased government liability for claims. This
apparently led to the earlier rejection of GFE for the pro-
pulsion system by higher authorities. Second is the problem
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of finding an adequate procurement organization within the
Navy that will be responsive to the SHAPM. Although we might
explore this alternative further, it does not look promising.
This list of six alternatives is, therefore, narrowed to
four, which can be further narrowed into two major decisons:
1. The make-up of the central procurement agent, whether it
should be the lead shipbuilder, or whether it should be
a joint venture.
The advantage of joint venture is that all builders
participate in the equipment selection, further reducing
the potential for claims against the government on the
basis of late delivery. The disadvantage is the organ-
izational difficulty and, therefore, resistance of the
builders to the method. An attempt might be made to
determine whether a satisfactory organization can be
determined, with the aid of Bath.
2. The degree to which the option should be compulsory or
whether shipbuilders should be allowed to substitute
other vendors. The alternatives here range from no
compulsion, alternative 3, to complete compulsion,
alternative 5. Alternative 4 is a compromise which
makes the shipbuilder justify non-standardization and
allows the SHAPM to penalize bidders who have a high
degree of non-standardization.
Making the option compulsory is undesirable in that it
limits the ability of the builder to respond to local
conditions and increases the potential government claim
liability. The "government specified equipment" has
the same late delivery claim problem as GFE. It should
be used only if reasonable standardization cannot be
ensured by other techniques ; including a standardization
evaluation and/or standardization penalty. This problem
requires further evaluation. The SSN-688 program
attempted a non-compulsory option which failed, appar-
ently because a central procurement agent felt the Navy
had limited its choices.
A decision tree for the centralized procurement problem









































1. Recommend either the option or outright purchase
method or combination for the propulsion equipment. If the
option is chosen, propose wording for the option and deter-
mine whether or not it should be placed in the contract for
the lead ship and LBTS.
2. Recommend a plan for centralized procurement of non-
propulsion equipment.
3. Develop a plan for centralized procurement activities





Enclosure (1) : Performance history for Companies A, B,
and C





Briefly outlined below are comments and findings which
should contribute to an overall preference rating of Companies
A, B, and C.
I. Company A, Lockhaven, California
A. Recent reorganization of Company A has resulted
in the appointment of Mr. P.J. Dolittle as President and
Mr. I.M. Curious as Vice President/Division Manager of the
Lockhaven facility. Both individuals exhibited a rare degree
of administrative capability and demonstrated an awareness of
in-house programs and first hand knowledge of personnel. Each
of the management personnel has exhibited a knowledge of and
responsiveness to PF Program requirements. It was noted that
the Lockhaven facility dedicates approximately 50 percent of
its capacity to commercial work and the other 50 percent to
military oriented efforts in such areas as marine gears,
actuator systems for aircraft and cargo handling systems for
air/ground support. They are currently producing at about
50 percent capacity.
B. The following are brief comments on various
aspects of Company A:
1. Facilities and Equipment appear adequate at
this time to handle initial PF Program requirements, with no
immediate need to increase facilities, equipment, or personnel





It was noted that this company has never had
a strike and that it is in a substantial unemployment area.
3. All internal functions such as purchasing,
financial and manufacturing are autonomous by division.
4. Company A owns 80 - 90 percent of all tooling
and facilities that would be utilized for the PF requirements,
while the balance are Government-Owned Facilities, under
Contract FAC #AF (657 ) -69-C-0490
.
5. An in depth review of Manufacturing/Production
Control/Quality Assurance Programs revealed systems that are
compatible with BIW needs.
6. Configuration Management System, current
Engineering Change Control Procedures and Quality Assurance
Programs were reviewed. Individual discussions with the
various managers involved coupled with the reviews demonstrated
a superior approach to hardware and software requirements.
7. Purchasing, Estimating and Cost Accounting
Systems were reviewed and found adequate.
8. Current organization and proposed program
management plans including the designation of specific
individuals with responsibilities in these areas, evidenced
management and corporation awareness and support.
9. The review of the proposed milestone program
and in-house capabilities gave assurance that Company A, if
selected to supply reduction gears is capable of meeting its
obligation to furnish quality equipment on schedule for LBTS,
lead ship and follow-ship sets.
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10. A separate in-depth financial review by BIW
Management has been accomplished. No major drawbacks were
found after review of Company A.
II. Company B, Pilgrim, Massachusetts
A. This facility operating under the guidance of
Mr. D.S. Bennet, General Manager , who did not participate in
discussions, exhibited an on-going capability for the produc-
tion of marine reduction gearing for both commercial and
military application. It was noted that Company B has been
furnishing ships' propulsion gearing to the U.S. Navy for a
lengthy period, is currently involved in programs such as the
SSN-688 and has furnished gearing for the DLG, DE, LSD, and
AOR. In total, they have furnished ships' propulsion equip-
ment (Steam Turbines and gears) for over 500 vessels in
military, Merchant Marine and commercial service. Normally,
work distribution is approximately one-third (1/3) Government
oriented, one-third (1/3) commercial and the remaining portion
is dedicated to export (foreign needs) . The workload
specified above represents approximately 85 percent of this
department's volume, while 15 percent encompasses industrial,
utility and test gearing for locomotives, traction vehicles,
high performance compressor gearing and hydrofoil type
transmissions
.
B. The following are brief notations on various
aspects of Company Bi
1. This company currently employs 1100 people
and review and discussions of facilities, personnel and
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equipment indicate that it could absorb LBTS, lead ship and
follow-ship requirements with no impact upon present
capabilities
.
The use of Government owned facilities will not
be required in the performance of requirements for the PF
Program.
2. Review of strike history showed a major
strike (16 weeks duration) in 1969, and two smaller strikes in
years previous. Discussion with Management disclosed that they
do not anticipate further labor difficulties.
3. This company is in a substantial Labor
Surplus Area.
4. Company B maintains separate profit centers
by department and/or divisions and although separate balance/
operating statements are maintained they are company
proprietary.
5. Organization and projected program management
approach appeared to be compatible with PF needs. All
management personnel were keyed to and appeared capable of
handling a multi-ship program of large magnitude.
6. Observation and discussion of Engineering/
Manufacturing, Product Control and Quality Assurance Programs
indicated adequacy and good traceability which should result
in reliable end products.




8. A brief review of the purchasing function
showed that some improvement in internal paperwork flow and
turn around times would be beneficial to the PF Program.
9. A degree of internal interface redundancy
exists.
10. During the course of our discussions, BIW
received no evidence of divisional management support. A
program such as the PF demands vigorous, attentive support in
order that program objectives be attained.
C. In summary, it must be stated that any lack of
management participation and direction coupled with high
production-rate observed may result in lack of control on the
part of Navy, prime and subcontractors.
III. Company C, Sunnyside, California
A. The recent merger of the Missile Launching and
Handling Division with the Marine Division has created a large
(2200 employees) organization that demonstrates the capability
of handling a complex multi-ship procurement such as the PF
Program.
B. The following are brief notations on various
aspects of Company C:
1. The Marine Division, under the guidance of
J.T. Door, General Manager and T.E. Edwards, Deputy General
Manager, was selected for and is proceeding with the
manufacture and testing of reduction gearing and associated
equipment for the DD9 6 3 Program.
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2. All management personnel with whom discussions
were held demonstrated an awareness of PF Program requirements
and assimilated these requirements with the on-going DD963
Program.
3. Approximately 85 percent of current workload
is Government oriented. Plant, facilities, personnel and
equipment appeared adequate to handle PF Program requirements
for LBTS and lead ship.
4. Performance capability on follow ship
requirements is questionable.
5. Company C is in a substantial Labor Surplus
Area.
6. Review of strike history reveals that there
has been one strike (three weeks duration) which affected
the Marine Division since 1950.
7. As a public corporation all internal functions
are independent by division within the corporation.
8. Current balance and operating sheets for the
Marine Division were not available. Dun & Bradstreet rating
reveals capitalization in excess of $50 million and a
desirable payment record.
9. Company C indicates that although they
currently have Government owned facilities, they would not
be required nor would addition facilities be contemplated
for the performance of PF Program requirements.
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10. Review of in-house procedures and systems in
areas of Manufacturing, Production Control and Quality Assur-
ance reveal (as a possible carry-over from ML&H) a complex
series of checks and balances which will ultimately insure
reliability and quality of products.
11. Managerial and supervisory talents are
abundant to a point of possible impracticality and possible
excessive cost for the needs of the PF Program.
12. In-depth reviews of Engineering, Procurement,
Reliability, and Quality Control Programs reveal systems are
adequate, if somewhat unwieldy.
13. DCASO has extended their approval of the
ML&H Procurement System through 15 June 1973.
C. In summary, it is Company C's intent to handle
PF Program follow ship requirement by tail-ending them with
DD963 program requirements. It is considered that if DD963
deliveries were extended or PF lead time for follow-ship
requirements shortened, it would create major parallel
production, testing and delivery problems which would







BIW has analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of Central Procurement and
recommends that Central Procurement he utilized for selected PF equipment and
components to reduce the acquisition and life cycle costs offollow ships.
Clearly, there are advantages and disadvantages of Centralized Procurement versus
more traditional procurement practices utilized in the construction of earlier classes of
destroyers. BIW has analyzed the 'two fundamental concepts, i.e., centralized vs. non-
centralized procurement and concluded that the advantages of centralized procurement.
if properly implemented in the PF program outweigh the inherent disadvantages of this
approach.
In arriving at this conclusion. BIW material, technical and contracts personnel first
evaluated noncentrali/ed procurement. They determined the following:
Advantages Noncentralized procurement might reduce delay risk costs by
increasing the supplier base:
Risks would be spread to vendors in direct relationship to the number of
units manufactured and more vendors would undoubtedly share risks.
Several vendors could supply equipment faster than one source - if
necessary..
The PF Program at some premium in cost would support a broader
industrial base - if this were required.
•
- Once into the program, there might be alternative sources already pro-
ducing any given equipment or system - if this is desirable or necessary.
D/sac/rcN/agcf-Standardization would be reduced and material acquisition
costs, procurement administration, engineering support and other non-recurring
costs would be higher for the Navy, shipbuilders and vendors:
Under noncentralized procurement, participating shipyards would at times
procure from common suppliers. Frequently, however, this would not be




Where different vendors were used, material acquisition costs might rise,
but most significantly Navy life cycle costs would increase.
To maintain a degree of standardization, key systems or components
would have to be furnished by the government or specified contractually.
This would in effect place the risk of cost, schedule and performance on
the government with minimum shipbuilder input.
Less standardization of equipment as compared with the results of
centralized procurement produces higher maintenance, repair and training
costs for the Navy over the life of the ship.
There would be costly duplication of effort with respect to purchasing,
expediting, vendor quality assurance, vendor start-up costs, engineering
and production.
Some of the value of data passed from the lead yard to follow shipbuilders
would be mitigated because different vendor sources could be used.
Government approval, inspection time and costs would be increased.
Thus, while there are advantages and disadvantages of noncentralized procurement, it was
concluded that the major advantages were not consistent with the principal "design to a
price" objective of the PF program. On balance, central procurement is more attractive to
the government, participating shipyards and vendors than is noncentralized procurement.
Principal factors which support this conclusion are:
Lower acquisition costs due to procuring in larger quantities
Increased interest because quantity procurements are attractive to industry and
invite competition.
Reduced administrative costs due to the consolidation of several procurement
actions.
Simpler and more effective Navy program management.
More standardization of equipment within class.
Opportunity to make commitments before follow yards are selected.
Central Procurement, the process by which one organization procures material for
multiple users, therefore is the recommended approach. The process includes reviewing
purchase specifications, initiating requests for pricing, negotiations, supplier selection,
order issuance, and purchasing function administration. The Central Procurement Agency
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would procure specified equipment for Test use. Lead Ship, and Follow Ships. Central
Procurement would coordinate the schedule requirements of all participating shipyards,
together with the equitable distribution of all centrally procured material.
A material item which meets any one of the following criteria would be a candidate
for a Centralized Procurement Plan:
High cost
Critical impact on production schedules
Long lead time requiring procurement action prior to designation of Follow
Yards
Technical complexity
Identified by Performance specifications
Requiring interpretive engineering
Requiring engineering interfaces among several suppliers
Subject to potential cost growth through
Design change of development
Schedule change
Requires a high order of standardization.
On the basis of prior Bath experience, it is estimated that 120 line items of equip-
ment would meet these criteria for the PF and become candidates for Central Procure-
ment. The value of these items would represent 50 per cent of the material cost of the
ship. If central procurement is approved by the Government for PF these candidate items
would be intensively reviewed to select specific equipment best suited for central procure-
ment.
BIW has considered many central procurement methods. The BIW alternatives
worthy of consideration are shown below. Alternative 8 is added only as a datum, to
evaluate the other alternatives. Significant features of the alternatives are displayed in
Exhibit 11-20.
Alternative 1: The Government acts as Central Procurement Agency and issues
procured equipment to the participating shipyards asGFE.
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Alternative 2: Shipyard A acts as Central Procurement Agency and actually
takes title to and issues procured equipment to the participating shipyards in
accordance with their contractual production requirements. Follow shipyards
would not include the centrally procured equipment costs in their proposal,
since progress payments would be made to Shipyard A.
Alternative 3: Shipyard A acts as Central Procurement Agency, and negotiates
an option for each participating shipyard to purchase its own requirements in
accordance with negotiated terms. The Government would approve Shipyard
A's central procurement actions. Subsequently each shipyard would administer
its own purchase orders and take title to its own equipment. The Government
would accept follow yard material costs for centrally procured material to the
limit established in Shipyard A's contract. Progress payments would be paid by
the Government to each shipyard.
Alternative 4: A joint venture consisting of the participating shipyards
performs the Central Procurement functions as in Alternatives 2 or 3
Alternative 5: A separate company is subcontracted by the Government to act
as the Central Procurement Agency for the new PF Program.
Alternative 6; The Government or Shipyard A directs the sources of procure-
ment based upon lead ship experience.
Alternative 7: The Government directs the source of procurement based upon
current Government contracts.
Alternative S: Each participating shipyard procures the equipment which he
alone requires. This is the usual noncentralized method of procurement, but is
an alternative, and it is used in subsequent analysis as a datum upon which to
evaluate other alternatives.
Review of the above alternatives indicates that some could be eliminated from
further detailed analysis for this program. These are:
Alternative I : Government acts as Central Procurement Agency. This concept
would involve the Government in the details of the procurement program and
subject the Government to liability for problems of the Government furnished
material. All procurement under this plan would be one step further removed
from the using shipyards than any other alternative with attendant delays
involving interface problems of engineering and schedule.
Alternative 4: A joint Procurement Agency of Participating Shipyards. In the
early phases of the PF Program, the follow shipyards will not be designated so
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their participation would be impossible. This aspect negates any advantage of
joint participation.
Alternatives 6 and 7: Government Directed Source. These options can be
applied by the Government to any material regardless of the nature of the
Procurement method. Therefore, consideration of these options is not required
to analyze the impact of a Central Procurement System.
The remaining Alternatives (2.3,5 and 8) have been compared to determine the most
appropriate procurement method for the PF program. The following features of each
alternative were rated with respect to the normal, noncentralized method (Alternative 8).
Each feature was assigned a percentage weighting factor, as shown in Exhibit 11-21.
The features of each alternative were evaluated with respect to the noncentralized
method of procurement, and assigned a numerical value of 1 through 9 to indicate
beneficial impact. On this scale, numbers less than 5 represent a negative effect, and
numbers greater than 5 indicate a positive or desirable effect. The number 5 is neutral,
indicating no difference or no impact on the desirability of the subject alternative
compared to noncentralized procurement. To each of the assigned numbers the listed
weighting factor was then applied. The sum of these weighted values represents the
relative merit of the subject alternative with respect to the noncentralized method which
is datum.
Experienced personnel of the BIW Material Division performed the evaluation
described above. The results of this evaluation are displayed in Exhibit 11-22 from the
standpoint of the Government, a lead yard and a follow yard.
On the basis of the foregoing, central procurement alternatives appear more
desirable from the point of view of the Government than they do to shipyards. This is
due to the complexities and the risks involved in a shipyard operating a Central Procure-
ment Agency. The Government however, will have only one procurement agent to
manage and control instead of one for each shipyard.
The following specific conclusions can be drawn for each of the alternative procure-
ment approaches examined:
Alternative 2: Shipyard A acts as central procurement agency and takes title to
material: this alternative
Provides excellent benefits to the Government by reducing costs and
simplifying Navy Program Management. This alternative poses some risks
to the Government, however, because a single contractor is responsible for
very large committments.
Could be acceptable to the lead yard due to reduction of costs and









Recurring Acquisition Cost - Tends to reduce as quantity increases, but approaches zero cost
change with very large quantity procurements. 25
Standardization- Affects program costs by:
1) increasing the opportunity for quantity procurements
2) reducing the number of procurement actions
3) reducing subsequent logistics support
4) permitting multiple courses where desirable to support production schedules or to
inspire competition
5) simplifying Quality Control
20
Non-Recurring Acquisition Cost- Associated with design of equipment and the tooling for
manufacture. These costs are to be applied to the Lead Shio. 10
Cost Growth - Unplanned increase in costs composed of high rate of escalation, design
change by vendor or customer, schedule changes, and variations in engineering
interpretation.
10
Delay Cost - Cost resulting from the non-performance of vendors. Impacts a Central
Procurement Agency in the form of liability fcr delays incurred by the supported shipyards
as the result of deficiency of the procured material in quality, pe.tormance, or delivery.
10
Cancellation Cost - Additional costs incurred as the result of a reduction in the quantity of
the material contracted. It could result from a major design change of from a reduced
number of ships in the Pi Program.
5
Schedule Control - The ability to ensure the logistics support of ship production, and the
support of program management. It requires interface with shipyards, suppliers, and the PF
Program Office with respect to schedules and reports.
5
Quality Control - The ability to ensure the adherence of procured material to specified
standards. Achieved by systematic inspection and tests of materia], inspection and
evaluation of vendors' facilities, and by the efficient administration of related records.
5
Administrative Cost - The costs of operating and supporting the procurement function.
Includes personnel, facilities and equipment required to perform the'tasks of specification





The incentive for a private enterprise to do business. Of interest as an






have to be high to compensate for the unusually high contractual responsi-
bility with the attendant large financial risk involved in its role of
supporting the follow yards.
Is very attractive to the follow yards because of lower costs and and the
assumption of risk by the lead yard.
Alternative 3: Shipyard A negotiates original contracts, and follow yards pick
up option for their own procurements: This alternative:
Provides benefits to the Government in the form of low costs and
simplified overall program management at the beginning of the procure-
ment. The Government receives full benefits from centralized procure-
ment.
Is desirable to the lead yard because it has complete control over its own
procurement, and realizes the benefits of central procurement. With the
option clause, Shipyard A shares risks with follow yards.
Reduces follow shipyard procurement problems because all activities
associated with initial committments are complete, yet control their
procurements and assume responsibility upon exercise of the procurement
options.
Increases equipment costs due to securing vendor options but reduces
program costs due to reduced risk for Shipyard A.
Alternative 5: A separate company other than a participating shipyard is
designated as central procurement agency, and operates as in Alternative 3:
This alternative;
Provides advantages to the Government in the form of lowered costs and
simplified Navy program control. The interposition of an extra party
between the Government and the participating shipbuilders detract from
the advantages. The Government would not receive the benefits of having
the lead shipbuilder using his Navy funded experience and acquired
knowledge of PF to centrally procure critical equipment.
In conclusion, Bath recommends:
That a form of centralized procurement be used for PF for high value,
complex, or long lead equipment
That the central procurement agency be a participating shipyard.
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Adoption of Alternative 3, which on balance appears to offer the best prospect
of achieving PF objectives. During SSDS, however, a continuing analysis of
Alternatives 2 and 3 with B1W and Navy participation would assure that the
best central procurement method is selected.
That during SSDS a plan for the administration of central procurement be
developed. The plan would be evolved after detailed analysis of the aspects of
cost, risk, and effective management. The plan would provide for the develop-
ment of:
Terms and conditions to apply to subcontracts related to centrally
procured material
An equitable policy governing the allocation of centrally procured
material
An itemized list of material to be centrally procured
A reporting system to provide an effective management tool for control of
the central procurement program
An approved method to share risks.
Based on the analysis done in preparing this proposal, BIVV considers Alternative 3 to
be the most attractive to the Navy and to participating shipyards in the PF program. The
significant points of this alternative are:
Shipyard A would be designated by the Government as the Central Procure-
ment Agency.
Shipyard A would, after receiving approval from the Government, negotiate
subcontracts for the centrally procured items, with an option for the follow
yards to pick up their requirements from the same vendor. Initial production
schedules would be derived by Shipyard A with due consideration of the
production requirements of all participating shipyards.
Follow shipyards would be required by the government to exercise their
options to pick up their part of the original subcontract and from that point
would administer their portion of their own subcontract. They would be
responsible for refining delivery schedules for their portion of the subcontract.
Progress payments would be made by the government to each shipyard as its
performance warranted.
The government would accept material costs for all centrally procured material
to be those quoted by Shipyard A.
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The Alternative 3 method of central procurement will be acceptable to follow yards
because:
They will derive benefits of central procurement in the form of lower admin-
istrative costs and simplified management during the critical phases of the
procurement.
Risks will be equitably shared among all participating shipyards.
B1W as central procurement agent will take advantage of experience gained
during the design phase and lead ship procurement to reduce recurring and
nonrecurring material costs.
The key to success under Alternative 3 is the confidence of the follow yards in the
capability of the lead yard to perform in a satisfactory manner. Follow shipyards should
have a high degree of confidence in B1W and its design subcontractor, because of their
current destroyer expertise and past performance.
2. Application to Propulsion System Procurement
The Propulsion Svstem of PF meets all the criteria for consideration as a candidate
for central procurement. Its unique characteristics emphasize the desirability of
central procurement of the system
.
Bath estimates the cost of a PF Follow Ship Propulsion System at about S6 million.
If not handled properly, the potential impact of delay on follow ships production
schedules is massive, particularly for reduction gears, shafts, and propellers which must be
assembled and installed prior to launch. This, with the impact of complexity, relatively
long lead times, and limited number of qualified suppliers, cause B1W to propose central
procurement of the propulsion system for follow ships. The following discussion is
directed specifically to the propulsion system, but is generally in consonance with the
BIW approach to central procurement recommended in the previous portion of this
Section.
Bath recognizes that early procurement of long lead time items such as propulsion
systems is as essential to follow ships as it is to the test unit and lead ship. Bath also
recognizes that all feasible economies derived during test unit and lead ship experience
must be reflected in the acquisition of follow ship units. The goals of Bath's approach to
follow ship procurement are to:
Provide equipment at the shipyards on or before scheduled dates.
Minimize the cost of material
»
. Minimize risk to the Government and to the shipyards
Minimize Navy administrative costs.
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If authorized by the Government, and after award of an SSDS Contract, BIW will
establish a Central Procurement Planning Organization which will:
Develop a detailed plan for administering the procurement of follow ship
propulsion systems, after thorough analysis of the aspects of cost, risk, and
effective management.
Develop terms and conditions for test unit, lead ship, and follow ship contracts.
Develop a policy governing the equitable allocation of centrally procured
propulsion system components to the participating shipyards.
Develop a reporting system compatible with CDRL requirements which will
permit effective control of suppliers' performance.
The plan and policy developed as above will be implemented during SSDS by BIW
Procurement personnel supporting the design effort and procuring the test unit and lead
shipset. (See Section Ie). These procurement personnel will:
Direct and control all relations between potential suppliers and design
personnel
Develop lists of qualified suppliers
Evaluate and approve, from the standpoint of procurement, developing plans
for the propulsion system through participation in baseline reviews
Develop and later refine test unit, lead yard, and follow yard schedule require-
ments for propulsion system components
Originate Requests for Proposal from all potentially qualified suppliers
Develop negotiating strategy which will include consideration of savings to be
derived from test unit and lead ship experience
After approval of the Government, subcontract for and release for manufacture
specified equipment for propulsion systems
Develop contingency plans for the procurement of equipment from alternate
sources in the event of strike or disaster
Allocate equipment to the participating shipyards after Navy approval.
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The BIW approach to central procurement of follow ship propulsion systems in a
quantity buy will minimize costs, and:
. Permit economical purchase of manufacturing time by reducing surges in
demand caused by uncoordinated add-on procurements. Although some of the
basic research of PF-type propulsion systems has been accomplished in prior
programs, a learning curve will exist reflecting system integration, tooling, and
start-up time. Significant savings can be expected as a result of quantity buys.
Limit the cost of centrally procured service engineering. During negotiations,
methods will be established which will segregate service engineering costs and
avoid their hidden duplication in subsystem and component items.
Reduce the costs of subcontract administration and enhance program control
by passing CDRL requirements on to subcontractors in form and format.
Reduce overall program procurement costs by combining the functions of
several shipyards into one central agency for execution. Experience gained in
test unit/lead ship procurement will be applied to follow ship procurements.
Exhibit 11-23 demonstrates the order of magnitude of savings possible for the
propulsion system. The weighting factors reflect the relative expenditures
required for lead and follow shipyards operating as individual procurement
agencies as compared with a centralized procurement system. The dollar values
shown are order of magnitude estimates for performing the listed functions for
PF for SSDS. Test Unit, Lead Ship, and first block of Follow Ships.
BIW recognizes that the procurement of the follow ship propulsion system involves
risks to the Government and to participating shipyards. These include technical risk,
delay risks, and cost growth risks.
Technical risks include re-engineering, re-testing, re-tooling, and guarantee
engineering. Technical risks are associated with program delays, contract changes, and
retrofit. BIW will reduce these risks by ensuring the intimate participation of industry in
design development. The same personnel buying for the test unit and lead ship will buy
for follow ships under central procurement. Subcontracts will be structured to limit cost
impact to those items affected by actual design change. Advantage will be taken of
tooling and expertise developed during the test unit and lead ship production.
Delay risks result from nonperformance of suppliers in the areas of quality, perfor-
mance, or delivery. In addition to costs resulting directly from defective equipment, each
shipyard is faced with hidden internal costs associated with delays. Based on experience
at BIW, these costs can be substantial. Delays in production cause serious schedule
disruptions, need for creation of work-around plans, transfer of personnel to other work
causing new learning curve and added cost of overtime to regain schedule.
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Delays also affect the Government by jeopardizing the Nation's security by
increased subsistence and other costs of naval personnel who are ineffectively used, and
by the cost of extending the length of the entire program with its attendant administra-
tive costs. Thus, any step that can be taken to avert delays will prove beneficial to all
parties and keep the total program cost to the minimum. B1W will reduce the risks of
delay to the shipyards and to the Government with the following strategy:
Subcontracts for the Propulsion System for the test unit and Lead Ship will be
negotiated as Firm Fixed Price. Fixed Price Incentive Fee subcontracts will be
considered for follow ships. The incentive elements considered for inclusion in
these subcontracts will be: cost, delivery, and reliability. Particular emphasis
will be placed on those components which impact most heavily on ship
production, the reduction gears, shaft, and controllable reversible pitch
propellers.
Subcontracts for propulsion system components will include negotiated
milestones which will involve hardware, spare parts, testing, and Contract Data
Requirements List (CDRL). These milestones will be used by the Central
Procurement Agency to control progress pavrncnts. w hich will be keyed to
performance and results, and not to effort expended.
. . Subcontracts for propulsion system components will be negotiated to pass
Quality Assurance/Control requirements to the subcontractor, and to require
reporting levels of sufficient depth to ensure prompt visibility of any potential
problems to the Central Procurement Agency. Corrective action will be
initiated immediately.
Subcontracts for propulsion system components may include provisions which
,
will permit the use of tooling by alternate manufacturers at no cost in the event
of schedule adherence problems. Lists of potential alternate sources will be
generated during the supplier selection process to provide relief in case of strike
or disaster.
.
•-.. A pool of advance equipment will be produced which will be available as a
cushion or hedge against strikes or other delays. This pool will be created by a
production rate of propulsion system components greater than the initial ships'
production rates.
Bath procurement personnel will survey the facilities of propulsion system
manufacturers before supplier selection to verify qualifications under
MIL-Q-9858A. They will continue to inspect suppliers' facilities after award of
subcontracts to ensure adherence to subcontracts and to obtain early warning
of potential problems.
Cost growth risks are associated with changes in design, schedule change, or






escalation and the impact of change on a manufacturer's methods, tooling, and
production time. BIW will limit the risk of cost growth by the following:
Subcontracts for propulsion system components will have escalation clauses
which bring escalation rates for components closely in line with Bureau of
Labor Statistics escalation indices for steel vessels.
BIW personnel who administer the subcontracts for propulsion system
components will have participated in the design effort and baseline reviews, and
will have procured lead ship and test unit equipment. The expertise gained
thereby will minimize disruption which attends change. The Subcontract
Administrators will be thoroughly familiar with the nature and background of
the components of the system.
3. Budgetary Estimates for First Block of PF Follow Ships
Exhibit 11-24 displays a time-phased estimate of budget requirements for the
procurement of propulsion system major components for the first block of 24 PF
Follow Ships.
The ordering and delivery schedule for the first block of follow ships is based upon
Figure A-3 in the RFP. The following assumptions have been made:
Central Procurement personnel will have participated in the design phase and
will have negotiated prices, terms and the delivery for test unit and lead ship
propulsion systems.
Multiple manufacturers will have been identified to ensure the required rate of
production, except for the gas turbine.
Tooling will require only limited modification from test unit and lead ship
production.
A modern shipyard will require propulsion system components 6 months
following commencement of fabrication.
Bath has determined that, following design and the production of the first unit, a
production lead time of 15 months is required, and that a production rate of one shipset
per month is reasonable at no premium cost. Allowing 16 months for start-up, produc-
tion, and transportation, the first production block for follow ships should be released for
manufacture not later than July l c)75. Release for manufacture should be delayed until
this date to accommodate any change which may be initiated as a result of experience
gained from the test unit or lead ship unit. Exhibit 1 1-25 summarizes the delivery schedule
for propulsion system components for the first block of PF Follow Ships. It is noted that
the production rate of propulsion systems equals the steady state rate of the scheduled
ship production, providing a maximum of two shipsets on hand at each yard at any one
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LEAD SHIP PRODUCTION CONTRACT CASE
A. BRIEF
This is a two part case dealing with the structuring
decisions for the lead ship production contract for the Patrol
Frigate (PF) . This contract, while basically a production
contract, has development characteristics because of the
nature of lead ship production. The use of options and
incentives are considered.
This part of the case deals, essentially, with long-
range planning of the contract structure while the second
part introduces a few of the more complex problems which had
to be dealt with as the time of award of the contract
approached.
It is recommended that students consider Part A of the
case first and without knowledge of Part B. Once they are
satisfied with their analysis of Part A, then the complica-
tions of Part B will present interesting sidelights into
program management.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives for the student considering this case are:
1. To gain an understanding of the criteria on which
contracts are based.
2. To gain an understanding of the interrelations of
multiple-incentive contracts.
3. To examine tradeoffs which must be made among the various
products 1 criteria for a production contract.
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LEAD SHIP PRODUCTION CONTRACT CASE
PART A
A. BACKGROUND
Before discussion of the PF lead ship contract, a brief
review of the overall procurement plan may be useful. Figure
1 shows the major acquisition phases that should be generally
familiar. The Ship System Design (SSD) is being developed by
NAVSEC, with technical assistance from the contractor, and
defined in a series of four technical baselines. As seen in
the PF PROCUREMENT PLAN, Figure 2, award of the lead ship
production contract is made after the completion of the first
three of these baselines. The fourth baseline, the Follow
Ship Allocated Baseline (FSABL) will be established during
production of the lead ship and with the assistance of the
lead ship contractor.
The lead ship contract will then have eight products:
1. The Land Based Test Site (LBTS) - This is a prototype
of the combat system and propulsion system built ashore
to allow verification of proper integration and perform-
ance of these systems in an environment more controlled
and less costly than aboard ship.
2. Tehcnical assistance in the production of the FSABL.
3. Centralized procurement agent for long-lead-time and
other non-GFE items.
4. Production of the data package for follow shipbuilders
(post-FSABL)
.
5. Production of the lead ship.
6. Development of software for the lead ship (QA,
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7. Design studies for proposed changes.
8. Technical advice on follow-ship procurement and
problems
.
For each of these products it is possible to develop
criteria to which it is desired that the contractor perform
other than merely cost under contract. Ideally, we could
specify performance, cost, and schedule for any task and the
contractor would meet all three. When these can't be easily
specified in a contract, or when the contractors' resources
are limited, it is desired that the contractor be responsive
to the government's values on the goals or criteria. This
generally is attempted through the use of incentives and
specifications. For each product, main criteria for contrac-
tor performance have been derived and desired tradeoffs
specified. These criteria and tradeoffs are schematically
represented in Figure 3. An example of the interpretation
for this diagram would be to consider PRODUCT 1, LBTS with
design criteria Design Quality (Q) , Performance of Prototype
(P) and Timeliness (T) . The expression P, Q < T can be read,
"if necessary the contractor should trade time in order to
achieve a good propulsion design and demonstrate performance
on the prototype, rather than meet the original schedule."
The rationale for a tradeoff like this would be that undis-
covered problems in the design of the propulsion for the lead
ship will echo through all 50 ships and cause major slippages
because of the necessity to change long-lead-time items. Also,
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testing is not required for DSARC III (Full-scale production
decision) . Finally, slippage here is less likely to exceed
other slippages. The student should attempt to determine the
rationale for each of the other tradeoffs in order to verify
their validity.
The conclusions which can be made from examining the
tradeoff for each product are that in general the government
should be prepared for:
1. Trading money for quality of the design and data for
the follow ships.
2. If necessary, trade time for quality of the design and
data for the follow ships.
These conclusions are based on the present estimated schedule
and the interrelationship of lead ship and follow-ships
.
These conclusions indicate that alternatives considered for
the lead ship contract should encourage the contractor to
develop a complete, producible design and should contain
incentives (actually penalties) to limit the amount of
transfer of cost and time from the follow ships to the lead
ship.
Based on these conclusions the following three alternatives
for the lead ship production contract have been developed:
1. A cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract with cost
and schedule incentives based on the lead ship itself.
2. A CPIF contract with cost and schedule incentives
based on the lead ship plus an incentive of $.10/$1 below
the target cost of the weighted average of bids from
qualified follow ship builders. Escalation would be allowed.
Target cost would be based on the programs objective for follow
ships cost. This alternative will be called "CPIF + Bid."
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3. A CPIF contract with cost and schedule incentives on
the lead ship plus an option at the builder's discretion for
four ships Firm Fixed Price (FFP) at $45 million minus GFM
and lead^ship builder's savings. The option date would be
six months before letting of follow ship contracts. Escalation
would again be allowed. This alternative will be called
"CPIF + Option." These alternatives are presented as a
decision tree in Figure 4.
There are six basic criteria on which it has been sug-
gested that the lead ship production contract are judged.
These are enumerated now with the three alternatives ranked
for each of them. They are:
1. Contractor motivation to reduce follow ship cost.
In this case CPIF + Option is preferred to CPIF +
Bid which is greatly preferred to CPIF. CPIF + Option
has the strongest dollar reward to the contractor for
low cost design.
2. Early information on likely cost of follow ships.
Again CPIF + Option is preferred to CPIF + Bid
which, is greatly preferred to CPIF. The option price
and contractors reaction will be available at the
contract and option dates.
3. Risk of contractor windfall.
CPIF is greatly preferred to CPIF + Bid which is
preferred to CPIF + Option. CPIF + Option has a great
chance of contractor windfall as does CPIF + Bid to a
lesser degree.
4. Contractor motivation to bring leadship in on target.
For this criteria all alternatives are the same.
Performance with respect to target for the lead ship
should depend on incentives which will be the same
for all alternatives.
5. Government negotiating power for all ships.
CPIF + Option is greatly preferred to CPIF + Bid
which is preferred to CPIF. The CPIF + Option
alternative, if chosen, would give the government a
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6. Simplicity of administration.
Here, CPIF is preferred to CPIF + Option which is
preferred to CPIF + Bid. The CPIF + Bid alternative
could make it difficult to measure bid performance and
may be more subject to disputes concerning charge
orders.
These criteria should be considered in determining the
structure of the lead ship production contract. There are,
of course, many other criteria and reasonings which could
play a part in the final decision.
B. REQUIREMENTS
The student should complete the analysis required and
determine the structure for the lead ship contract. Share




LEAD SHIP PRODUCTION CONTRACT CASE
PART B
A. ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION
During February 1973,. the solicitation for the construction
of the PF lead ship was assembled in preparation for forwarding
to BIW. The earlier proposals for a lead ship incentive, as
explained in Part A of this case had met with the following
fate at the hands of NAVSHIPS 02B:
1. CPIF - Acceptable.
2. CPIF + Bid - The objective was deemed to be satisfac-
tory. However, it appeared to 02B that the method put an
incentive or penalty on a factor over which BIW had little
effective control. There are many reasons (besides efficient
design) which could influence competing shipbuilders proposal.
The market place and its condition at the time proposals are
received could have the most marked effect on follow-ship
prices. A situation could easily result wherein BIW would be
paid a substantial bonus simply because one or more competing
shipbuilders submit "buy-in" or unreasonably low proposals.
The Navy is already on the record as saying that the lead ship
contract with BIW must be cost reimbursement type because
they are not in a position to estimate a firm ship price.
3. CPIF + Option - Not recommended for many of the same
reasons as above. How could a price for an option be
negotiated prior to lead ship award? If this could be done,
then the use of CPIF for lead ship construction should be
questioned. Additionally, the award of a bonus ship to BIW
contradicts the APP which indicated competition on all follow
ships
.
Included in the DATA section of this case are the memoranda
by which the SHAPM, CAPT. Otth, submitted his ideas for the
contract to NAVSHIPS 02 and NAVSHIPS 00J for review and
comment and the resulting replies. These are included as
illustrative examples of the manner in which these matters are
handled within the Navy.
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The failure of this incentive led the Deputy Project
Manager to suggest another method which would tie the results
of the lead ship construction to a low cost for the follow
ships. He suggested the use of a weight or displacement
incentive, reasoning that since a lighter ship usually costs
less, rewarding Bath Iron Works (BIW) for this would result
in saving money on the follow ships acquisition.
It appeared that there were five general areas of possible
weight savi.ngs efforts by the contractor during design. These
were:
1. Major redesign efforts for structural members, shell,
foundations, shafting, rudder, etc., or rearrangement of
machinery or superstructure to reduce foundations or stacks,
etc. Here it would be possible to save $2-3 thousand per
ton; but changes would be required to the contract in areas
that are already thought to be well designed/ in addition to
creating a time problem.
2. Refined design of minor systems and non-structural
members such as scantlings, floors, bulkheads, etc. to
minimize material, welding, and foundations. Savings here
would be on the order of $2-3 thousand per ton.
3. "Minimal requirements" design of the following
subsystems
:
a. Heating, ventilation and air conditioning.
b. Power and lighting distribution, outlets, control
and flexibility.
c. Minimal distribution and control of "plumbing," fuel
systems, compressed air, fire extinguishing, stores
handling systems.
d. Minimal insulation, deck covering, cathodic protection.
e. Minimal noise, shock, EM protection, accessability
,
maintenance equipment handling.
f. Minimal habitability and environmental control.




4. Substitution of lower-weight, but higher cost or
lower durability materials, i.e., insulation, piping, wiring,
paint, steel.
5. Weight savings which reduce producibility , i.e.
elimination of metal by requiring machining, assemblies instead
of castings, crowding equipment together, etc.
In order to assess the possible savings in using an
incentive of this type, the information presented in Figures
5 and 6 was developed by NAVSHIPS 0161.
A second development in the lead ship structure contract
problem was that several modifications made to the SSD con-
tract had included many of the tasks originally listed for
the lead ship production contract. The SSD contract of
approximatley $5 million placed BIW in the role of supporting
a design effort by NAVSEC . The contract was CPIF. Several
modifications were made to this contract, most notably a large
detail design modification and a less expensive propulsion
modification. The detail design modification of the SSD
contract was planned for over $20 million and contained
activities of detail design, ILS, lead yard services to follow
shipbuilders and the validation of the follow ship baseline
data package. Figure 7 shows the results of modifications
on the lead ship production contract.
Finally, at about this time, the question arose in the
project office of what would happen if BIW was awarded
follow ships. If this happened they would have both a CPIF
ship construction contract for the lead ship and an FPIF
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WEIGHT CONTROLLED BY LEAD SHIP BUILDER
Tons Tons Not Tons
Control Under Control Total
Group 1 - Hull structure 1153
(26% controlled)
Under contract, or Guidance 856
Contract Drawings - shell
decks, etc.
Not under guidance - bulk-
heads, etc. 190
All other weight 107
Group 2 - Propulsion (24%) 262
No control - turbines, gear, etc. 199
All other weight 63
Group 3 - Electric Plant (64%) 167
No control generators, swbds , etc. 64
Cable and all other weight 103
Group 4 - Communications (0%) 100 100
Group 5 - Auxiliary Systems (33%) 327
Diagramatic Guidance & Fluids 221
All other systems 106
Group 6 - Outfitting and Furnishing (?) 245
Group 7 - Armament (0%) 95
Group 8 - Load (0%) ' 855
569 2T9~0~ 320T
Not including outfitting, control is 569/2959 = 18%
Including outfitting as controlled, 814/3204 = 25%
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1. What additional ways could BIW l s lead ship activities
reduce costs of the follow-ships not affected by the weight
incentive?
2. Evaluate the use of a weight incentive as a feature
of the lead ship production contract.
3. The detail design modification to the SSD contract
contained an award fee. It was suggested that a weight
incentive might be put in this contract. How could this be
done? Consider: a) timing, b) measurement, c) award structure
4. What are the difficulties which could be encountered
if BIW is awarded follow-ships? How could they be avoided?
Develop a plan for other lead ship contracts conversion to
FPIF.
5. Originally the lead ship contract was to be an FPIF
contract. What are the advantages and disadvantages for the
proposed lead ship contract as represented by Figure 6? The
FPIF would have standard shipbuilding escalation.
C . DATA
Enclosure (1) : PMS 39 9 memorandum to SHIPS 02 and 00
J
Advanced Planning for Lead and Follow Ship Procurement.
Enclosure (2) : SHIPS 02B reply to Enclosure (1)
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subj •• Advanced Planning for Lead and Follow Ship Procure-
ment,
Ref i (a) NAVSHIPSNOTiJ 9110, 012 : WHR:,)ec, ser 219-012 of
14 May 1971
End: (1) Analysis of PP Contract Incentive Alternatives
1. In planning for procurem
ships, Pi'4S 399 has developed
that appear to hold promise
developing the detailed impl
these approaches, your comme
propose to present these app
for approval and to reflect
cosing D3AR3 presentations a
the PP APP and DCP.
ent of the lead and follow
a number of new approaches
for the PF program. Before
ementation procedures for
nts are requested. We would
roaches to SHIPS 09 and 00
them as necessary in forth-
nd subsequent revisions to
2. Briefly, the approaches currently favored by PMS 399
are as follows
:
a, PA3L Review . Reference (a) requires that, "for
major SON ship Projects, a final review and evaluation
of the ship contract package shall be conducted by a re-
view team headed by the SHAPM or his designated
representive. The team shall insure that the package
meets all the formally estaolished operational require-
ments and the ship cost baseline, and is suitable for
contracting purposes.... The contract package review
team normally shall consist of representatives of OP&AV,
NAVMAT, MV3HIPS, MVSJSO, SAV0£D, KAVSUP, JJAV^LSX,
NAVAIR, and SUP3HIPS." It is our intent to convene this
team at the Naval Observatory starting upon completion





review in a manner similar to the PF 3SDS source selection
effort completed earlier this year. In accordance with
reference (a), the team will consist of an Operational
Suitability" Group, a Business and Legal Group, ana a Tech-
nical Group. The three Groups will report to the PF PAB.U
Review Council, which will in turn report on the adequacy
of the design and contract package to the CiN.4. It is
proposed that the Council be chaired by CQ^iNAVSHIPS, and
be comprised of senior representatives from the system
commands, PM Id, IfiSURV, and the fleet commands. Tne
SHAPtf would function as executive officer to tne chairman
and will be responsible for the detailed conduct of the
PABL review.
b. Lead Ship Incentive Provisions . We have conduct-
ed various types of performance incentives that may be
applied to the lead ship CPIF construction contract. We
have concluded that an incentive on lead ship delivery
would not De useful because timely lead snip delivery is
not crucial to the program and, if stressed, could detract
(
from other more important efforts under the lead ship
contract. Incentive on performance in tne areas of speed,
displacement, reliability, silencing, or similar hardware-
oriented parameters are also considered to be unwise for
the lead snip contract oecause these items are only part-
ially within contractor control and, in many cases, are in
conflict with the major program goal of low follow ship
cost. Because low follow ship costs is a major program
objective, it is our conclusion that an incentive on
follow ship cost is desirable, and can be developed to the
mutual satisfaction of BIW and the Navy. We have explored
two means of implementing such an incentive in the lead
ship construction contract:
(1) Provide a payoff (or penalty) to BIW in
proportion to the difference between a pre-established
follow ship cost goal, and the average per-ship price of
all competing shipbuilder's proposals to build follow
ships. Or
(2) Include an option in the lead ship con-
struction contract for one follow ship, at a price to be
negotiated prior to lead ship contract award. This option
could be exercised or declined by BIW in PI 75, based on
their cost experience with tne lead snip. If Bath exer-
cised the option, the Navy would agree to award the second
ship to BIW at the option price probably on a FPIF basis,





ships. Should BIW be awarded a contract for additional
follow ships during competition, that contract would live-
ly be combined ith the "option" ship contract. The
advantages and disadvantage of these approaches are cited
in enclosure (1).
c. Follow Ship Incentive . As noted in the PP APP,
it is our intention to attempt to require follow ship
configurations essentially identical to the lead snip. To
achieve this, it will be necessary to require construction
of the follow ships in accordance with detailed plans
developed by the lead yard and provided by the Navy to the
follow yards in accordance with a pre-established
schedule, ilach subsequent data package will be negotiated
with the follow yards and will be contractually implement-
ed as a result of a bilateral supplemental agreement. It
is important that these bilateral change negotiations not
be permitted to consider tne entire follow snip contract
structure and price each time a data package increment is
added. To avoid that possibility, it is currently in-
tended that the follow ship contracts be written such that
the target cost may be adjusted as data increments are
contractually invoked, but that the ceiling price will
remain unchanged.
d. Central Procurement . Because of tne rapid de-
livery rate of tne PP follow ships (4 per year from each of
three yards, delivery at 1 per month intervals), it has
long been tnought that some form of central procurement of
major items could be advantageous, in tnat it would avoid
the problem of having three yards compete witn one for
favorable scheduling from vendors of items common to all
ships, and could eliminate duplication of procurement
effort. In response to the HPP for Ship System Jeslgn,
both BIW and Todd suggested that lead yard subcontracts
for major items should include an option that may De exer-
ised by follow yards. It is currently our plan to require
3IW to procure propulsion system components in this
manner; other major long lead time components (such as the
diesel generators) are also being investigated for pro-
curement in a simmilar way.
e. Joint Ventures (for Short Lead Time Items/
Material, not justifing Central Procurement as defined
above)
. Because of the rapid deliveries of follow ships
and the use of three building yards, it is expected that
component vendors will have considerable difficulty in
responding to the differing but nearly simultaneous





negotiation cycle, and again at delivery. Similarly,
there will be a large amount of duplication of effort
among the three separate purchase activities of the three
follow yards. For these reasons we plan to explore in
some detail the feasibility of requiring the follow yards
to enter into a Joint venture for procurement of com-
ponents and material for follow ships, and for the con-
figuration management (and possibly data management) for
same. Items suitable for procurement by a joint venture
could include cables, piping, pumps, motors, fans, heat
exchangers, and other items that are normally contractor
furnished. Such an arrangement would most certainly assure
a high level of standardization between follow ships,
whould reduce follow yard purchase office costs, would
require vendors to respond to only one customer in lieu
of three, would simplify configuration management, and
hopefully would obviate the otherwise liKely need for Bavy
intervention to resolve conflicts between yards demanding
,
identical delivery dates from the same vendors.
3. All of the above approaches require acceptance within
'KAVSHIP3, NAVMAT, OSD and industry to be sucessful, and to
this end your comments are solicited. tfe are not seeding
innovation for tne sake of innovation, but do think that
at least some variations of the above will be necessary to
meet our very ambitious goal of delivering 12 identical
ships per year for four years, starting in 1976. Any add-
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Memorandum f^^th
19 July 1972
from : SHIPS 02B
to : BIS 399
subj : Advanced Planning for Lead and Follow Ship (PF)
Procurement; Request for Coiaments
1. Paragraph 2(a) is acceptable so long as the "Business
and Legal Group" is intended to include the Contracting
Officer.
2. paragraph 2(b) has a satisfactory objective but both
proposed methods are not recommended. Paragraph 2(o)l
seeics to put an incentive or penalty on a factor over
which Bath Iron tforKS has little effective control.
There are many reasons (besides efficient design) which
could influence competing shipbuilders' proposals. The
market place and its condition at the time proposals are
received could have the most marked effect on fellow-
ship prices. We could easily wind up in a situation
where we would give 3a th Iron tfor^s a substantial bonus
simply because one or more competing shipbuilders submit
"buy-in" or unreasonably low proposals. rfe are already
on record as saying that the lead ship with Bath Iron
Worics must be cost type because we are not in a position
to estimate a firm ship price.
Paragraph 2(b)2 is not recommended for many of the
same reasons as above. How can we negotiate a price for
an option prior to lead ship contract award? If anyone
says we can then we should question tne use of OPIF for
lead ship construction. Furthermore, why are we talking
about a bonus ship to 3a th Iron tforks at the same time
that an APP is going forward indicating competition on
all follow ships.
3. Paragraph 2(c) has been commented on previously.





inflexible ceiling? Wouldn't it change to PFP -wnen the
target price approached or met tne ceiling which it could
easily do considering our normal number of specification
changes?
4. Paragraph 2(d) is the same suggestion as we origin-
ally made in the early planning stages of PF. I consider
it essential during the follow-on construction,
5. Paragraph 2(e) while this idea sounds good it has
generally proved impossible to achieve. The same result
can be achieved through establishment of planning yard
procedures similar to what has been practiced on sub-
marines. This provides for the planning yard ordering
option quantities for follow yard material which follow
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s/N-0104 904.1762 (REV I 1 -«TI
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Memorandum 26 Aus»st x^2
FROM SHIPS OOJ
to : ptfS 399
subj : Advanced Planning for Lead ana Follow Ship (PP)
Procurement; Request for Comments
A judicious balancing of tno Pareto principle with
an innovative application of the Peter principle could
motivate Bath to design the PP within tne given restraints
of the Program's "cost-to-produce" parameters without
sacrificing the anticipated impact of the fall-out
benefits of repeated application of increasingly meaning-
ful exercise of parametric cost estimating techniques
currently under development.
Recommend we wait for the forthcoming DoD handbook
on the special "cost-response" program referred to on





SHIP PROJECT DIRECTIVE CASE
A. BRIEF
This case investigates the role of the Ship Project
Directive (SPD) in the management of a major ship acquisition
project. The major aspects of NAVSHIPS SPD Instruction
(7000. 29B) are reviewed and summarized. Relationships between
the Ship Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM) and the Secondary-
Managers are discussed. Problems encountered with SHAPM
primacy, reporting requirements, cost estimates and financial
reports, funding deficiencies and changes, and timing of
initial SPD preparation are cited. The student is required to
analyze these problems and prepare recommendations for their
correction.
B. OBJECTIVES
During investigation of this case the student should
develop an understanding of:
1. The relationship between the SHAPM and Secondary Managers
2. The SPD System Concept.
3. The SPD format.
4. The SPD implementation process.
5. The chronological development of the SPD.




In its procurement efforts the Navy annually issues
approximately three billion dollars of contracts to private
suppliers. Guiding this purchasing are the many volumes of
ASPR, the Armed Services Procurement Regulations, the efforts
of the support commands, bureaucracies and the entire U.S.
legal structure of laws and lawyers. Conflicts between
supplier and purchaser have resulted despite this apparatus.
In addition, the Navy, more so than other services, procures
approximately one billion dollars worth of material from its
own enginering and production organizations within the
systems commands NAVORD , NAVSHIPS, NAVELEX, NAVSUP , NAVFAC
,
and NAVAIR. The situation is that the project manager must
reach an agreement with the systems command for the procure-
ment of GFM for the project. He wants a firm estimate of the
cost for whatever function is being considered. The systems
command wants to receive funding for developing and procuring
the equipment which meets the required function, such as a
fire control system. Before the first budget is formulated,
the systems command and the project manager have had to agree
that the system will be at least like the existing "Mark 204"
fire control system, or no cost estimate can be given. But
there are always questions about exact configuration and the
integration of this component with the rest of the system.
Therefore, the systems command personnel are not very willing
to set a firm price at which they will perform their portion
of the procurement. Thus, we have almost all the same
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problems as with a procurement from the private sector. What
replaces the ASPR, the procurement agencies and the legal
system for these procurements?
The Ship Project Directive (SPD) System is the means by
which Ship Acquisition Project Managers (SHAPM) authorize
and direct the accomplishment of tasks to be performed in
support of their ship projects. Since its inauguration
5 May 1969 nearly 400 SPD ' s have been signed and issued to
Secondary Managers by SHAPM' s. While still in its infancy
the SPD System is firmly established as an on-going program
and is a valuable tool of the SHAPM, providing him with better
control over his project efforts.
The purpose of the Ship Project Directive System is to
provide the machinery which permits the Ship Acquisition
Project Manager (SHAPM) to assign tasks to a supporting
agency, to give them the funds required to perform the tasks
assigned," to obtain the supporting agency's commitment to
provide the material or services specified, to control project
funds, and to manage his project with improved effectiveness.
D. THE SPD SYSTEM CONCEPT
The concept of the SPD system as described in NAVMAT
Instruction 7000. 14A is as follows:
"The concept of management for ship construction and
conversion is to give the Ship Project Manager responsibility
for managing all aspects of his Ship System as a complete
entity. The Ship Project Manager will have the authority
commensurate with his responsibilities to direct efforts
and execute changes to effect completion of his project
wherever required within the Naval Material Command. In
carrying out his responsibilities he will utilize to the
maximum extent the organizations in the Naval Material
190

Command to effectively use the expertise in specific
functional areas of both administration and technology. In
effect, these organizations, from the viewpoint of a Ship
System, will support the Ship Project Manager in addition
to carrying out their responsibilities for developing and
producing common equipment and services."
The concept envisions the tasking of functional organiza-
tions to satisfy project needs, specifying feedback informa-
tion required, and monitoring their performance, but does not
authorize interference by SHAPM' s in the internal matters of
the supporting organizations.
The SPD itself is the official instrument by which the
direction and authority for accomplishment of the planned
project effort is promulgated by the SHAPM. It authorizes the
Participating Manager (PARM) and/or Action Addressee designated
by the PARM to initiate action to accomplish the tasks
specified in the SPD at a total cost not to exceed the funds
cited therein. It is the means by which the what and when of
specified tasks are conveyed to the action addressees and by
which the administrative funding limitations are established
by the SHAPM.
E. SPD DESCRIPTION '
A sample SPD is presented in enclosure (1) . The Ship
Project Directive consists of a Transmittal Page and three
basic parts. The Transmittal Page identifies the Project
and SPD, lists the current effective pages and their issue
dates, provides a record of all modifications and record
acceptances and authorizing signatures.
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Part I (Management Direction) specifies objectives and
requirements, assign responsibilities, establishes current
project content, configuration and schedules, authorizes use
of resources other than funds, and delineates special reporting
requirements
.
Part II (Funding and Quantity Direction) provides task
description and/or identification of deliverables at the level
funded, funding information, and other applicable accounting
data and quantities, as required, for proper control.
Part III (Delivery Direction) provides configuration iden-
tification and calendar delivery dates for all deliverables
listed (GFE, GFI, Test Support Equipment) under cognizance
of the PARM and/or Action Addressee to which addressed.
The SPD is intended to cover a complete class of ship
construction such as the Patrol Frigate, rather than a fiscal
year's quantity of ships. It is imperative that PARM's be
provided with as complete an understanding of this total
effort as possible, and thus allow maximum planning of resources,
maximum opportunity to capitalize on multi-year options or
multi-year contracts, meaningful reporting, and effective
management by the PARM on a project basis. To accomplish
this goal, the SPD is designed to cover all ships to be built
or converted to one basic set of plans and specifications,
including acquisitions planned in future program years.
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F. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SPD
In accordance with NAVSHIPS instruction 7000. 29B, the
project issues as early as possible an SPD to every system
command and some sub-organizations from which GFM is to be
obtained. One project has issued 169 SPD ' s . No guidance is
provided regarding optional time-phasing for SPD issuance
relative to any key event. SHAPM' s and Secondary Managers
agree that pre-planning represented by issuance of "For
Planning Purposes Only" SPD ' s should begin early. SHAPM's,
for the most part, believe that pre-planning should begin at
the time the Ship Characteristics are approved. Secondary
Managers believe that pre-planning should begin at least 24
months prior to the Ship Project Program Year for advance pro-
curement funding of ordnance equipment. Differences in
procurement lead times account for these latter differences.
After the planned project effort (task) has been detailed
and priced out on a basis acceptable to both the SHAPM and the
PARM the SPD will be prepared to initiate execution of the
agreed upon task. ' As an integral part of the total process,
SHAPMs will be expected to provide PARMs with adequate
information on which the PARMs can base their cost estimates.
Conversely, the PARM will provide the SHAPM with sufficient
information including citing comparative procurement documents




It is imperative to the proper functioning of the system
that the PARM and the action addresses immediately proceed
to initiate procurement and management actions defined in an
SPD which has been signed by the SHAPM, whether or not the
PARM agrees to the terms of the SPD. PARMs who disagree
significantly with the tasks cost or delivery dates specified
in SPDs should not sign the SPD. The PARM v/ill not be held
responsible for accomplishment within time or cost figures
that he has not yet agreed to. However, when the SHAPM and
PARM disagree on points that both parties consider minor, the
PARMs should sign SPDs and record specific points of disagree-
ment. Usually, the PARM has 21 calendar days commencing with
the date of SHAPM signature to accept the SPD or to state in
writing his reasons for rejection. In exceptional circum-
stances, the SHAPM may give the PARM up to an additional 21
calendar days. In the cases of rejection, the SHAPM must
immediately notify the NAV MAT Project Manager (PM) that the
PARM has submitted a written rejection and that the PARM will
confer directly with the PM. If no PM is involved then the
matter will go to COMNAVSHIPS for resolution. The PM/
COMNAVSHIPS must act within 15 days to resolve the problem.
Their decision is final unless within five days the SHAPM or
PARM requests PM/COMNAVSHIPS to refer the issue to CNM.
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It should be noted that PARM's have a right and a
responsibility to question the validity of requirements, to
state conditions which may limit their ability to comply with
an SPD and to propose alternate courses of action to satisfy
valid SHAPM requirements.
PARMs are not inclined to change existing systems and
procedures to accommodate unusual SPD requirements. One
reason for this is the difference in depth of reporting and
reporting frequency requested by different SHAPM s . Reporting
systems are not easy to develop and to change them requires
time and resources. The need for change must be substantiated
and the direction of change must be clear. This is not the
case if inconsistent and incompatible reporting requirements
are placed upon the PARM.
A chronological development of the SPD for the Patrol
Frigate ship acquisition project is presented below. The SPD
development is generally divided into four phases.
The first phase for purposes of our discussion is the
preliminary planning phase. During this phase, the SHAPM
organizes and staffs to develop a project master plan and
begins the actions which will eventually lead to a completed
ship.
The second phase is the SPD negotiating phase. An SPD
is negotiated with NAVSEC during this period to obtain
engineering or design services. Also during this period a
proposed list of government furnished material (GFM) is
prepared by the SHAPM in consultation with the PARMs. An SPD
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is negotiated with each Secondary Manager to obtain the ship
sub-systems under his cognizance. Some ship—subsystems are
required early in the construction period or require a pro-
curement lead time longer than the ship construction period.
For this reason, the SPD ' s for ship-sub-systems must be
negotiated (at least for known long lead time items) in advance
of the program year in which the shipbuilding contract is to
be awarded. In the proper sequence of events approved ship
characteristics should lead to an approved list of GFM. This
list should be used by the SHAPM to generate SPD ' s . From
signed SPD ' s should come a firm Schedule A for the shipbuild-
ing contract. An extract of a Schedule A is presented in
Figure 1.
The third phase is the SPD execution phase. It is during
this phase that the Secondary Manager takes action and reports
progress. The SHAPM monitors progress and costs. Changes
to SPD's are negotiated to reflect reality and to keep the SPD
viable in a dynamic business environment.
The final phase is the retirement of the SPD. This occurs
when all action has been completed and all funds have been
expended or revised to require no further action and the
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The student should analyze the operation of the SPD
system and evaluate the effectiveness of the SPD system in
achieving the results intended. Several problem areas
affecting the operation of the SPD system are presented below.
The student should analyze these problems and develop
recommendations for correction of these deficiencies and
improvement of the SPD system.
Problem 1: SHAPM Primacy
The concept of Project Management has a basic premise,
that is, the Project Managers have complete control over the
acquisition of their systems and their components. Numerous
directives have established this fundamental policy. NAVMAT
and NAVSHIPS Directives on the SPD System further define and
strengthen the primacy of the SHAPM. Yet, there have been
numerous instances where a Secondary Manager challenged the
authority of the SHAPM by:
a. Refusing to provide procurement documents agreed
upon in jointly signed SPDs.
b. Refusing to substantiate to the satisfaction of
the SHAPM, cost estimates provided for the SPD.
c. Refusing to provide meaningful cost information
in a manner required by the SHAPM.
Several factors of the Project Management environment may lead
to these unsatisfactory occurrences. The more significant
casual factors may be the command structure, the SHAPM 1 s
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relative rank, ignorance on the part of the SHAPM and low
directed cost estimates.
Problem 2 : Reporting Requirements
SPD * s are vital to assure that SHAPM requirements,
performance delivery dates and costs are acceptable to both
parties. However, some Secondary Managers object to the
detailed reporting requirements written into the SPD's and
the depth of monitoring planned by some SHAPMs . The SHAPMs
,
on the other hand, believe they have the authority to require
detailed reporting and the responsibility for monitoring the
progress of the Secondary Manager's contribution to the Ship
Acquisition Project. The result of this controversy sometimes
is deadlocked negotiations or a Secondary Manager's refusal
to provide documentation or reports specified in the SPD.
Secondary Managers do not have unlimited personnel
resources. This is especially true for tasks which require
large headquarters efforts which cannot be funded by the SCN
appropriation. Therefore, unless the tasks can be accomplished
through contractor services or unless the Secondary Manager
is customer-funded, more money from the SHAPM will not provide
additional mandays. A frequent example of this is the
placement of excessive reliability, maintainability, and
availability requirements on the PARM by the SHAPM.
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Problem 3 ; Cost Estimates and Financial Reports
While some SHAPM's report a lack of confidence in cost
estimates by Secondary Managers in general, the basis for cost
estimation identifiable to specific historic contractual docu-
ments are readily available for estimates received from some
Secondary Managers. The Project Document Report, issued
monthly by the Naval Material Command Support Activity, lists
contracts issued by these Secondary Managers with status of
commitments and obligations. Previous issues of this report
are readily available. Other Secondary Managers publish the
Program Director's Report (PDR) weekly. This report is
identifiable with items listed in their Chart of Accounts.
The Chart of Accounts combines for each SPD line item all
commitments and obligations involved on a cumulative basis.
These PDR's are forwarded to the SHAPM.
Most of the SHAPM's commenting on this topic consider
the PDR, if used for verification of cost estimation, as being
insufficient for proper verification of costs proposed by
certain Secondary Managers. The reason for this is that there
is no visible track established between costs shown on certain
Charts of Accounts and the basic contract contributing to the
costs depicted on the PDR. Further, it is difficult for the
SHAPM to correlate the percentage of work completed with the
amount of dollars spent. All costs charged to a SHAPM must
be specifically identified to contracts and other financial
documents originated by a Secondary Manager, since headquarters
personnel are chargeable to the O&MN Appropriation, not to
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the SHAPM 1 s SCN and R&D project funds. The SHAPM must have
the assurance that only those charges legitimately chargeable
to his project are, in fact, made. He can do so only by
direct tracking with the specific contractual and financial
documents establishing these charges, and with the specific
bases developed by the Secondary Manager for cost estimating.
Problem 4: Reporting Fund Deficiencies and Changes
The NAVSHIPS SPD Instruciton (7000. 29B) permits the
SHAPM to specify line-item level of cost control for some SPD
items as well as control, at the total directed dollars level.
The estimated cost of any line item marked by an asterisk (*)
in Part II of the SPD may not be exceeded without prior
approval of the SHAPM. This is true even though the total
directed dollar amount may not be exceeded. On other items
the SHAPM must be notified within five working days when the
line item cost estimate has been exceeded.
One Secondary Manager reported that 50 financial
changes occurred within a 30-day period. These resulted from
various causes including inflation, modifications, market
conditions, and quantity changes. A price change of one
equipment may effect SPD's from more than one SHAPM.
Procurements are based upon total equipment requirements, not
on line items within an SPD. Equipment procurements are
spread over time and, therefore, at the time the increase in
cost of one equipment is known other .equipment costs are yet
uncertain. A review of all SPD's that require a particular
item, to determine what other equipment procurements must
201

be considered and a corresponding review of those equipment
procurements to determine if an overrun is likely, becomes a
large clerical effort. Some Secondary Managers complained
that resources are not available to perform this analysis for
each procurement request processed. SHAPM's indicated that
they were not receiving the analysis reports required by the
NAVSHIPS instruction.
Everyone agrees that SHAPM's should be notified as
soon as it appears likely that an overrun will occur. The
foregoing discussion indicates, however, that Secondary
Managers are unable to clerically review and analyze SPD ' s to
report financial status as each procurement is processed.
Until this analysis can be accomplished through ADP processes,
another method of review is required.
Problem 5: When Should SPD Preparation Begin ?
The initial implementation planning for the SPD
System required the SHAPM's and Secondary Managers to complete
SPD negotiations for the Fiscal Year 1970 Program by 1 July
1969 and for prior Fiscal Years 1964-1969 by 1 July 1970.
There was no formal plan at the NAVSHIPS level for accelerated
preparation of subsequent program year SPD ' s to bring about
negotiation of an SPD at a point two years before the
commencement of the program year. In August 197 0, few SPD's
had been received by Secondary Managers for the Fiscal Year
1971 program. The absence of SPD's early in the planning
process means that (1) Secondary Managers are getting
requirements and funds for long lead time items through a
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different system, C2) The SPD is reduced in stature to
a
recording device for previous decisions, and (3)
duplicate
work is required to keep the two systems synchronized.
The
SPD System cannot reach its full potential until it
becomes
the singular document for placing requirements on the
Secondary Manager and the Secondary Manager's key source
document for planning and procuring.
Under ideal conditions a list of proposed government
furnished material (GFM) should be prepared early in the
project planning phase. Once approved, this list should be
the basis for preparing an SPD for each of the Secondary
Managers. The SPD should form the basis for RFP/IFB and
contracting purposes by the PARMs. Under present SPD proces-
sing conditions the SPD's are not prepared until relatively
late in the project. This means that GFM decisions are being
made outside of the SPD System. Long lead time material
is being budgeted for and financed without a covering SPD.
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SHIP PROJECT DIRECTIVE
(CONTINUATION SHEET)




Background and basis for issue of Ship Project Directive, should include




The Project's policy on changes to GFE should be expressed. In
addition, the PARM's participation in controlling the configuration of
contractor furnished equipment under his technical cognizance should be
spelled out explicitly or by invoking some other document.
(2) Data Management
Define the PARM' s participation in the establishment of data
requirements, and in the acquisition, collection, distribution, filing,
retrieval, and updating of data for the ship class.
(3) Security
Invoke the security guidance covering the particular ship design.
Require the PARM to provide guidance on classification of equip-
ment and subsystems. for which he is responsible.
(4.) Cost and Schedule Management
If any requirements beyond normal Quarterly Production Progress
Conference (QPPC) routine progress reporting and standard controls are to be
employed, these should be spelled out.
(5) Software appraisal
PARM review of TDP's, PMP»s, contract proposals, and other
across-the-board software not tied to particular discipline or subsystems






NAVAL SHIP SYSTEMS COMMAND HEADQUARTERS
SHIP PROJECT DIRECTIVE
(CONTINUATION SHEET)
(6) Delegation of Authority to the PARM by the SHAPM
It may be desirable to require the PARM to act for the SHAPM.
For example, it is possible to delegate to him approval authority for some
technical documentation provided by the shipbuilder. The extent of the
delegation and the means through which it is to be exercised, should be
spelled out here.
(7) Required Membership on Committees, Boards, etc.
In addition to the SHAPM Project Change Control Board, the SHAPM
may establish other committees and teams requiring PARM representation. Any
such committee type actions should be listed here, although details on how
they function may be handled in other portions of the SPD.
b. Ship System Engineering
(1) Whole Ship Studies
The scope of support by the PARMS must be spelled out for each
ship project.
(2) Ship Systems Integration
The contribution of the PARM should be stated, and any constraints
which he must comply with must be invoked. For example, if the integration of
the combat system is to be done in accordance with some plan which sets physical
parameters, casualty philosophy, and so forth, that plan must be invoked.
(3) Ship Systems Safety Engineering
PARM support required to review ship designs for safety aspects
should be defined and applicable sections of MIL-STD-882 should be utilized
as a guide.
(4.) Quality Assurance
The QA requirements should be placed here. The level of
essentiality of the equipment should be invoked here, by reference, if desired.
(5) System Test and Evaluation
Documentation which the PARM is required to provide as an input
to the formal ship test program should be defined. His personnel support in
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(6) Installation and Check-out
The extent of documentation and personnel support to be provided
for installation and check-out of equipment and subsystems should be spelled
out. This is particularly important in the case of complex systems such as
missile systems, where a special team may be put together to check-out a
system comprised of equipment furnished by several Systems Commanders.
(7) Design Work Study in Shipbuilding
Place a requirement on the PARM to establish the manning
requirements for the hardware system or equipment he is responsible for
(or the ship design in the case of NAVSEC) , together with the supporting
documentation showing how the operational and maintenance requirements were
arrived at.
(8) Human Engineering
The extent of human engineering to be carried out should be
described. For example, a system which requires a very rapid response, like
a threat-reactive missile control, may require an end-to-end human engineering
study to insure that human time lag and error do not subvert its intent.
What support is expected of the PARM in such a study should be spelled out.
(9) Risk Management
The SHAPM is required to identify risks and to have a Risk
Management Plan to control them. The actions which he requires of a PARM to
assist in preparation of details and execution of the Risk Management Plan
should be spelled out here. For example, if a special analysis by the PARM
is required to permit a decision as to whether some risk item will be used
or a fall back will be employed, the analysis should be called out here.
(10) Engineering Interface Standards for Shipboard Systems and other
Constraints
The interface requirements and constraints to be invoked for a
system to be installed aboard ship should be defined to the PARM. Existing
Engineering Interface Standards should be invoked here.
c. Equipment Engineering/Production Standardization
(l) Component/Equipment Standardization-state or reference the
standardization objectives of the project; for example, all equipments of all
ships of the class identical; all computers employed to be AN/UYK-7; not over
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Provide guidance to the PARM on the steps to be taken to insure
that out-year ships will have equipment identical with current year ships, and
specifically cover the issues of multi-year equipment procurement, standardization
E&F's, options and advance procurement.
(2) Reliability Engineering
Advise the PARM what his reliability engineering requirements
are and under what conditions they are to be achieved. This will probably
have to be done by invoking the appropriate reliability engineering military
standard, instruction, etc.
(3) Maintainability Engineering
Any special maintainability requirements to be met by the
equipment should be called out here.
The provision of MEAR's for use in the ILS project will be
covered under the heading of Integrated Logistic Support (paragraph d. below).
(4-) Signature Engineering
Any special requirements on equipment silencing, magnetic
signature, or electromagnetic radiation signature should be called out here.
(5) Equipment Safety Engineering
PARM support required to review equipment for safety aspects
should be defined.
(6) Engineering Interface Standards for Equipment and other
Technical Constraints
Place a requirement on the PARM to invoke Engineering Interface
Standards in the procurement specifications for new equipment.
(7) Specific Actions to be taken by the PARM on Contractor Furnished
Equipment Under his Technical Cognizance
In some cases, the shipbuilder is developing equipment which
would normally be provided as GFE. In such cases, assistance should be
obtained from the cognizant NMC PARM to insure that it is properly developed,
and where appropriate, service approved.






NAVAL SHIP SYSTEMS COMMAND HEADQUARTERS
SHIP PROJECT DIRECTIVE
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Documentation and assistance to be provided for installation
and check-out of GFE should be spelled out here.
d. Integrated Logistic Support
PARM support required to formulate the Ship Project Integrated
Logistic Support Plan should be defined. Application of Logistics Support
Analysis techniques (NAVMATINST £000. 20, current version) in hardware
acquisition and the extent of the application of ILS by the PARM should be
described.
e. Special Government Furnished Information (GFl) Requirements
NAVSEC may be required to develop a list of GFI, obtain concurrence
that it is adequate from the cognizant SUPSHIP, schedule it, obtain it, and
deliver it. This covers not only GFI furnished with hardware but other GFI
where required. (Note: Where GFI is to be delivered separately and will




Pertinent dates (Note: GFM dockside or equivalent delivery dates will be







7. Format Guide Statement
In preparing this Part I, the SHAPM has reviewed and considered each area
of the Format Guide for applicability. Therefore, any area not cited above
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TEST AND EVALUATION CASE
A. BRIEF
This case investigates the Operational Test and Evaluation
(OT&E) process in the procurement life cycle of the patrol
frigate. The case studies some of the recent changes in test
and evaluation concepts brought about by the recommendations
of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel and DODI 5000.1. The initial
Patrol Frigate test and evaluation plan is reviewed and then
contrasted with the two alternative plans. Major issues
concerning land based test sites, whole-ship initial
operational test and evaluation, and number of shipyards to
be used are considered. The student is required to develop
his own test and evaluation plan for the patrol frigate using
the proposals included in the case as guidance.
B. OBJECTIVES
During investigation of this case the student will develop
an understanding of:
1. Recent changes in test and evaluation concepts.
2. The distinction between operation and developmental
testing.
3. The relationship between test and evaluation and the
DSARC.
4. Whole-ship initial operational test and evaluation.
5. The concept of land based test sites.
6. The initial patrol frigate test and evaluation plan and
and its alternatives.




Test and Evaluation is an integral and continuing part of
the acquisition cycle. In the process of gaining knowledge
from research through development and production, some test
and evaluation occurs each step of the way. Evaluation of
material prior to approval for service use is a vital function
In the past, it too often has been compromised as attempts
were made to meet fixed deployment dates even though programs
slipped in their earlier stages.
On 1 July 1970 the results of the Blue Ribbon Defense
Panel were published. The report made a clear distinction
between operational test and evaluation (OT&E) and functional,
engineering, or developmental testing (technical) . OT&E
determines to what extent a given system or material can meet
operational requirements. It must provide knowledge as to
what the capabilities and limitations will be when the system
is subjected to the stresses of the environment for which
it was designed, usually combat. Operational testing must
take into account the interface with other systems and
equipment, tactics, techniques, organizational arrangements,
and the human skills and frailties of the eventual users.
Developmental testing is done to determine whether design and
performance contractual specifications are met. The report
concluded that OT&E had not been adequately managed or super-
vised at the OSD level and that a "higher-than-service" level




Mr. Fitzhugh's Blue Ribbon Committee saw great potential
in a program of well-managed OT&E. They also recognized
prototyping and preproduction operational testing as more
reliable than weapons systems analysis in the form of reams
of paper.
Secretary Packard issued Dep. Sec. Def. memos pertinent
to OT&E in February, April, and August of 1971. The first
directed that each of the Services establish an agency which
is separate and distinct from the developing command, and
which reports the results of its test and evaluation efforts
directly to the Chief of the Service. In addition the memo
advised the establishment of a Deputy Director for Test and
Evaluation within DDR&E. The April memo presented the
requirements for the flow of T&E information in terms of
program milestones. The August memo to the Service secretaries
re-emphasized that operational test and evaluation will be
accomplished prior to the decision to go into full production.
The memo also stated "this initial operational test and
evaluation will be accomplished with operational personnel in
as realistic an operating environment as possible and where
practical, will use pilot or early production items."
On 13 July 1971 DOD Directive 5000.1 was published. This
directive further clarified the program decision-making process
and emphasized that anyone involved with RDT&E must acquire
and understanding of DSARC concepts. The T&E effort was
discussed as follows: "Test and Evaluation shall commence
as early as possible. A determination of operational
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suitability, including logistic support requirements, will be
made prior to large-scale production commitments, making use
of the most realistic test environment possible and the best
representation of the future operational system available.
The results of this operational testing will be evaluated and
presented to the DSARC at the time of the production decision."
In response to DOD Directive 5000.1 the Secretary of the
Navy issued SECNAVINST 5000.1 for implementing the new
provisions. Due to the wide variety of naval weapons, the
Instruction allows varying approaches to the conduct of test
and evaluation. However, such effort shall be tailored to the
needs and characteristics of each individual acquisition with
prime consideration being given to adequate operationally
oriented testing. Normally, the following general sequence
of events should prevail: 1) laboratory/contractor preliminary
test and evaluation of breadboard demonstration hardware dur-
ing the conceptual effort, 2) contractor/development activity
test and evaluation of subsystems and/or full-scale prototype
during full scale development, 3) technical test and evaluation
conducted by the contractor with Navy participation during
pre-production/production, 4) initial operational test and
evaluation (IOT&E) by or with the active participation of
Navy operational forces prior to the major production decision,
5) Navy OT&E prior to approval for service use and inventory
acceptance.
Although this approach to test and evaluation appears
conceptually good, production of a system might have to be
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delayed one to two years to allow completion of the opera-
tional testing. In the Patrol Frigate (PF) program the delay
to the program of waiting until the lead ship was built and
operationally tested to start construciton of the follow on
ships was initially estimated to be about 15 months. The
urgency of the PF acquisition is the result of well established
block obsolescence of our WWII vintage surface combatants and
the increasingly complex and capable threat, both contemporary
and projected. According to OP-03D, the PF acquisition
schedule recognizes this urgency but does not over-react to
it even though projected ship retirements will drive force
levels below the "reasonably attainable" levels in the JSOP
.
Delays of this duration would drive this already undesirable,
but acceptable, dip in force levels further toward an unac-
ceptable force level shortfall. Can delays of this magnitude
and other resulting consequences be accepted in a major systems
acquisition? The Patrol Frigate program seems to be the first
test case in this area.
D. THE INITIAL PATROL FRIGATE TEST AND EVALUATION PLAN
Supplementing and anticipating the lead ship construction,
two individual, full-scale land-based test sites (LBTS) would
be erected for the propulsion and combat systems respectively.
In addition to validating the ship engineering aspects of
installation and integration of the critical Patrol Frigate
systems, the two land-based test sites would provide the
facilities to assist in the configuration management of the
222

Patrol Frigate propulsion and combat prototype systems.
In concept throughout the life of the PF program, these sites
would be used to evaluate change proposals prior to appli-
cation to the ships. The sites would be controlled to insure
that the LBTSs are a realistic prototype of the PF combat
and propulsion system. After the initial validation of system
integration, the two land-based test sites would also be used
to validate operation, maintenance and support concepts
proposed for the PF.
The central relationship of these test sites to the ship
acquisition schedule is presented in Figure 1. Land-based
testing is to be used in concert with IOT&E plans for individ-
ual equipments not now in inventory. This should allow
achievement of the requisite level of confidence in ship and
equipment engineering before a commitment is made to produce
either in quantity. The land-based testing and equipment
IOT&E schedules provide for proofing of key systems beginning
two years before completion of the lead ship. This coincides
with the planned award date for follow-ship construction
contracts, shown by the vertical time line.
According to Capt. Otth, the PF SHAPM, to further build
confidence in the validity of the PF design for the follow
ships, the start of follow-ship construction is contiguous
with completion of lead-ship fabrication. Thus the detail
design would be 42 months mature and validated by the start
















































































The PF SHAPM has identified the integration of the combat
system as a critical task in the Patrol Frigate development
effort. Because of its critical nature the integration effort
will be decoupled from the time critical events of the ship-
yard and conducted at Land-Based Test Sites. This approach
should allow sufficient management and engineering attention
to be focused on the task to establish the validity of the
combat system design before the PF shipbuilding phase.
The Patrol Frigate combat system Land-Based Test Site
should be a genuine prototype of the PF combat system. Its
creation early in the PF development process should provide
the opportunity and the mechanism to validate and document
not only the combat system engineering process but also the
installation, test and checkout, and operation and maintenance
procedures prior to the delivery of the first PF
.
In order to satisfy these objectives the PF SHAPM is
planning to aggregate at the site three essential functions:
1. A functional Checkout Facility to validate the system
engineering and electrical compatibility of the equipment.
2. A Computer Program Checkout Facility to debug the
combat system computer programs.
3. A Physical Mockup to validate the design and to be
the ultimate recipient of the results of the above efforts.
The Physical Mockup will be the combat system prototype.
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Throughtout the life of the PF Program the LBTSs should
be used as an integral part of the PF configuration management
program. The SHAPM should require that all change proposals
be evaluated at the appropriate LBTS before they are considered
by his change control board. Once engineering solutions have
been validated at the LBTS the configurations will be frozen
and controlled.
The design and development of the site should commence
in late calendar year 1972 concurrent with the beginning PF
Detail Design. The site should be fully operational in mid-
1974. The availability of the site and its ability to generate
data which can provide an initial assessment of the PF's
operational capabilities is central to the establishment of
the February 1975 date as the target for PF DSARC III. The
site is designed to support the PF development through the
life of the PF Project, by providing a land based testing
source for installation, test, and operational experience
before delivery for the first PF (6/77)
.
Because the LBTSs are designed to be replicas of the
ultimate PF systems they offer the means to develop, document
and validate critical portions of the Total Ship Test Plan
(TSTP) , before the test procedures are required for use on
the lead and follow ships. The PF TSTP will be provided to
the lead and follow shipbuilders for execution to ensure the
PF is constructed in accordance with the Navy's intent.
However, the PF TSTP will cover all ship systems. The
opportunity afforded by the LBTS should allow the combat and
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propulsion system test procedures to be developed with
minimum redundancy before use on the lead ship. Before
implementation on the follow ship the entire TSTP will be
validated through analysis of lead ship testing in order to
ensure a least-redundant TSTP.
Patrol Frigate compliance with DODIR 5000.1 is based on a
four step approach to providing a capable fleet unit:
1. Selected equipment is service approved.
2. Equipment is integrated into ship systems,
3. Ship systems are installed in the hull.
4. Ship is operated at sea.
The first two steps are to be accomplished in parallel prior
to DSARC III and should provide sufficient data to allow a
reasoned decision relative to the PF follow-ship program.
The problem that the PF SHAPM anticipates is one of
structuring and communicating the sense of the data once it
is assembled. Thus he has undertaken to work with Applied
Physics Laboratory to develop a systematic approach to
integrating the data available from the various Navy develop-
ment projects as well as data available from the PF Land
Based Test Site. The objective is to identify measurable
engineering parameters which are necessary to the establishment
of the PF performance characteristics, then to match these
parameters against testing opportunities to insure that all
available data is considered at DSARC III and to minimize
redundant testing for the PF. Additionally, this effort
should allow the PF Land Based Test Site program to complement
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the at-sea testing of individual equipments and to identify
at-sea requirements that could be satisfied by other existing
development programs. However, this approach does not obviate
the need for an at-sea evaluation of the PF . The approach
allows for a DSARC III decision on the basis of the initial
assessment of the PF's operational capabilities before at-sea
trials and will identify areas where rigorous at-sea
evaluation is required.
E. ALTERNATIVE TEST PLANS
According to the initial PF test plan it is apparent that
the IOT&E would be completed and the results available only
after all contracts are finalized and fabrication has begun
on about half of the 50 ships in the contract. It is important
to note that when construction begins simultaneously at the
three shipyards, the results of IOT&E on the lead ship as a
unit are not available and would not become available for two
years. Should the members of the DSARC consider themselves
obligated to be responsive and letter strict to the require-
ments of DODINST 5000.1 and the desires expressed by Congress
in Public Law 92-156 Section 506, covering their desire for
appropriate operational test reports, the initial PF test plan
would be unacceptable. However, if whole ship IOT&E is to
be completed and results published and analyzed before the
initial production decision the delay in delivery of each ship
could be as much as three and a half years. According to the
CNO, the requirements of the Navy make this unacceptable. A
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middle ground introducing considerably less delay might be
more appropriate. In other weapon system acquisition
programs, RDT&E has agreed that continuation of production at
one source before the major production decision is an appro-
priate measure to reduce program costs and additionally
provide units on which to conduct further OT&E. This precedent
indicates the OSD criticism would be directed only toward the
beginning of production at the second and third shipyard in
advance of the results of IOT&E from the lead ship.
In an effort to provide additional alternatives, more
convincing to OSD that the Navy is inserting appropriate OT&E
into the procurement of ships, COMOPTEVFOR proposed a new
alternative which delays production in the second and third
shipyard until IOT&E on lead ship is completed. However,
production in the initial shipyard would continue. This
alternative results in up to 24 months delay for the ships
being produced in the second and third ship yard (see Figure
2) . A second alternative was suggested as an effort toward
reducing delivery delay to the minimum. This alternative
delays the completion of the entire 50 ship program by nine
months or less as compared with the present test plan (see
Figure 3) . This second new alternative is in consonance with
the first new alternative until DSARC III and the completion
of IOT&E on the lead ship. At that time, however, four ad-
ditional shipyards would be contracted for construction vice
two. The addition of two shipyards is made possible by
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turbine) before completion of IOT&E of the ship and DSARC III.
Since these subsystems are apparently low risk items, RDT&E
would assist the Navy in making such arrangements. Another
consideration favorable to the alternative is the possibility
of using naval shipyards in the construction of naval ships.
If only these additional shipyards were available, then the
delay would be something between nine and 24 months.
F. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
Both alternatives propose reorientation of the PF produc-
tion plan in an attempt to inject whole ship IOT&E into the
ship acquisition program. The impact of such an action on the
other objectives of the PF program, notably rapid acquisition
and minimum cost, is discussed below.
The initial Navy proposed acquisition schedule was
structured to reduce total program costs by taking advantage
of the significant economies of scale and series production
that result from learning curve experience in each of the
three production yards now proposed and multi-year procurement
of components at a new rate judged to be within the production
capacity of vendors. According to OP-0-3D new alternative II
would be particularly disruptive of this balance as each of the
four follow ship production yards would just reach the peak
of the learning curve when production stopped. In addition,
delivery of ships in excess of one per month could create
problems in vendor representative availability, crew avail-
ability and training peaks, and time on ranges for SQT,
shakedown training, and other ship delivery trials. The Navy
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would also lose the opportunity to make changes between the
first and second block ships that is provided for in the DCP
proposed schedule. All of these factors would tend to increase
costs due to escalation in a stretched program. Though not
precisely quantifiable at this time, the DCNO for Surface
Warfare indicated that going to five yards for a relatively
short period of peak production, rather than three yards for a
longer production run could reduce the well-established econ-
omies that result from competition. This lack of competitive
incentive could increase the cost of ships by $1-2 million
each. With respect to ship equipments and components, the
impact of the new alternatives would be to increase costs by
requiring vendors to increase production capacity to meet the
requirements of over one per month ship deliveries or to
produce components essentially as called for in the DCP
proposed schedule and warehouse production items until needed.
The delaying of shipbuilding, in which there is essentially
no technical risk, and warehousing the components which are
most subject to technical risk must also be considered.
G. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. Is whole-ship IOT&E needed in the ship acquisition
process?
2. Are landbased tests a meaningful substitute for
operational testing?
3. What alternatives exist for conducting sufficient
IOT&E on future ship construction to ensure maximum quality
relative to cost, while not unduly delaying fleet introduction




Each student will develop an Operational Test and
Evaluation Plan for the Patrol Frigate. The three test plan
proposals presented in the case may be used for guidance.
The student's position on the issues mentioned in the dis-
cussion questions should be addressed in the plan. The
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